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ABSTRACT
During the 1960's warrants to purchase common shares were 
attached to the debt and equity securities of an increasing number of 
corporations in order to facilitate the sale or exchange of these securi­
ties. These warrants presented a potential problem to investors who 
purchased common shares of the issuing corporations.
The exercise of these warrants could result in the dilution of 
the corporations' book value per share, their earnings per share, and 
the market value of their shares as well as the voting power of the in­
dividual stockholders. In May, 1969 the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (through the issuance of APB Opinion No. 15) adopted 
the treasury stock method for reflecting the potentially dilutive effect 
of warrants on earnings per share.
On a theoretical basis the. treasury stock method has certain 
disadvantages. Although the treasury stock method makes no specific 
assumptions about the rate of return earned on warrant proceeds, the use 
of this method results in an earnings rate on warrant proceeds which is 
less than the earnings-price ratio of the corporation. Such a rate is 
unrealistically low for corporations with high price-earnings ratios and 
perhaps overly optimistic for corporations with low price-earnings ratios. 
In addition, the treasury stock method causes the earnings per share of 
corporations with warrants outstanding to vary inversely with the price 
of the corporations' common stock.
This study evaluates, on a theoretical basis, several methods of 
reflecting the potential dilution of warrants in the earnings-per-share
xiii
computations. The desirability of including the potentially dilutive 
effect of warrants in both primary and fully diluted earnings per share 
is also considered. Guidelines for the evaluation of the various methods 
of reflecting the potential dilution of warrants in the earnings-per- 
share computations are developed through an analysis of: (1) the attri­
butes of earnings per share that investors perceive to be useful in the 
evaluation of common stocks, (2) the characteristics of warrants which 
might affect earnings per share, and (3) the problems encountered by the 
Accounting Principles Board in arriving at an acceptable method for 
handling warrants.
This thesis includes an in-depth study of the accounting, finance, 
and investment literature related to warrants and earnings per share as 
well as an intensive examination of the earnings-per-share files of the 
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants. In addition, an analysis was made of the characteristics of 
warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange between 1950 and 1972.
This study concludes that a minimum of two earnings-per-share 
figures for companies with warrants outstanding should be provided to 
investors. These are: (1) earnings per average common share which ex­
cludes the potentially dilutive effect of warrants and (2) fully diluted 
earnings per share which includes an estimate of the potential dilution 
of earnings per share which might occur through the exercise of warrants.
This study further concludes that the most appropriate method of
reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of warrants in fully diluted
earnings per share is the operating rate of return method. This method 
assumes that the investment of the warrant proceeds will provide a return 




Accountants, aware of the limitations of net income for a single 
period, have been reluctant to include earnings-per-share statistics in 
the financial statements. This apprehension of accountants was expressed 
by Herman Bevis, a member of the Accounting Principles Board, as follows:
The earnings-per-share statistic for the current year or quarter 
is probably the most widely used of all financial statistics. . . .
It is said that some make investment decisions after looking at 
this single earnings-per-share statistic, or at the price-earnings 
ratio based upon it.
This is frightening to those who take great pains to disclose 
important information about elements included and excluded in 
measuring net income for the year . . . .  The alarm derives not 
from the development and use of per-share earnings figures . . . .
The concern, rather, is the serious oversimplification of the 
information as to how it was derived. It is this amplifying 
information which puts it in perspective and which we must con­
stantly remember is an integral part of the story told by earnings 
per share.1
This statement confirms earlier conclusions of the Committee on 
Accounting Procedure that it is ". . . undesirable to give major promi­
nence to a single figure of earnings per share; . . . "^ It is not 
surprising, therefore, that accounting literature, until 1966, contained
^Herman W. Bevis, "Earnings per Share and the Need for Full Dis 
closure," The Journal of Accountancy, CXXI (February, 1966), 52.
2Committee on Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Earnings per Share, Accounting Research 
Bulletin No. 49 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1958), p. 29.
1
2
very little material on earnings per share. Apparently accountants hoped 
that by de-emphasizing earnings per share, investors would also.
But such was not the case. Interest in common stocks and other 
securities increased tremendously during the two decades from 1950 to 
1970. In 1956 there were approximately 8,630,000 stockholders in the 
United States.^ The number had increased to an estimated 31 million by 
1970.^ If the indirect holdings through pension funds, profit-sharing 
funds, variable annuities, and endowment trusts were considered, then an 
estimated 100 million Americans had some stake in the stock market by 
1970.5
During the same period, merger activity increased considerably.
There were 589 reported mergers in 1958. By 1967 the number had in-
£creased to an estimated 1,496. With this increase in mergers, acquisi­
tion-minded companies began to design complex securities to meet their 
needs. These generally took the form of convertible bonds, convertible 
preferred stock, and stock warrants which were usually attached to debt 
or stock issues.
By 1966 two opposing forces related to earnings-per-share statis­
tics existed. On the demand side, many new and unsophisticated inves- 
tors--each with a relatively small investment--had appeared. Concern
^Phillip L. West, "The Reporting of Earnings to Stockholders,"
The Journal of Accountancy, CVII (February, 1959), 27.
^"Change and Turmoil on Wall Street," Time, August 24, 1970,
p . 53.
^Ibid.
£Samuel Richardson Reid, Mergers, Managers, and the Economy (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 15.
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over reporting to these investors was expressed by Phillip L. West, vice 
president of the New York Stock Exchange:
How does this broadening of share ownership affect us? I think
it affects us in an extremely important way. The great mass of new 
investors are not going to be composed of security analysts. They 
are going to have a limited knowledge of a balance sheet and income 
statement. They will want company reports which are relatively easy 
to understand. But more than that, I feel sure that they will 
expect that earnings as reported by the companies are comparable, 
at least in the same industry. If their company earned $2.00 a 
share and another company in the same industry earned $2.50 a share, 
they will consider that this is so.^
On the supply side, complex securities with potential claims on 
the stockholders' equity were becoming more numerous. Financial state­
ments, instead of being easy to understand, were becoming more complex. 
As a result new, unsophisticated stockholders were more likely to take 
refuge in a single earnings-per-share statistic.
A definite problem is that of computing and reporting earnings-
per-share statistics of corporations with complex securities that are
Qpotentially dilutive to the common equity. This problem is acute by 
virtue of the fact that many investors apparently rely heavily on 
earnings-per-share statistics while ignoring other important information 
in the financial statements.
This study is concerned with certain aspects of the problem of 
computing and reporting the earnings per share of corporations which 
have securities outstanding that are potentially dilutive to the common 
equity. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to evaluate, on a
^West, op. cit., 28.
^For a definition of this and other terms related to warrants 
and earnings per share, see Definition of Terms, pp. 20-21.
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theoretical basis, several methods of reflecting in earnings per share 
the potential dilution which might occur through the exercise of 
warrants. The means of accomplishing this objective are discussed in 
the remainder of this chapter.
THE NATURE OF.THE PROBLEM
The Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants has issued two opinions which deal with 
the problem of calculating and reporting the earnings per share of 
corporations that have securities outstanding which are potentially 
dilutive to the common equity. APB Opinion No. 9 was issued in December, 
1966 and subsequently revised by APB Opinion No. 15 in May, 1969. In 
APB Opinion No. 15, the Board required earnings-per-share statistics to 
be included on the face of the income statement so that, hopefully, 
users of the statistics would also evaluate the underlying financial 
data on which the statistics are based. For companies with complex 
capital structures, two earnings-per-share figures, "primary" and "fully 
diluted," are presented. "Primary earnings per share" is designed to 
reflect dilution by assuming the conversion or exercise of those poten­
tially dilutive securities which are the equivalent of common stock. 
"Fully diluted earnings per share" reflects maximum potential dilution of 
current earnings per share on a prospective basis by assuming conversion 
or exercise of all securities having a dilutive effect on current 
earnings.
There are two distinct types of securities which may have a dilu­
tive effect on earnings per share--convertible securities and warrants.
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Both may derive a major portion of their value from their common stock 
characteristics. Because their characteristics as securities in their 
own right differ, convertible securities and warrants do not present the 
same problems in the earnings-per-share computation.
The calculation of the effect of the conversion of convertible
securities on earnings per share presents little difficulty since these
securities are convertible into a specific number of common shares in
accordance with the terms of the issue. In computing the earnings per
share of corporations with outstanding convertible debt, interest net of
tax is added back to net income and the number of shares issuable is
added to the common shares outstanding. For companies with outstanding
convertible preferred stock, the dividends applicable to the stock are
included in earnings and the number of shares issuable is added to the
common shares outstanding. The classification of convertible securities
as common stock equivalents for purposes of computing primary earnings
per share does present a problem. This problem arises because convertible
securities have an investment value which is not related to their common
stock characteristics. The Accounting Principles Board did considerable
research on this problem of classification prior to the release of APB 
9Opinion No. 15. The release of APB Opinion No. 9 and APB Opinion No. 15 
has also stimulated research by others.
^This statement is made on the basis of a review of the earnings- 
per-share files of the Accounting Principles Board.
■^See, for example, Harold Bierman, Jr. and Ernest Liu, "The Com­
putation of Earnings per Share," The Accounting Review, XLIII (January, 
1968), 62-67; Werner G. Frank and Jerry J. Weygandt, "Convertible Debt 
and Earnings per Share: Pragmatism vs. Good Theory," The Accounting
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No classification problem exists in regard to warrants because 
they have no cash yield and therefore no investment value other than that 
related to their common stock characteristics. Warrants are always 
classified as common stock equivalents when their effect on earnings per 
share is dilutive. As a consequence, the potentially dilutive effect of 
warrants on earnings per share is included in both the primary and fully 
diluted computations under the guidelines of APB Opinion No. 15. An in­
vestor, therefore, is denied an estimate of the magnitude of the potential 
dilution of warrants on earnings per share. The question of whether war­
rants should be classified as common stock equivalents for purposes of 
computing primary earnings per share will be considered in this study.
If warrants are assumed to be exercised for purposes of calcu­
lating either primary or fully diluted earnings-per-share, some assump­
tion must be made as to the return which will be earned on the proceeds.
A greater proportion of the Accounting Principles Board's research was 
devoted to the classification problem associated with convertible securi­
ties than was devoted to the earnings-on-proceeds problem of warrants.
In addition, none of the published research on earnings per share deals 
with the problem. Since different assumptions may have materially dif­
ferent effects on earnings per share when the number of warrants outstand­
ing is significant in relation to the number of shares outstanding, this 
study will concentrate on this aspect of the earnings-per-share problem.
Review, XLV (April, 1970), 280-289; Thomas R. Hofstedt and Richard R. 
West, "The APB, Yield Indices, and Predictive Ability," The Accounting 
Review, XLVI (April, 1971), 329-337; and Werner G. Frank and Jerry J. 
Weygandt, "The APB, Yield Indices, and Predictive Ability: A Reply,"
The Accounting Review, XLVI (April, 1971), 338-341.
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PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
The Accounting Principles Board considered four basic methods of 
treating outstanding warrants in the computation of earnings per share 
before it decided on the treasury stock method. These were:
I - equivalent shares considered as outstanding - no credit given 
for earnings on potential proceeds
II - equivalent shares considered as outstanding - credit given for 
earnings on potential proceeds:
(a) - at some earnings rate determined from data independent
of the corporation's own rate of return
(b) - at a rate based on the earnings of the corporation in
relation to the current market price of its common 
stock
III - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option 
reduced to a portion based on the relationship of the 
exercise price of the warrant and the current market price 
of the common stock - also known as the purchase of treasury 
stock method
IV - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option 
reduced to a portion based on the relationship of the market 
price of the warrant and the current market price of the 
common stock - the Graham-Dodd formula.^
In analyzing these methods, the Board apparently did not develop 
a consistent set of criteria. In early drafts prepared in July and 
August, 1968, warrants were not considered common stock equivalents at 
the time of issuance unless the market price of the optioned stock was 
150 percent of the exercise price. If warrants were not classified as 
common stock equivalents at the time of issue, they would not
^Letter from Frank T. Weston, member of the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to 
Philip L. Defliese, Chairman, Subcommittee on Convertible Debt of the 
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, dated January 20, 1969.
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subsequently be so classified until the market price of the stock was 200 
percent of the exercise price. After being designated common stock equiv­
alents, they remained in that classification until the market value of 
the stock obtainable was equal to or less than the exercise price.
During this period the Board felt that the assumption as to the use of 
funds should be consistent with the company's financial policy. In the 
absence of such a policy, the Board preferred: (1) the rate of interest
being paid on outstanding debt, net of tax effect, (2) an assumed invest­
ment in government or similar obligations, net of tax effect, or (3) the 
assumed use of funds to purchase stock of the issuing company at current 
prices.
The major criterion at this stage appeared to be interperiod and 
intercompany comparability of earnings per share because few warrant 
issues would be classified as common stock equivalents under these guide­
lines. At the same time, however, warrants classified as common stock 
equivalents would cause a lack of intercompany comparability because of 
the wide latitude of options permitted the companies on the assumed use 
of proceeds. However, this criticism may not be valid because the pre­
sumption is that management would use the funds in accordance with sound 
financial policies. Nevertheless, showing the maximum dilutive effects 
of warjants did not appear to be a criterion in the early drafts.
Further lack of consistency in evaluation of the methods is evi­
denced by the changes made in subsequent drafts. For example, in the 
November 6, 1968 exposure draft on earnings per share, the treasury stock 
method was rejected as being inappropriate due to ", . . the number of
1 2estimates, restrictions, and other factors involved.,IJ-
In the remaining drafts and the final opinion, the treasury stock 
method was reinstated in a more dilutive form by the elimination of the 
percentage test to determine common stock equivalency. Thus the criteria 
appeared to shift toward showing greater dilution. Intercompany compara­
bility of earnings-per-share figures was also improved through the elimina­
tion of alternate assumptions as to the use of funds. The treasury stock 
method, however, does not offer the same degree of comparability as 
certain other alternate assumptions because earnings per share as computed 
under this procedure will vary inversely with the price of the common 
stock. This specific point is discussed in depth in Chapter 5 of this 
study.
Perhaps one reason for the 'adoption of the treasury stock method 
was that the Securities and Exchange Commission favored it. Andrew Barr, 
in commenting on the November 6, 1968 exposure draft, wrote: "We
believe that the assumed use of funds to purchase treasury stock is an 
appropriate basis and that it will produce the most reliable results in 
many instances.
On the other hand, committees from two of the organizations most 
concerned with earnings per share were opposed to the treasury stock
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings
per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12. (Mimeographed.)
1 2Letter from Andrew Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the 
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, dated January 7, 1969.
10
method. In a letter to J. S. Seidman, a member of the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board, Frank T. Weston, also a member of the Accounting Principles 
Board, demonstrated that the treasury stock method assumes a rate of re­
turn on the proceeds from warrants which is approximately equivalent to 
the reciprocal of the price-earnings ratio. Thus, in 1968, Ford Motor 
Company, with a price-earnings ratio of 65, would have an earnings rate
of 1.5 percent on warrant proceeds. U. S. Steel, with a price-earnings
ratio of 12, would have an earnings rate of 8.5 percent.^ David Norr, 
Chairman of the Financial Accounting Policy Committee of The Financial 
Analysts Federation, stated that this letter " . . .  seemed most impres­
sive in destroying the treasury stock method."!-*
The Corporation Finance Committee of the Investment Bankers 
Association of America commented:
The "treasury stock" method is faulty because:
(a) it assumes an unlikely event (corporations rarely retire 
common stock with warrant proceeds),
(b) it assumes an illegal event (SEC anti-manipulative rules),
(c) it assumes an impractical event (substantial market 
purchases of common stock would increase price), and
(d) it produces a more favorable result than that likely to
occur (most corporations would not immediately earn equal 
return on new equity funds as old).
l^Letter from Frank T. Weston, member of the Subcommittee on Con­
vertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles Board 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to J . S. 
Seidman, member of the Accounting Principles Board of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated March 28, 1969.
l^Letter from David Norr, Chairman of the Financial Accounting 
Policy Committee of The Financial Analysts Federation, to Frank T.
Weston, member of the Accounting Principles Board of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated April 3, 1969.
^Memorandum from the Corporation Finance Committee of the In­
vestment Bankers Association of America to the APB Subcommittee on Con­
vertible Securities of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, dated February 19, 1969.
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The preceding discussion suggests that the formulation of an 
appropriate method of reflecting warrants in the earnings-per-share com­
putation requires a set of criteria for evaluating the various alterna­
tives. These criteria should be derived from the attributes of 
earnings-per-share statistics that investors appear to use in valuing 
common stocks and from the characteristics of warrants which affect the 
earnings-per-share statistics. The purpose of this study is to evaluate, 
on a theoretical basis, several methods of reflecting warrants in the 
earnings-per-share computation. The desirability of including the poten­
tially dilutive effect of warrants in both primary and fully diluted 
earnings per share will also be considered. This evaluation will be 
based on guidelines developed throughout this study. Based on this 
evaluation recommendations will be made for the computation of earnings 
per share of companies with warrants outstanding.
IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY
Warrants were not considered residual securities under APB 
Opinion No. 9. They might, however, be included in pro forma earnings 
per share if their exercise would result in material potential dilution. 
No explanation has been offered in the literature for the Accounting 
Principles Board's failure to designate warrants as residual securities. 
Perhaps the Board felt that the volume of warrants being issued at the 
time the opinion was written was not material to the earnings-per-share
12
problem. During 1966, for example, only 12 companies issued warrants.
At the same time, only 19 warrants were being traded on the American 
Stock Exchange.
Warrants were considered common stock equivalents in APB Opinion
No. 15, which was issued in May, 1969. The decision to include warrants
was probably influenced by their increased usage, especially as a merger
currency and as distributions to stockholders in lieu of dividends. In
181968, 65 companies issued warrants, followed by 123 companies in 1969. 
Warrant trading also increased on the American Stock Exchange to 42 
issues in 1969. There are approximately 62 issues being traded in 1974.
Equally as important as the increased usage of warrants is the 
extent of the potential dilution to the common stockholders. Royer, in 
a study of 167 warrant issues offered between 1950 and 1969, found a 
potential dilution of 10 percent or more in approximately one third of 
the cases.^ He defined dilution for this purpose as the ratio of the 
optioned shares to the sum of shares outstanding and the optioned shares 
on the issue date of the warrants.
Individual cases point out how serious the problem can be. For 
example, as of December 31, 1970, National General Corporation had
■^investment Dealers' Digest, Corporate Financing Directory 
(Section 11) (New York: Investment Dealers' Digest, Inc., 1967), cited
in Pierre Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments," (unpub­
lished Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970), p. 15.
^®Ibid.
^Pierre Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments," 
(unpublished Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970), 
p . 196 .
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warrants outstanding for the purchase of approximately 10,858,000 of its 
shares. Outstanding common shares were only 4,977,000. In August, 1968, 
LTV Aerospace Corporation issued $40 million of subordinated debentures 
with detachable warrants to purchase 1,200,000 shares of its common 
stock. This amounted to approximately 70 percent of the cotnaon shares 
outstanding. The evidence suggests that warrants will become even more 
significant in the earnings-per-share problem as their usage increases.
The Accounting Principles Board in APB Opinion No. 15 adopted 
the treasury stock method of reflecting the use of proceeds that would 
be obtained upon exercise of warrants. A review of the correspondence 
in the Board's earnings-per-share files and of the various drafts of the 
opinion indicates much indecision and controversy over its adoption.
Of the three members of the Accounting Principles Board dis­
senting to the issuance of APB Opinion No. 15 and five members assenting 
with qualifications, six objected to the treasury stock method. The 
extent of the dissents on the Board suggests that additional research is 
needed to determine the effect on earnings per share of various assump­
tions regarding the rate of return earned on the proceeds from the 
exercise of warrants. This is further reinforced by the previously cited 
opposition of committees from the two leading organizations most concerned 
with using earnings per share--The Financial Analysts Federation and the 
Investment Bankers Association of America.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The critical problem that arises from the assumption that warrants 
have been exercised for purposes of computing earnings per share is that
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of attributing earnings to the warrant proceeds. Several alternative 
assumptions as to the use of warrant proceeds, each with a different 
effect on earnings per share, have been cited. A set of criteria for 
evaluating these alternatives is needed in order to determine the most 
appropriate method of reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of war­
rants in earnings per share. This study proposes to derive these guide­
lines from the attributes of earnings per share that investors appear to 
use and from the characteristics of warrants that are important to the 
earnings-per-share computation. A discussion of these two factors 
follows.
Attributes of Earnings per 
Share Used by Investors
A premise of this study is that investors use the trend and the 
variability of the trend in earnings per share as one of the factors in 
determining the price-earnings multiple with which they evaluate common 
stock prices. Ceteris paribus, they place a higher multiple on stocks 
which exhibit a high growth rate and low variability in earnings per 
share. The following example demonstrates this point;
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Average, 1966-1970 $0.45 $0.86
Average price, 1970 $18.75 $14.88
Price-earnings ratios 
On 1970 earnings 




While other factors influence expectations, the wide discrepancy in the 
price-earnings ratios of two companies engaged in similar operations 
must be attributable in part to the trend and variability of their 
earnings per share.
on the trend and variability of earnings per share. Chock Full o'Nuts 
in its 1964 annual report shows earnings per share (as adjusted) for the 
years 1961-1964 as 60 cents, 61 cents, 60 cents, and 62 cents, respec­
tively. But the president, in his letter, added the following postscript:
P.S. I would like to point out that we deferred our costs of 
introducing new products in the years 1961, 2, and 3.
Had we written these expenditures off in the years in which they 
occuried, we would have shown a very good growth pattern--
42c a share for the year ending July 31, 1961
50c a share for the year ending July 31, 1962
67c a share for the year ending July 31, 1963
Management is also aware of this emphasis that investors place
2 0Compiled from Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks: Second 1971
Edition (New York: Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 1971), pp. 291, 803.
16
2 174<: a share for the year ending July 31, 1964 
Bernstein, in commenting on this example, states: "In both instances,
the average earnings per share for the four years are about 60c, t>ut the 
different trends displayed would undoubtedly cause significantly differ- 
ing market evaluation of the company's stock,"
These examples also illustrate the effect of the base year upon 
the earnings trend, particularly when the earnings are highly variable. 
For example, selection of 1966 as the base year for computing the com­
pound annual growth rate of Royal Crown Cola would result in a much 
lower growth rate than if 1967 were selected. Similarly, Chock Full 
o'Nuts' growth rate would be significantly different had the company 
chosen to expense new product costs in the years in which they were 
incurred.
Characteristics of Warrants
Another premise of this study is that warrants are the equivalent 
of common stock from the date they are issued because all of their value 
is derived from their common stock characteristics. This value consists 
of two elements: a tangible value and a premium value. The price of a
warrant will fluctuate between its tangible value as a minimum and the 
price of the related common stock as a maximum. The warrant premium is 
highest when the common stock is selling at or below the exercise price
*^1964 Annual Report: Chock Full o'Nuts Corporation, cited by
Leopold A. Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary Gains and Losses 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1967), p. 49.
2 2 Leopold A. Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary Gains and 
Losses (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1967), p. 49.
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because the market recognizes the leverage potential of the warrant. As 
the price of the common advances, the leverage potential declines be­
cause of the increasing tangible value of the option. As a result, the 
premium declines and the warrant price approaches its tangible value.
The premium is also affected by the expiration date of the warrant. As 
the expiration date approaches, the premium declines and the warrant 
price approaches its tangible value.
Warrants are bought to be traded rather than exercised. Since 
arbitrageurs prevent warrant prices from falling below their tangible 
values, an investor desiring common stock would find it cheaper to buy 
the stock directly. It is the option not to buy common stock which gives 
warrants leverage. As a result, warrants are usually not exercised until 
close to their expiration date.
These characteristics of warrants have two implications for 
earnings-per-share computations involving warrants:
1. Warrants are always common stock equivalents because both 
their tangible value and their premium value are dependent upon the 
underlying common stock price and/or expectations about that price.
2. Since warrants are not bought to be exercised and are usually 
not exercised until shortly before their expiration, the price of the 
warrant or of the common stock bears no relationship, at any given time, 
to the imminence or probability of exercise nor to the ultimate dilution 
in earnings per share.
By their nature, warrants which are exercised always result in 
dilution to existing stockholders in the sense that the holders of war­
rants are issued common stock at less than the current market price.
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This is true because warrants are never exercised unless the market price 
of the stock exceeds the exercise price of the warrant. This type of 
dilution resulting from the difference between the option price and the 
market price on the exercise date is not reflected in the financial 
statements. Such dilution is in the nature of an opportunity cost repre­
senting income foregone by rejecting an alternative. Accountants record 
events resulting from alternatives selected rather than those rejected 
because of the difficulty in accumulating data on what might have been.
The dilution, if any, which will ultimately be reflected in 
earnings per share is caused by an increase in the number of shares 
issued through the exercise of warrants that is proportionately greater 
than the increase in earnings that results from the investment of the 
funds received. Dilution with which the accountant is concerned, there­
fore, is a function of the common shares outstanding, the shares issuable 
upon the exercise of warrants, the earnings on capital provided by the 
existing common stockholders, and the earnings on the proceeds of warrants 
exercised.
METHODOLOGY
Finance, investment, and accounting literature will be surveyed 
to determine how investors use earnings per share and to determine the 
characteristics of warrants which affect the earnings-per-share computa­
tion. In addition, the characteristics of all warrants listed on the 
American Stock Exchange during the period from 1950 to 1972 will be 
analyzed. Based upon these desired information characteristics, guide­
lines for computing earnings per share when warrants are outstanding
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will be developed. These guidelines will be employed in evaluating the 
various earnings-per-share statistics which result from the use of dif­
ferent assumptions in regard to the earnings on warrant proceeds. From 
this evaluation will come recommendations for computing the earnings per 
share of companies with warrants outstanding.
Much of the data for this study will come from current finance 
and accounting journals and books. The Wall Street Journal, The Wall 
Street Journal Index, Moody's Industrial Manual, Standard and Poor's 
Corporate Records. Value Line Investment Survey, and other financial 
services are the data sources for the individual companies being 
analyzed. Data will also be secured from the annual reports of specific 
companies and from Form 10-K Annual Report filings with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. In addition, copies of much of the correspon­
dence in the earnings-per-share files of the Accounting Principles Board 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants are available.
LIMITATIONS
This study does not attempt to answer the normative question, 
"Should investors use earnings per share in evaluating common stocks?"
A fundamental assumption is that investors do use earnings per share in 
evaluating common stocks.
APB Opinion No. 15 is concerned with the effect of all types of 
potentially dilutive securities on earnings per share. This study is 
limited to a consideration of the effects of warrants on the earnings- 
per-share computations. The warrants studied are those listed on the 
American Stock Exchange during the period from 1950 to 1972. This
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limitation is necessary because warrant prices are required in the study. 
No inferences can be made about warrants which are not traded because 
their characteristics may be substantially different from the population 
under study.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
The definitions which follow are of terms associated with war­
rants and earnings per share:
Common stock equivalent. A term used by the Accounting Principles Board 
in APB Opinion No. 15 to designate a security which, because of its 
terms or the circumstances under which it was issued, is in substance 
equivalent to common stock. Warrants are designated common stock 
equivalents under the treasury stock method if the average market 
price of the related common stock exceeds the exercise price.
Dilution (Dilutive). A term used by the Accounting Principles Board in 
APB Opinion No. 15 to indicate a reduction in earnings per share re­
sulting from the assumption that convertible securities have been 
converted or that options and warrants have been exercised or other 
shares have been issued upon the fulfillment of certain conditions.
Under the treasury stock method, warrants are dilutive when the 
average or current market price of the related common stock exceeds 
the exercise price.
Earnings per share. As defined by the Accounting Principles Board in 
APB Opinion No. 15, it is the amount of earnings attributable to each 
share of common stock. It may be used without qualification only when 
no potentially dilutive securities or ■crther agreements-pToviding for 
contingent issuances of common stock are outstanding.
Exercise price. As used in this study, the amount that must be paid for 
a share of common stock upon exercise of a warrant. Depending upon 
the terms of the warrant agreement, the amount may be paid in cash or 
by surrender of other securities at their par value.
Fully diluted earnings per share. As defined by the Accounting Principles 
Board in APB Opinion No. 15, the amount of current earnings per share 
reflecting the maximum dilution that would have resulted from conver­
sions, exercises, and other contingent issuances that individually 
would have decreased earnings per share and in the aggregate would have 
had a dilutive effect.
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Intrinsic value. The present worth of a warrant assuming immediate exer­
cise of the option privilege. It is calculated by subtracting the 
exercise price from the market price of the related stock. The term 
is synonymous with tangible value and theoretical value.
Premium value. The value investors are willing to pay for the leverage 
a warrant offers. It is calculated by subtracting the warrant's tangi­
ble value from its market price. For comparative and analytical 
purposes, the premium is often expressed as a percentage of the market 
price of the optioned stock.
Primary earnings per share. As defined by the Accounting Principles 
Board in APB Opinion No. 15. the amount of earnings attributable to 
each share of common stock, including common stock equivalents.
Security. As defined by the Accounting Principles Board in APB Opinion 
No. 15. the evidence of a debt or ownership or related right. Warrants 
are securities under this definition.
Tangible value. The present worth of a warrant assuming immediate exer­
cise of the option privilege. It is calculated by subtracting the 
exercise price from the market price of the related stock. The term 
is synonymous with intrinsic value and theoretical value.
Theoretical value. The present worth of a warrant assuming immediate 
exercise of the option privilege. It is calculated by subtracting the 
exercise price from the market price of the related stock. The term 
is synonymous with intrinsic value and tangible value.
Treasury stock method. The method designated by the Accounting Principles 
Board in APB Opinion No. 15 for recognizing the use of proceeds that 
would be obtained upon the exercise of options and warrants in computing 
earnings per share. It assumes that the proceeds would be used to 
purchase common stock at average or current market prices.
Warrant. A negotiable security giving the holder the right to purchase 
a designated number of shares of common stock at a definite price 
during a stipulated time period. For purposes of this study, this 
definition excludes employee stock options and warrants to purchase 
securities other than common stock.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter 2 will discuss what use investors make of earnings-per- 
share statistics. Accounting, finance, and investment literature will be 
surveyed in order to determine the attributes of earnings per share that 
investors perceive to be important.
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Chapter 3 will be devoted to an analysis of the characteristics 
of warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange during the period from 
1950 to 1972. The amount of potential dilution and of actual dilution, 
the contractual provisions, the exercise ratio, the life span, the reasons 
for issue, and other characteristics will be discussed.
In Chapter 4 the concepts of residual securities and common 
stock equivalents will be examined. The difficulties encountered by the 
Accounting Principles Board in the promulgation of APB Opinion No. 15 
will be studied through a review of the Board's earnings-per-share files.
A knowledge of these difficulties will be helpful in formulating the 
guidelines for the earnings-per-share computations of companies with 
warrants outstanding.
The guidelines for earnings-per-share calculations involving 
warrants will be developed in Chapter 5. These guidelines will be em­
ployed to evaluate several methods of computing the earnings per share 
of companies with outstanding warrants. Finally, based on this evalua­
tion, a recommended method of computing earnings per share will be 
devcloped.
Chapter 6 summarizes the major points developed throughout this 
study and sets forth the primary conclusions drawn from this research.
Chapter 2
ATTRIBUTES OF EARNINGS PER SHARE USED BY INVESTORS
Since a basic premise of this study is that investors and 
security analysts use earnings per share extensively in common stock 
valuation, a knowledge of how the statistics are used is essential to 
establishing the attributes of earnings per share that are important to 
investors. From these attributes, guidelines for computing the earnings 
per share of companies with warrants outstanding can be formulated.
These objectives can be accomplished through a survey of account­
ing, investment, and finance literature. First, the circumstances sur­
rounding the origin of the basic valuation model predominantly used today 
by practicing analysts--capitalization of earnings--is investigated. The 
failure of accountants to provide adequate income statements and their 
attitude toward earnings-per-share statistics were influences which con­
tributed to the development of this model.
The basic methods of common stock analysis are also examined to 
discover those methods which utilize earnings-per-share data. Next, 
significant research related to common stock valuation is analyzed for 
any implications related to earnings per share. The emphasis of this 
study, however, is on how earnings per share is actually used in valuing 
securities and not on the manner in which it should be used. Finally, 
after determining how earnings per share is used in security analysis, 
the attributes important to investors are formulated.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
Prior to the early 1920's, the purchase and sale of common stocks, 
with few exceptions, was considered to be a speculative activity. The 
few stocks qualifying as investments were those with a long record of 
stable dividends and earnings with average prices close to their par or 
asset values. Such stocks were considered similar to junior grade bonds 
and were evaluated in much the same manner--principally on the basis of 
a balance sheet analysis.
During this period, earnings-per-share statistics were not cited 
in financial publications. Instead, in addition to absolute amounts, 
earnings were reported as a percentage of the aggregate par value of 
common stock outstanding. The New York Times Annalist, for example, 
reported the earnings of United States Steel Corporation for the first 
half of 1913 as follows: "The balance after preferred dividends,
$33,696,527, is equal to 6.63 percent on $508,302,500 common stock for 
the six months."^ In commenting on Packard Motor Company's earnings, 
the same publication stated: "The Packard Motor Company, which earned
36.6 percent on its $5,000,000 common stock during the 1912 fiscal year 
ended August 31, has paid no common dividends for three years, but has 
retained the cash for working capital."
Investors changed their attitude toward common stocks during the 
early 1920's and accepted common stocks as legitimate investments. With 
this change of attitude, the financial press began publishing
■̂The New York Times Annalist, August 4, 1913, p. 138.
^The New York Times Annalist, January 20, 1913, p. 30.
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earnings-per-share statistics. The circumstances which led to the 
acceptance of common stocks as investments, the early importance of 
earnings per share in the evaluation of common stocks, and the accoun­
tant 's attitude toward earnings per share during this period are dis­
cussed in this section.
The Acceptance of Common 
Stocks as Investments
In 1924, Edgar Lawrence Smith planted the seeds of what has been 
called the new era of common stocks.-* Smith's theory was that a well- 
diversified investment in common stocks, if held for a long period, would 
give a better return than an investment in bonds. Smith supported his 
theory by a study which showed that a well-diversified portfolio of 
common stock of important companies had consistently outperformed a bond 
portfolio over any ten-year period since the Civil War if the return in­
cluded price changes as well as interest or dividends.
Smith's study became the official textbook of the new-era stock 
market of the roaring twenties.^ In fact, his original theory was 11. . . 
copied and distorted by other financial writers and market letter fabri­
cators until its author was forced to disclaim responsibility for the 
absurdities that were being committed in his name."-* Common stocks as a
■*Edgar Lawrence Smith, Common Stocks as Long-Term Investments 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924).
^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security 
Analysis: Principles and Technique (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1962), p. 409.
^Emerson Wirt Axe, "The Stock Market Still Blocked by Unliqui­
dated Debris for the 'New Era,'" The Annalist, April 17, 1931, p. 722.
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class were accepted as investments of little risk because of the persis­
tent secular price uptrend of the stocks in Smith's portfolio. This 
almost complete reversal of investor attitudes toward common stocks was 
succinctly explained by Emerson Wirt Axe, who wrote:
Before the war, buying stocks was always regarded as dangerous. 
And west of Pittsburgh it was not even moral. One might as well 
have been a grain trader or a gambler. But the Liberty loans 
accustomed people to buying securities and the widespread discus­
sion of E. L. Smith's theory of common stocks as long term invest­
ments convinced the public that security speculation was both safe 
and respectable. Finally, the spectacular advance in stock prices 
over the last six years and the great increase in the number of 
issues listed have advertised the stock market as never before.
Like golf and bridge, stock speculation, once the amusement of 
the few, has become a national pastime.6
The new-era philosophy of the 1920's signaled the end of the 
evaluation of common stocks as investments on the basis of balance sheet 
analysis. As would be expected in the booming 1920's, a growth stock 
cult emerged which favored the income statement and earnings per share 
as the basis of common stock evaluation for investment purposes. Since 
this study is concerned with making earnings-per-share statistics as 
meaningful as possible to investors who might use them for the evaluation 
of companies with warrants outstanding, a closer look at the philosophy 
of the new era is appropriate. Axe, a financial writer for The Annalist 
during the 1920's, analyzed the tenets of this philosophy shortly after 
the October, 1929 crash. Following is a summary of some of the principles 
he observed:
1. What has happened in the past is of little interest; every stock 
must be judged on its own merits.
^Emerson Wirt Axe, "A 'Through the Looking-Glass' Stock Market; 
Popular Illusions Rule," The Annalist, April 18, 1930, p. 840.
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2. A distinction between speculation and investment is not valid. 
Speculation merges into investment and investments contain 
speculative elements.
3. The idea that the purchase of common stocks involves consider­
able risk is unsound. Common stocks are a better long-term 
investment than bonds if purchased in sufficient diversifica­
tion.
4. There is no such thing as "the market" because individual stocks 
move differently. Consequently it is more important to know 
what to buy than when to buy. Good stocks can be bought 
anytime.
5. The worth of a stock can be judged reasonably well by examining 
annual reports and earnings statements. The fact that insiders 
know the contents of statements before they are published does 
not materially reduce their value for price forecasting purposes.
6. The trend of stock prices is always upward and bear markets are 
unlikely.7
Thus, basic investment concepts such as asset backing and earn­
ings and dividend yields were abandoned. Current price was of little 
significance because earnings growth would soon justify the price. No 
attempt was made to establish a fundamental investment value. The only 
quantitative input which remained was the earnings growth rate, which was 
usually projected on the basis of the most recent results without adequate
g
consideration to factors which might cause the rate to change. Thus 
the trend of earnings per share, correctly or incorrectly, became estab­
lished as one of the major factors in the evaluation of common stocks
^Emerson Wirt Axe, "New Popular Theories of Investment, Specula­
tion Go Down the Drain in Stock Crash," The Annalist, November 1, 1929, 
p. 859.
QAxe commented that trend " . . .  meant simply that earnings had 
been increasing for three or four years--which earnings of most companies 
had, because business had been improving since 1924 . . . See Emerson 
Wirt Axe, "The Stock Market Still Blocked by Unliquidated Debris from the 
'New Era,'" The Annalist, April 17, 1931, p. 722.
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during the 1920's. Trend in earnings per share, whether used alone or in 
conjunction with other quantitative or qualitative factors, is still a 
major factor in common stock valuation and this trend is one of the attri­
butes of earnings per share that must be considered in earnings-per-share
Qcomputations involving warrants.7
Early Importance of 
Earnings per Share
With the change in investor attitudes toward common stocks as 
investments and with the almost exclusive reliance upon earnings trend 
in their evaluation, the financial press began publishing earnings-per- 
share statistics in their earnings announcements during the early 1920's. 
This was a logical development because it allowed valid interperiod com­
parisons of the net income of companies with changing capital structures. 
While an investor might be impressed with a company which doubled its net 
income with no change in shares outstanding, his attitude would change if 
he learned that the number of shares had doubled through the sale of 
additional stock to the public. Thus earnings per share relates the net 
income theoretically available to common stockholders to each unit of 
capital provided by those stockholders.
^The point that common stock evaluation procedures of the 1920's 
were still practiced, to some extent, at least, in the early 1960's is 
made by Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, who stated; "The carouse of the 
1920's succeeded in mixing up speculative and investment viewpoints in 
inextricable fashion--nor have we yet been able to put asunder the 
approaches that were so undivinely joined together." See Benjamin 
Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, op. cit., p. 409. That such 
procedures persisted until the late 1960's is affirmed by Bellemore and 
Ritchie. See Douglas H. Bellemore and John C. Ritchie, Jr., Investment: 
Principles, Practices, Analysis (3d ed.; Cincinnati: South-Western Pub­
lishing Company, 1969), p. 298.
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The number of common shares outstanding is the common denominator 
which reduces aggregate earnings to a basis that is comparable with stock 
prices, which are always stated on a per-share basis. The stating of 
earnings on a per-share basis also allows a comparison of earnings with 
dividends, which are usually quoted on a per-share basis. Through the 
use of the price-earnings ratio, comparison among corporations with dif­
ferent capital structures, as well as interperiod comparisons of the same 
company, can be made. Weston and Davidson, both members of the Account­
ing Principles Board at the time APB Opinion No. 15 was released, have 
concluded that the purpose of earnings-per-share statistics is as 
follows:
For the present we may conclude that the purpose of earnings 
per share data is to attribute the earnings of a corporate entity 
for a specified period to the capitalization structure of the 
entity existing during that period. Stated another way, the 
purpose is to relate the earnings for a period to the various 
categories of equity based on their relative legal and/or economic 
relationships, preferences and privileges . ̂
By 1923, earnings-per-share data of many companies were being pub­
lished by the financial press. For example, of the 29 companies report­
ing earnings in February 12, 1923 issue of The Annalist, 19 also reported 
earnings per share. ̂  But whether earnings per share, as published 
during this period, achieved its purpose of making the earnings of dif­
fering corporate capital structures more comparable is questionable.
When comparative earnings-per-share figures were published, they were
^Frank T. Weston and Sidney Davidson, "What Will Accounting 
Changes Do to Earnings?" Financial Analysts Journal, XXIV (September- 
October, 1968), 59.
^The Annalist. February 12, 1923, p. 254.
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often as misleading as absolute earnings. For example, in 1923 The 
Annalist reported the quarterly earnings of Underwood Typewriter Company 
as follows:
Underwood Typewriter Company, for quarter ended September 30,
1923, reports net profits of $488,468, after depreciation but before 
Federal taxes, equivalent, after preferred dividends, to $1.05 a 
share (par $25) earned on outstanding $10,000,000 common stock com­
pared with net profits of $341,993, or $3.08 a share (par $100), 
earned on outstanding $9,000,000 common stock in third quarter 
of 1922.12
Mergers also created problems in earnings-per-share reporting. 
General Foods reported earnings per share, after adjustment for a two- 
for-one stock split in September, 1925, for the years 1924-1926 as $4.72, 
$3.35, and $7.71, respectively. The apparent drop in earnings per share 
in 1925 was not caused by adverse economic conditions or poor management, 
but by the method of computing the figure. General Foods had acquired 
Jell-0 Company on December 25, 1925 through the issuance of 570,000 shares 
of common stock. In computing earnings per share, the earnings of Jell-0 
were excluded from the numerator, but the shares issued for its acquisi­
tion were included in the denominator. A more comparable figure, based
13on average shares outstanding, would have been $5.83. An investor who 
used the trend of earnings per share in evaluating the common stock of 
General Foods would almost certainly reach a different conclusion if he 
were aware of the method of computing 1925 earnings per share. Without 
this information, he would conclude that the three-year trend, although 
upward, was highly variable. Conversely, if he used only the latest two
2̂The Annalist, November 12, 1923, p. 650.
1 ̂ Wadsworth H. Mullen, "The Effect of Capital Stock Increases on 
per Share Earnings and Book Value," The Annalist, July 10, 1931, p. 43.
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years, he would conclude that earnings had more than doubled when in fact 
the increase was only about 32 percent.
Failure to adjust retroactively for stock dividends also destroyed 
the comparability of earnings per share. This was perhaps more serious 
than the failure to adjust for stock splits, because the average investor 
would be less likely to investigate a small decrease in earnings per 
share caused by a 5 or 10 percent stock dividend than he would a larger 
decrease caused by a stock split.^
The issuance of stock dividends was a common practice during the 
1920’s.^ There was considerable evidence that the public and some 
financial writers did not understand the ultimate effect of this practice 
on stock prices. Stock dividends were devised as a means of allowing a 
corporation to obtain capital for expansion from its stockholders in the 
simplest manner by retaining cash that would otherwise be paid out as 
dividends. At the same time, it permitted stockholders to realize cash 
from sale of the stock received as a dividend. Advocates of stock divi­
dends presented the argument that the final effect of a stock dividend 
was the same as if a company had paid a cash dividend and each stock­
holder had in turn reinvested that cash in new stock of the company. With 
appropriate accounting procedures for stock dividends, this argument 
might have been valid, but some companies were issuing stock dividends
l^Ibid., pp. 43 and 44.
15See, for example, Walter J. Matherly, "Last Year's Flood of 
Stock Dividends," The Annalist. March 12, 1923, p. 380 and "The 
Principal Causes of the Stock Market Crisis," The Annalist, January 31, 
1930, p. 310.
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without capitalizing any retained earnings while others capitalized a 
1nominal amount. °
The fallacy of this argument is illustrated in the following ex­
ample. Adalbert Wolff, in an article for The Annalist, advocated 
periodic stock dividends for the reasons cited above.^ He used as an 
example the North American Company, which regularly declared a 2 1/2 
percent quarterly stock dividend during most of the 1920's. Earnings 
per share were $3.85 in 1926 and $3.86 in 1927, but the market value of 
the stock dividends in each year was approximately $7.00. R. H. 
Montgomery, the distinguished accountant and author, in a letter to the 
editor of The Annalist pointed out that cash dividends could not legally 
exceed earnings per share for any extended period of time. He specu­
lated, therefore, that a change from stock dividends to cash dividends 
would bring about a radical change in the market value of the stock.
He concluded, "To me, as an accountant, it appears to be a pyramiding 
which entirely disregards the actual earnings per share and presents a
1 Qfalse picture to stockholders."
E. H. H. Simmons, president of the New York Stock Exchange, con­
cluded that the excessive use of stock dividends and the failure of the 
vast majority of investors to understand their true effect on stock prices
■^J. M. B. Hoxsey, "Accounting for Investors," The Journal of 
Accountancy, L (October, 1930), 265 and 266.
^Adalbert Wolff, "Periodic Rights and Stock Dividends--Experi- 
ence, Successful and Otherwise," The Annalist, July 6, 1928, pp. 5-6.
■̂®R. H. Montgomery, "Periodic Rights and Stock Dividends," The 
Annalist, July 27, 1928, p. 141.
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contributed to the high level of security prices in the summer of 1929 
and the resulting panic in October, 1929.^ In 1929, the governing com­
mittee of the exchange had created a special committee on stock dividends 
to study the accounting aspects of the problem. This committee issued two 
reports which were adopted by the governing committee on September 11,
1929 and April 30, 1930. The conclusion was that the minimum charge 
against retained earnings for stock dividends " . . .  appears clearly to 
be the sum of the theretofore capital and capital surplus per share, for
o  r\each share issued as a dividend." u The exchange would not, however,
delist a company for failure to comply with this ruling provided there
21was full disclosure of the accounting method used. Despite this early 
action by the New York Stock Exchange, the first official pronouncement 
by accountants on the subject of stock dividends was not issued until 
September, 1941. Accounting Research Bulletin No. 11, Corporate Account­
ing for Ordinary Stock Dividends, as revised in November, 1952, required
a charge to earned surplus for the fair value of the additional shares
 ̂ 22 issued.
With the shift in emphasis from the balance sheet to the income 
statement and with the increasing availability of earnings per share,
■^"The Principal Causes of the Stock Market Crisis," The Annalist, 
January 31, 1930, p. 310.
M. B. Hoxsey, op. cit., 267.
21Ibid., 282.
22Committee on Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Restatement and Revision of Accounting 
Research Bulletins, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1953), p. 51.
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investors began using price-earnings ratios and their reciprocal, earn- 
ings-price ratios, for the evaluation of common stocks. Even the Harvard 
Business Review published a study of "normal" rates of capitalization by 
industry for the years 1922 through 1925. While the article was not a 
defense of the capitalization of earnings on theoretical grounds, it did 
not attack the practice, as shown by the following:
Because of simplicity, the capitalization of earnings is often 
used as a method for appraising the value of common stock of a 
going concern. Since, in the last analysis, the value of any 
particular business is its capacity to earn profits, this method 
would seem to conform to sound economic theory. . . . The problem 
is not so much the justification of the method, but rather 
determination of the proper rate which should be used in capital­
izing earnings, and the extent to which this rate can be of real 
use in valuing the common stock of a going concern.^
The conclusion was that while a normal rate of capitalization of earnings
computed by averaging several yearly rates probably could not be used in
valuing common stocks with any degree of success, ". . .a yearly rate
can be computed and used as a starting point in valuing common stocks.
The use of price-earnings ratios in valuing common stocks had 
become so widespread by 1929 that the president of the New York Stock 
Exchange, E. H. H. Simmons, cited it as one of the contributing factors 
in the October, 1929 stock market crash. He stated:
Another contributing cause was the practice of gauging the 
value of securities by multiplying their most recently reported 
net earnings by some factor which was deemed to be applicable to 
the industry in which the company was engaged. This method
9 ̂̂-"'Summaries of Business Research; Market Capitalization Rates 




of valuation, while perfectly proper, leads to inflation in periods 
of great industrial activity. 5
Accountants' Attitude
toward Earnings per Share
The enthusiasm of investors for valuing common stocks by applying 
price-earnings ratios to earnings per share was not shared by accountants. 
As the preceding discussion has shown, there was need for improvement in 
the method of computing and reporting earnings per share. But accoun­
tants, who believed that valuation techniques based heavily on earnings 
per share were misleading, chose not to encourage such techniques by 
refusing to include earnings-per-share statistics in the financial state­
ments.
During the two decades from 1920 to 1940, The Journal of Accoun­
tancy published only one article on earnings per share. In April, 1930, 
Natvig pointed out the usefulness of earnings-per-share statistics for
measuring market values and the need for a standard method of computing 
2 6them. An editorial the following month, in answer to the article, con­
cluded that ". . . it is a fallacy to allow oneself to be governed by 
earnings 'per share' in estimating probable market v a l u e . "^7
This attitude of accountants toward earnings per share prevailed 
until the publication of APB Opinion No. 9 in December, 1966. For
^"Principal Causes of the Stock Market Crisis," The Annalist, 
January 31, 1930, 310.
^ A n d r e a s  s. Natvig, "Earnings per Share," The Journal of 
Accountancy, XLIX (April, 1930), 252-263.
27"Earnings per Share," The Journal of Accountancy, XLIX (May, 
1930), 325.
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example, in April, 1951, The Journal of Accountancy published an article
by W. F. Stanley, Vice President and Secretary of Southwestern Public
Service Corporation, urging accountants to include earnings and dividends
28per share in the financial statements. ° The editors invited J. E. 
Robertson, a partner in Haskins & Sells, New York, to respond to the 
Stanley article. In summarizing Robertson's comments, the editors con­
cluded: "Little significance can be attached to earnings per share as a
figure purporting to express operating results. It is unwise, therefore,
2 Qto encourage stockholders to rely on this item." 7
This attitude was again confirmed in 1955 when Bertrand J. Belda 
urged accountants to use uniform methods in computing earnings per share. 
Carman Blough, editor of accounting and auditing problems in The Journal 
of Accountancy, commented on Belda's letter as follows: "We do not join
in Mr. Belda's enthusiasm for the earnings per share figure as a measure 
of a company's performance, since it is usually necessary to know the 
elements going into the make-up of the net income figure if the per share 
figure is to be meaningful."^® Blough did agree, however, that since a 
great deal of importance was attached to earnings per share by financial 
reporters, security dealers, and investors, more attention should be paid
28W. F. Stanley, "Financial Statements Should Report Earnings and 
Dividends per Share." The Journal of Accountancy. XCI (April, 1951), 
566-568.
29J. E. Robertson, "Why Accountants De-emphasize Earnings per 
Share," The Journal of Accountancy. XCI (April, 1951), 568.
30Carman G. Blough (ed.), "Accounting and Auditing Problems:
The Calculation of Earnings per Share," The Journal of Accountancy. C 
(September, 1955), 62.
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to the development of uniformity in its calculation.
As the result of accountants' refusal to accept earnings-per- 
share statistics, very little attention was paid to their calculation.
But at least one financial writer showed evidence of having given con­
siderable thought to the problem. In 1931, Wadsworth H. Mullen wrote an 
article for The Annalist suggesting methods for making earnings per share 
more comparable under conditions of various forms of capitalization 
increases.Mullen considered the effects on earnings per share caused 
by: (1) stock issuances for the acquisition of assets, (2) stock divi­
dends, (3) the conversion of senior securities, and (4) the exercise of 
stock purchase warrants, stock rights, and employee stock options.
A description of Mullen's method for making prior period earnings 
per share comparable with the period in which warrants were exercised is 
appropriate to this study. Mullen began by computing the average rate of 
return on owners' equity (i.e., net income divided by average owners' 
equity) for the period in which the warrants were exercised. He then 
assumed that the earnings on the warrant proceeds would accrue at this 
rate for the fraction of the period prior to the exercise of the warrants 
and at a comparable rate for previous periods. Finally, he computed 
earnings per share on a retroactive basis by adding these assumed earn­
ings to the numerator and by increasing the denominator by the number of 
shares issued for the warrants.
31Ibid.
32Wadsworth H. Mullen, "The Effect of Capital Stock Increase on 
per Share Earnings and Book Value," The Annalist, July 10, 1931, pp. 
43-45.
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Perhaps the reason accountants chose to ignore earnings-per-share 
statistics had to do with the quality of the income statements that they 
were providing to investors during the 1920's. In fact many companies 
did not publish income statements at all, the rationalization being that 
", . .a concern 'gives aid and comfort to its enemies' (i.e., competi­
tors) when it makes a complete and illuminating financial state­
ment . . . Numerous examples of the complete inadequacy of financial
information being provided to stockholders and investors were cited by 
William Z. Ripley in an article pleading for the stockholder's right to 
information. The following excerpt is typical:
. . .  It is certainly out of line with good business practice 
that the Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., the greatest cotton mill in 
the world, should render an income account not in dollars but in 
yards, along with a petty trial balance; or that the Waltham Watch 
Co., owned by more than 3,000 people, two years after reorganiza­
tion, after having appealed to the public for subscription to its 
securities, should still vouchsafe nothing but a skeleton balance 
sheet. Neither does the former instance obscure unprofitable 
operation nor does the latter, as it appears, cover up the full 
measure of current profits. Both meager reports are incompatible 
with the best modern standards of business practice.34
All too frequently, even those firms providing income statements 
condensed the information to such an extent that the statements were 
practically useless for security analysis purposes. In 1929, Laurence
H. Sloan published a comparative study of corporation profits for the 
years 1926 and 1927. As a result of this study, Sloan joined Ripley in 
the plea for better and more complete financial statements. He found, for
■^Laurence H. Sloan, Corporation Profits: A Study of Their Size,
Variation, Use, and Distribution in a Period of Prosperity (New York: 
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1929), pp. 344-345.
■^Sjilliam Z. Ripley, "Stop, Look, Listen!: The Shareholder's
Right to Adequate Information," The Accountant, March 5, 1927, p. 347.
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example, in an analysis of the income statements of the 545 leading indus­
trial corporations, that only 235, or 43 percent of the total, included 
gross income.^5
Gullible investors, confronted with completely inadequate income 
statements, became convinced " . . .  that nearly all companies conceal a 
substantial proportion of their earnings and that because they do there 
is no telling how much the stock may be w o r t h . R i p l e y  used National 
Biscuit Company as an example of the situation which gave rise to this 
type of attitude on the part of the investing public. He charged that 
the company understated post World War I profits through excessive de­
preciation. In 1922 National Biscuit abandoned this policy and with the 
resulting increase in profits, the price of its stock bounded upward.^ 
This attitude of investors also contributed to the high prices of stocks 
just prior to the stock market break in October, 1929.^®
Under these conditions, the practice of evaluating common stocks 
by applying a price-earnings multiplier to the latest earnings per share 
was not surprising. Income statements, if available at all, simply did 
not provide sufficient detail to make a meaningful evaluation of past 
performance, much less provide a basis for the projection of future per­
formance. Investors and security analysts had no other choice; they used
O CJJSloan, op. cit., p. 62. Gross income, as used by Sloan, means 
gross revenue.
■^Emerson Wirt Axe, "A 'Through the Looking-Glass' Stock Market; 
Popular Illusions Rule," The Annalist, April 18, 1930, p. 840.
■^Ripley, op. cit., p. 348.
38"The Principal Causes of the Stock Market Crisis," The Annalist, 
January 31, 1930, p. 310.
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the information that management and their accountants made available.
By failing to require management to publish informative and timely 
income statements during this period when common stock evaluation tech­
niques were being formulated, accountants must share much of the respon­
sibility for the earnings-per-share "syndrome." In addition, the failure 
to establish uniform methods of computing earnings-per-share statistics 
until almost half a century later compounded the error.
Of course, the argument could be advanced that public accountants 
were not firmly enough established to force management to provide ade­
quate financial information to investors. It was not until the estab­
lishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1933 that companies 
registering securities were required to obtain the opinion of certified 
public accountants. But Sloan, writing in 1929, felt that, given a 
concerted effort, public accountants could bring about the needed improve­
ments. He stated:
The public accountant has an interest at stake. He certifies 
the report. It is our opinion that if any important group of 
public accountants would agree to insist upon certain standards 
of adequacy--even though that adequacy fell far short of what we 
have expressed as our opinion of the ideal--that the accountants' 
position would be strengthened, and that the resistance would 
actually prove to be much milder than it is assumed to be.
Indeed, we ascribe the major portion of the unsatisfactory 
situation which obtains in regard to corporation statements to 
inertia and tradition, more than to a conscious effort to with­
hold information which should really be g i v e n . 39
In summary, investors accepted common stocks as investments during 
the 1920's. And their basis for evaluating these stocks shifted from the 
traditional balance sheet analysis, which emphasized the past, to an
•^Sloan, op. cit., pp. 345-346.
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income approach, which emphasized the future. Since many companies pub­
lished no income statements, or statements with little detail, investors 
began using earnings per share and price-earnings ratios to evaluate 
common stocks. Little emphasis was placed on the fundamental values 
which, prior to World War I, had been required in order for a common 
stock to be considered an investment.
Accountants rejected this new income approach and attempted to 
discourage its use by refusing to include earnings-per-share statistics 
in the financial statements. This refusal to include earnings-per-share 
statistics in the financial statements did not achieve the desired goal 
of discouraging an emphasis on earnings per share for common stock 
evaluation purposes. Earnings per share continued to be one of the most 
important financial statistics used by investors. Thus the accountants' 
refusal to report earnings per share merely handicapped investors by 
preventing the development of a uniform method of computing and reporting 
earnings per share.
Probably as a result of the 1929 stock market crash, the almost 
exclusive reliance on future expectations was modified somewhat in the 
1930's and 1940's. More attention was paid to the past record of a com­
pany and its financial condition as evidence of a promising future. This 
was a throwback to the period prior to World War I when very few common 
stocks were considered of investment quality. But emphasis continued to 
be on an upward trend in earnings per share and expectations that the 
trend would continue into the f u t u r e W i t h  the bull market of the
^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security 
Analysis: Principles and Technique (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1962), p. 413.
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1950's the enthusiasm for common stocks continued to increase. Once 
again, as in the 1920's, the search for "growth stocks" was in full 
swing. Despite some adverse market reactions in the 1960's, the emphasis 
on future expectations continues. With this background on the develop­
ment of common stocks as investments and the emergence of earnings per 
share as an important financial statistic used in their evaluation, the 
role of earnings per share in current theory and practice will be ex­
amined more closely.
BASIC METHODS OF COMMON STOCK ANALYSIS
Over the years, two distinctive schools of thought have emerged 
on the question of how to make common stock investment decisions. Tech­
nical analysis utilizes little or no financial information generated by 
accountants and will be discussed only briefly. Fundamental analysis 
depends upon financial information and particularly on earnings per 
share.
Technical Analysis
In its purest form, technical analysis is concerned only with 
technical market data such as price and volume trends. Technicians 
study the market itself rather than the external factors reflected in 
the market. They recognize that stock prices are the result of such 
factors as expected earnings and expected dividends and the rate at which 
these expectations are capitalized. Technicians contend, however, that 
these factors are reflected in the supply and demand for stocks at a
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given price.^ In their view, by studying the past trading history of 
price and volume movements, future trends can be detected.
The first, and perhaps best known, of the technical methods was 
the Dow Theory, named after Charles H. Dow, one of the founders of Dow 
Jones & Company. Dow published the basic methodology of his theory in a 
number of editorials in The Wall Street Journal between 1900 and 1 9 0 2 .^ 
Other technical analysis methods include point-and-figure charting, bar 
charting, filter techniques, odd lot theory, advance-decline line, and 
Barron's confidence index.
Criticism of technical analysis has been extensive. Critics argue, 
and technicians admit, that if many investors used technical analysis, 
price movements would occur as a result of the techniques used and 
profits would disappear. Advocates counter that this is not likely to 
occur because the average investor is not likely to spend the time and 
effort required by the methodology.^ More serious are the implications 
of the random walk hypothesis, which will be discussed in a subsequent 
section of this chapter. Extensive empirical testing of a number of tech­
nical trading rules in general supports the conclusion that stock prices 
cannot be predicted on the basis of past price data alone.^
^^-Donald E. Vaughn, Survey of Investments (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), p. 322. See also Robert A. Levy, 
"Conceptual Foundations of Technical Analysis," Financial Analysts Journal. 
XXII (July-August, 1966), 83.
^Henry A. Latane and Donald L. Tuttle, Security Analysis and 
Portfolio Analysis (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1970), p. 354.
43ibid., p. 271 and Vaughn, op. cit., p. 400.
44gee George E. Pinches, "The Random Walk Hypothesis and Tech­
nical Analysis," Financial Analysts Journal. pp. 104-110 for a compre­
hensive summary o£ these studies and their results.
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Although pure technical analysts have no need for financial infor­
mation such as earnings per share, some financial advisors advocate a 
combination of fundamental and technical analysis. Vaughn reports good 
trading and investment results by using fundamental analysis to select 
desirable issues. Timing of the purchase is then determined by the 
technical indicators.^
Latane and Tuttle also recommend technical analysis as a timing 
device to be used in conjunction with fundamental analysis. They express
AfLsome skepticism as to its reliability, however. ° The majority opinion
seems to be summed up by Bellemore and Ritchie, who state:
A wide review of empirical evidence and the judgment of most 
successful investors--those who have built up substantial capital 
over the years— leads to the comment that the technical methods 
for forecasting have not proved very rewarding. '
Fundamental Analysis
The major premise of fundamental analysis is that an investment
value can be determined for individual common stocks apart from their
current price. In theory, this value is simply the present worth of all
48future cash payments expected to be received from the security. A 
second premise of fundamental analysis is that actual price will at some 
future point converge to this investment value if the analyst is correct
^Vaughn, op. cit., p. 321.
^Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 354.
47Douglas H. Bellemore and John C. Ritchie, Jr., Investment: 
Principles. Practices. Analysis (3d ed.; Cincinnati: South-Western
Publishing Company, 1969), p. 98.
^®Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., pp. 260-261.
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in his estimate of the investment value.49 In essence, determining the 
investment value of a stock is equivalent to predicting the security's 
future price.
Fundamental analysis, as the name implies, utilizes basic economic 
and financial information and other external factors which affect the 
stock market. The fundamental analyst, in addition to investigating 
general business conditions as reflected in the economy as a whole and 
in the specific industries in which he is interested, analyzes the finan­
cial statements of individual companies. He considers qualitative 
factors as well as quantitative factors in arriving at an investment 
value for each security under observation. This value is then compared 
with the existing market price to determine the appropriate investment 
decision— buy, sell, or hold.
Since this chapter is concerned with the attributes of earnings
per share that are used by investors in valuing common stocks, two ques­
tions relative to fundamental analysis need to be answered.
1. Is fundamental analysis used extensively, as opposed to 
technical analysis?
2. Is earnings per share a statistic frequently used by 
fundamental analysts?
There are no statistics available showing the relative frequency
of use of the two basic methods of security analysis. Further as pre­
viously pointed out, some analysts advocate a combination of the two
49Ibid., p. 12.
-^Robert A. Levy, "Conceptual Foundations of Technical Analysis," 
Financial Analysts Journal. XXII (July-August, 1966), 83.
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methods. Vaughn indicates that technical analysis gained in popularity 
during the early 1 9 6 0 ' s . A t  least one mutual fund, Technivest Fund, 
seeks maximum capital growth by emphasizing technical analysis.
On the other hand, Andrew Feretti, moderator of a Certified 
Financial Analysts research seminar on investment company portfolio 
management, concluded that few mutual funds base their investment deci­
sions entirely upon technical analysis. To the contrary, he stated; 
"Fundamental security analysis is typically given the greatest weight, 
because it is indispensable to an understanding of the environment in 
which an investment plan is o u t l i n e d . L a t a n e  and Tuttle also conclude; 
"Few investors make buy-sell decisions solely on the basis of technical 
analysis . . . "54 jn summary, the conclusion is that the vast majority
of investors, as opposed to traders, utilize fundamental analysis in 
making investment decisions.
The answer to the second question with respect to the frequency 
of use of earnings per share is that earnings per share is a primary 
financial statistic used by fundamentalists in valuing common stock.
This will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter through an 
analysis of the fundamental school's methodology.
Perhaps as a result of the stock market crash in 1929, there has
^^Vaughn, op. cit., p. 321.
^Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 378.
^Andrew P. Feretti (ed.), Investment Company Portfolio Manage­
ment; Proceedings. C.F.A. Research Seminar, May 26-27, 1969. Charlottes­
ville. Virginia (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 78.
-^Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 353.
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been an appreciable amount of market-oriented research, particularly 
during the 1930's and from 1950 to present. This research, largely per­
formed by academicians, has centered around common stock valuation 
methods, price behavior, and portfolio management. While some of the 
theory produced by the research has been accepted by practitioners, none 
has been particularly successful in practice, largely because of the 
difficulty of quantifying the data. Before analyzing how practitioners 
employ earnings per share in valuing common stock, some of the more im­
portant research in the areas noted above will be examined for its 
implications to common stock valuation and earnings per share.
SIGNIFICANT THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
RELATED TO COMMON STOCK VALUATION
Present value theory was applied to common stocks in the 1930!s. 
Although its emphasis is on cash flows, the application of present value 
theory relies heavily on earnings per share. In the 1950's and 1960's, 
interest in the random walk theory was revived through extensive empirical 
testing. The results of these tests led to the efficient markets theory 
which tends to discredit technical analysis. An examination of these 
theories and their implications to fundamental analysts who use earnings 
per share follows.
Present Worth Valuation Theories
Although present value theory had been in use for many years in 
the construction of bond tables, the idea that it was also applicable to 
common stocks is attributed to Robert F. Weise, who published an article
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on the subject in the September 8, 1930 issue of Barron's.^ The first 
full development of present worth theory for valuing common stocks was 
by John Burr Williams in his book, The Theory of Investment Value.̂ 6 The 
theory is simple in that the investment value of a common stock is the 
future stream of dividends discounted at an appropriate rate or rates.
The difficulty lies in its application. Future dividends must be esti­
mated to infinity, and an appropriate discount rate or rates must be 
selected. The technique may be modified for investment horizons shorter 
than infinity. The modification consists of discounting to present value 
an estimate of the market price of the stock at the end of the holding 
period.
Advocates of the present value theory of common stock, by making 
certain limiting assumptions about the growth rate of dividends or earn­
ings and dividend payout ratios, have published a number of present value 
tables that should encourage unsophisticated investors to use the tech­
nique. One such set of tables will be examined in detail to demonstrate 
the importance of earnings per share to present worth valuation theory.
Molodovsky, May, and Chottiner have constructed a series of tables 
for determining the earnings multiplier for various rates of return under 
various assumptions as to the earnings growth r a t e A l t h o u g h  input 
and output of the tables are in terms of earnings per share, the
55Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 300.
JDJohn Burr Williams, The Theory of Investment Value (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938).
c 7
-"Nicholas Molodvsky, Catherine May, and Sherman Chottiner,
"Common Stock Valuation: Principles, Tables and Application," Financial
Analysts Journal. XXI (March-April, 1965), 104-123.
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theoretical structure " . . .  rests on the foundation that the value of a
58common stock is the present worth of its future stream of dividends."
The conversion from earnings per share to dividends per share is made
possible through the assumption that the dividend payout ratio is a func
tion of earnings growth.
Molodovsky's tables are based on the assumption that earnings
per share will grow at a constant rate for a limited period and then
decline in a linear function to a zero growth rate, which is assumed to
continue to infinity. Output of the tables is in terms of a multiplier
for normal earnings of $1.00 per share. Thus the present value of the
share of common stock being evaluated is the product of this multiplier
and the normal earnings per share. Molodovsky's recommendations for
determining normal earnings per share are as follows:
Normal earnings are not a precise figure. They may be found 
by trend-line analysis using the least-squares criterion. Even so, 
judgment must enter in the selection of trend periods.
A less satisfactory but still acceptable approach is to deter­
mine normal earnings by averaging last year's earnings, the current 
level of earnings, and next year's expected e a r n i n g s . 60
In addition to normal earnings per share, four inputs are
required in order to use the tables. All are related, either directly
or indirectly, to earnings per share. These inputs are: (1) projected
growth rate of earnings per share, (2) constant growth period, (3)
58Ibid., 104.
-*^Ibid., 104-105. Low dividend payouts are the result of a high 
investment return which in turn causes a high earnings growth rate.
High dividend payouts are the result of low investment return which 
causes low earnings growth. The relationship between dividend payout
ratios and current and lagged earnings growth rates was established through multiple regression applied to the Cowles Commission data and 
Standard & Poor's 500 for the period 1871 to 1962.
60Ibid., 105.
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diminishing growth period, and (4) rate of return. Molodovsky states that 
the projected growth rate of earnings may be . . the same as the 
growth rate of earnings in the immediate past, or it may be higher or 
lower depending on circumstances which may alter the earnings trend.
He includes a table which utilizes the ratio of current earnings per 
share to earnings per share 10 years ago as a basis for approximating 
the compound annual growth rate. He suggests that the growth rate so 
determined may be used if the investor expects a continuation of the past 
growth rate.
The constant growth period is the number of years that the pro­
jected constant growth rate of earnings per share is expected to con­
tinue. Molodovsky contends that an estimate of its length would be 
suggested from the analytical procedure used in determining the constant 
growth rate. The diminishing growth period is the number of years after 
expiration of the constant growth rate during which earnings per share 
will decline to a zero growth rate. Molodovsky concludes that this 
period will depend upon the characteristics of the company. A long 
period of declining growth would be allowed for a company with excep­
tionally good prospects while a short period would be used for companies 
with poor prospects.
Molodovsky states that the rate of return is ". . . the inves-
62tor's desired rate of return from long-term common stock investments," 
and that it should bear some relation to alternate investment opportuni­




more specific and relate the rate to the uncertainty of the future earn­
ings-per-share growth rate estimates. Bauman, for example, states that 
the discount rate . .is determined by the degree of uncertainty of 
future cash payments, or is determined by the investor's objectives.
Bauman has published a series of present value tables similar in 
concept to those of Molodovsky.^4 The principal difference is that the 
input is in terms of dividends per share and the output is a multiplier 
for normal dividends of $1.00 per share. But the inputs to Bauman's 
present value dividend model, in particular the dividend-per-share 
growth rate, depend on earnings per share. This is shown by the fol­
lowing statement:
For a given stock, the dividend multiplier, as previously 
stated, is to be determined by the degree of quality and the 
future rate of growth in dividends per share; however, the 
quality and the future size of dividends are heavily dependent 
on the quality and the future rate of growth of earnings per 
share. The earnings multiplier is likewise determined by the 
degree of quality and the future rate of growth in earnings per 
share
Although the present worth theory of valuing common stocks is 
widely accepted, the method has not been adopted in practice to any 
great extent. This is shown by Bellemore and Ritchie, who state:
The major reason why most, if not all, successful practicing 
financial analysts reject all present worth theories of common 
stock valuation which state that the value of a stock is the 
discounted value of the future stream of dividends (or earnings) 
is simple. They realize from experience that such long-term 
projections of earnings and dividends as are required by these
63W. Scott Bauman, "Investment Returns and Present Values," 
Financial Analysts Journal. XXV (November-December, 1969), 108.
64Ibid., 107-120. 65Ibid., 117.
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theories do not produce figures that have enough reasonable 
accuracy to be of any practical value. . .
This conflict between theory and practice is really one of dif­
ferences in investor time horizons. Although modifications for shorter 
holding periods can be made by estimating the market price of the stock 
at the end of a given holding period, the present worth approach 
implicitly assumes a permanent investment and an infinitely long holding 
period. On the other hand, the average investor's time horizon appears 
to be from one to three years.^ The logic of a short investor time 
horizon is explained by Bellemore and Ritchie, who compare the inves­
tor's time horizon to corporate management's time horizon:
. . . Since corporate managements must invest for the long 
term, they may act on long-term capital projections in their 
capital budgeting and investment decisions, but many managements 
emphasize projects returning the most in 5 years. Investors are 
not forced to invest for such long terms and therefore need not 
accept the great risks of acting on very long-term projections 
for 20, 30, 40, or 50 years. . .
Perhaps the major contribution of present-value models to common 
stock valuation is that these models force an investor to make explicit 
assumptions regarding the factors which influence common stock investment 
values. The traditional multiplier techniques favored by most practi­
tioners and investors do not provide the same rigorous framework for
66Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 307. On this point, see 
also Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 263; Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, op. 
cit., p. 450; and Ralph E. Badger, Harold W. Torgerson, and Harry G. 
Guthmann, Investment Principles and Practices (6th ed.; Englewood Cliffs; 
New Jersey: Prentice-Ha11, Inc., 1969), p. 230.
67Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 114. See also Ralph A. 
Bing, "Survey of Practitioners' Stock Evaluation Methods," Financial 
Analysts Journal. XXVII (May-June, 1971), 57.
68Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 305.
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analysis. Yet, as the discussion of these multiplier techniques will 
show, the two approaches are compatible. Both depend, to a great extent, 
upon earnings per share, past and future, and its trend and variability.
More recent research in the area of stock prices and market be­
havior raises questions about fundamental analysts' attempts to establish 
investment values apart from current market price. The earnings-per- 
share implications of this research will be examined next.
Random Walk and Efficient 
Markets Theories
Although the random walk hypothesis was tested as far back as 
1900 as part of a doctoral dissertation by Louis B a c h e l i e r , ^  it did not 
receive much attention in the finance and investment literature until 
the 1950's and 1960's. In its original form, the hypothesis stated that 
changes in stock prices are completely unsystematic, i.e.. changes in 
stock prices are statistically independent, or random. In its narrowest 
interpretation, the theory implies that future price movements, being 
independent of past price movements, cannot be predicted on the basis of 
past price data alone. Thus, the various theories of technical analysis, 
all of which are based on the assumption that the historical patterns 
of past price behavior repeat themselves, cannot be used to increase 
expected gains if the random walk theory holds.
In its broadest interpretation, the random walk theory states 
that prices fully reflect all available information. This expanded
fi Q7Louis Bachelier, "Theory of Speculation," The Random Character 
of Stock Market Prices, ed. Paul H. Cootner (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 17-78.
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version implies that the capital market is a perfectly efficient mechan­
ism under which prices adjust instantaneously and accurately as soon as 
relevant information is received by the participants. Price movements
under this assumption are random because the information affecting prices
7 0arrives in a random manner. u
If the perfect capital market version of the random walk is valid, 
fundamentalists who analyze past financial information such as earnings 
per share are in much the same position as technical analysts. As new 
information affecting the intrinsic value of a security become available, 
the security's price would immediately change to reflect the new intrin­
sic value. Under these conditions, actual prices represent good esti­
mates of intrinsic value and attempts by fundamentalists to establish an 
intrinsic value separate from current price are useless.^
Testing of the random walk hypothesis has been extensive.^ As 
a result of the empirical evidence, the concept of a perfect capital 
market has evolved into that of an efficient capital market. A capital 
market in which all participants possessed perfect knowledge, although 
useful for theoretical purposes in explaining the random walk theory, 
simply did not exist. Henry C. Wallich, former Assistant Secretary of
^Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 506.
^Eugene F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices," The 
Journal of Business. XXXVIII (January, 1965), 40. As used in this study,
intrinsic value is synonymous with investment value.
72'See, for example, Paul H. Cootner (ed.), The Random Character
of Stock Market Prices (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press,
1964), which contains 21 articles on the subject. For a more recent
bibliography, see Eugene F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review
of Theory and Empirical Work," The Journal of Finance, XXV (May, 1970), 
416-417.
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the Treasury and member of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, 
gives the following explanation:
This is an idealization of even so good a market as the New York 
Stock Exchange. News does not travel instantaneously; it is not 
acted upon immediately; some people have inside information. Proph­
ecies can be self-fulfilling--if enough people follow a leader, the 
leader is running something akin to a pool operation. Moreover, a 
few rare individuals may genuinely be able to see farther ahead 
than the rest. . . .73
In general, the empirical evidence supports a random walk-effi­
cient market hypothesis. Consistent evidence of dependence in day-to-day 
price changes showed up as positive serial correlations in Fama's test 
of the 30 Dow Jones industrials.^ The filter tests of Alexander^-* and 
Fama and Blume^® also indicate a short-term dependence in price changes. 
Fama also found that large price changes tend to be followed by large 
price changes, although the sign is unpredictable.^ And Neiderhoffer 
and Osborne found a tendency toward excessive reversals in common stock 
price changes from transaction to transaction.
^®Henry C. Wallich, "What Does the Random Walk Hypothesis Mean to 
Security Analysts?" Financial Analysts Journal. XXIC (March-April, 1968), 
160.
^Eugehe F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices," The 
Journal of Business. XXXVIII (January, 1965), 72.
^Sidney S. Alexander, "Price Movements in Speculative Markets: 
Trends or Random Walks, No. 2," The Random Character of Stock Market 
Prices, ed. Paul H. Cootner (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press. 
1964), p. 369.
76Eugene F. Fama and Marshall E. Blume, "Filter Rules and Stock- 
Market Trading," The Journal of Business. XXXIX (January, 1966), 226-241.
^Eugene F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices," The 
Journal of Business, XXXVIII (January, 1965), 87.
^®Victor Niederhoffer and M. F. M. Osborne, "Market Making and 
Reveral on. the Stock Exchange," Journal of the American Statistical 
Association. LXI (December, 1966), 897-916. Reversals are defined as 
pairs of consecutive price changes of opposite sign.
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In each of the above cases, however, Fama has concluded that no 
trading rules could be devised to take advantage of the dependence in 
price changes because any profit would be absorbed by commissions on the 
transactions.^ Thus, although the stock markets do not produce com­
pletely random price changes and are therefore not perfect capital mar­
kets, they are reasonably efficient markets.
What are the implications of an efficient market to the funda­
mentalist who uses financial data such as earnings per share in his 
evaluation of common stocks? Fama has concluded that the average inves­
tor should concentrate on portfolio analysis. If, under the efficient 
markets theory, prices always reflect all available public information, 
he need not be concerned with whether a security is over or under-priced. 
He merely decides on the combination of expected return and risk which 
he desires for his portfolio and selects securities randomly from
o nvarious, or the same, risk classes to achieve this combination.ou
Latane and Tuttle have concluded that in a world of random walks 
where the stock markets are essentially perfect or highly efficient, an
^^Eugene F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work," The Journal of Finance, XXV (May, 1970), 414-415.
®^Eugene F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices," The 
Journal of Business, XXXVIII (January, 1965), 40. Portfolio theory is 
beyond the scope of this study; however, it does not eliminate the secu­
rity analysis function. Current theory has evolved from the "covariance" 
model proposed by Harry M. Markowitz in Portfolio Selection; Efficient 
Diversification of Investments, Cowles Foundation Monograph 16 (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 96-100. The concept involves combin­
ing individual securities into a portfolio with maximum expected return 
for a given level of non-diversifiable risk. Thus security analysts are 
required to estimate expected return and risk. In practice, the Markowitz 
model has not been widely used, nor have the results been very satisfac­
tory. On these points, see Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., pp. 865-867 
and Wallich, op. cit., 160.
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investor can achieve returns that are larger than the returns for the 
entire market in only two ways:
1. If the capital market ijs essentially perfect, the investor must 
be able to obtain "private" information--either information that 
is not generally known, or generally known information that has 
been transformed in some unique fashion such as through the 
creation of complex variables and models not used by most in­
vestors .
2. If the capital market is highly efficient but not essentially 
perfect, the investor may be able to use public information 
either before it is fully assimilated by the market or, if the 
market temporarily overreacts or underreacts, after it is 
assimilated
Regardless of the implications of the random walk and efficient markets 
theories, earnings per share continues to play an important role in 
security valuation, as will be shown in the following section.
THE ROLE OF EARNINGS PER SHARE 
IN FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS
This study will proceed under the assumption that a significant
number of investors and their advisors use a fundamental approach in
securing and evaluating information relevant to investment decisions.
By so doing, they increase the efficiency of the market by reducing the
82possibility of market power0 and by increasing the dissemination of 
information. Whether they are successful in increasing their returns is 
not significant to this study as long as they in fact do attempt to do
®*Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 518.
82Market power is the power of participants in the market to 
influence prices through control of the supply or demand for stocks or 
through influencing the actions of others by their statements or acts 
(self-fulfilling prophesies). See Wallich, op. cit., 161.
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so through fundamental analysis. Under this assumption, the importance 
of earnings per share to this fundamental approach will now be considered.
Importance of Earnings 
per Share
Fundamentalists use various methods in developing an intrinsic 
or investment value for common stocks, and it is impossible to specify 
all such methods in this chapter. There seems to be general agreement, 
however, that there are four basic quantitative factors which affect 
prices and are therefore used, in varying degrees, by fundamentalists 
in establishing such values. This is true in formalized methods based 
on well-defined theories of valuation as well as for informal and un­
sophisticated m e t h o d s . T h e  Bellemore and Ritchie listing of these 
factors is typical:
1. Asset values
2. Projected earnings and expected growth rate of earnings and their 
volatility.
3. Projected dividends and expected growth rate and volatility.
4. Capitalization multiplier--the price-earnings ratio for 
earnings and dividends that is expected in the future.84
In practice, these quantitative factors are modified by qualita­
tive factors such as the nature of the industry, management capabilities, 
and research and development. In fact, as Bellemore and Ritchie point 
out, quantitative factors, once they are analyzed and used in projections,
®^Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 299.
84Ibid., p. 327. For similar listings, see Graham, Dodd, and 
Cottle, op. cit., p. 443 and Badger, Torgerson, and Guthmann, op. cit., 
p. 217. Others, while not enumerating the factors specifically, are 
obviously in agreement, as indicated by the amount of space devoted 
to these factors. See, for example, Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., pp. 
277-281, 309-329, 405-427.
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become qualitative.85 Earnings per share is clearly an important element 
in common stock valuation, since three of these four factors are related 
to it.
Evidence of the importance that the financial community attaches 
to earnings per share is so extensive that it hardly needs documenting. 
One important segment of the financial community is investment banking. 
Its attitude toward the importance of earnings per share is expressed 
in the following statement:
We trust the Subcommittee fully recognizes the crucial im­
portance of reported earnings per share data to equity security 
markets. . . . Earnings per share data have probably become the 
single most important statistic to market valuation. . .
As would be expected, practicing financial analysts also con­
sider earnings per share a vital statistic in security valuation.
Pankoff and Virgil of Washington University have conducted a laboratory 
experiment on the usefulness of financial accounting information to 
security analysts. Their subjects were 32 security analysts employed 
by retail brokerage firms, commercial banks, and other investment insti­
tutions located in St. Louis and New York. They measured the demand of 
these analysts for accounting and other financial information of three 
basic types: company, industry, and general economic. The most
®^Ibid.
86Memorandum from the Corporation Finance Committee of the 
Investment Bankers Association of America to the Subcommittee on Con­
vertible Securities of the Accounting Principles Board of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 7,
1969.
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frequently requested item of information was earnings per share.
A recent development in the financial press contributes addi­
tional evidence of the importance that the investment community attaches 
to earnings per share and the related price-earnings ratio. On October 
2, 1972 Associated Press began reporting the daily price-earnings ratios 
of some 3,350 issues listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges 
as an addition to its daily price and volume information. Earnings per 
share used in the daily computations are reported earnings for the most 
recent twelve months. Many major newspapers including The Wall Street
Q QJournal and The New York Times have subscribed to the service.
The reluctance of accountants to accept earnings per share as an 
important factor in security valuation has already been discussed. Their 
later decision to require earnings per share to be included on the income 
statement confirms the importance that investors have attached to it. 
Recognition of this fact is expressed by LeRoy Layton, Chairman of the 
Accounting Principles Board at the time APB Opinion No. 15 was written, 
in the following statement;
Many investors are more interested in results of future opera­
tions and look to the past only in the hope that it will predict 
the future. Rightly or wrongly, earnings per share and its direc­
tional trend have become the prime measuring factors in the eyes 
of most investors. The maintenance of a favorable trend in earnings 
per share has become all-important to management in today's rugged 
competition for capital. An upward trend favorably influences stock
Q 7Lyn D. Pankoff and Robert L. Virgil, "Some Preliminary Findings 
from a Laboratory Experiment on the Usefulness of Financial Accounting 
Information to Security Analysts," Empirical Research in Accounting; 
Selected Studies, 1970, Supplement (Journal of Accounting Research, VII, 
(1970)), 25.
88"xhe New PE Column in the Stock Tables," Business Week, 
September 23, 1972, pp. 71-72.
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prices that have been so valuable in corporate acquisitions. Also, 
it affords, in a sense, job security for top m a n a g e m e n t
Similarly, Arthur Andersen & Co., a major accounting firm, 
recognizes the importance placed on earnings per share in the following 
statement:
. . . While there may be an overemphasis on earnings per share 
and a general failure to consider adequately other financial 
statistics, earnings-per-share information is in fact used as a 
convenient common denominator in investment valuation. Since 
earnings per share would undoubtedly be computed by someone, 
perhaps incorrectly, it is probably best dealt with in most 
situations in the financial statements.9®
The evidence presented has shown that earnings per share is an 
important statistic used in security valuation. The attributes of earn­
ings per share which seem important to investors will now be determined 




A survey of practitioners' stock valuation methods by Ralph A. 
Bing, an investment consultant to F. S. Smithers & Co., gives an indica­
tion of the variety of fundamental methods used and of the importance of 
earnings per share to each of these methods.^ The respondents to his
Q QOpinion expressed by LeRoy Layton, Chairman of the Accounting 
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants, in an address ("Accounting Principles under Fire") at Louisiana 
State University in New Orleans, April 27, 1970.
^Arthur Andersen & Co., Objective of Financial Statements for 
Business Enterprises (Chicago: Arthur Andersen & Co., 1972), p. 75.
^Ralph A. Bing, "Survey of Practitioners' Stock Evaluation 
Methods," Financial Analysts Journal, XXVII (May-June, 1971), 55-60.
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questionnaire included 31.5 percent of the 38 largest commercial banks 
and about 10 percent of the mutual funds with assets over $200 million, 
as well as a variety of other institutions, including eight large foun­
dations, universities, insurance companies, and company-managed pension 
funds of large industrial corporations. The questionnaire provided a 
choice of six fundamental methods of analysis, with space provided for 
the respondents to specify any other methods they might prefer. The 
methods enumerated by Bing were:
1. Estimate present value through discounting all future dividends.
2. Estimate present value through discounting future dividends and
estimated market value at the end of a specified holding period.
3. Estimate total future return from dividends and capital gains 
for a specified holding period and compare with a normal return 
for the stock in question.
4. Compare present actual price-earnings multiple with a normal 
multiple.
5. Compare price-estimated future earnings multiple at the end of 
a specified holding period with a normal multiple of this type.
6. Compare multiple and growth of individual stock with an industry
group multiple and g r o w t h . 92
An overwhelming majority of the respondents, 74.8 percent, indi­
cated a preference for one or more of the multiplier appraisal techniques. 
About 14.8 percent estimate future return and compare it with a normal 
return. Less than 6 percent use a present value technique and only 4.6 
percent specified a method other than the six enumerated by Bing.
Eighty-five percent of the respondents use more than one appraisal 
technique--an indication that the practitioner's approach to common stock
92Ibid., 56. 9^Ibid.
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valuation is both flexible and pragmatic. This is affirmed by a comment 
of one of the respondents to Bing's questionnaire that "the analyst's 
job remains essentially an unstructured one, and analytical approaches 
are highly individualistic, eclectic and, therefore, somewhat un­
stable."^
Bing's findings confirm those of Morton Backer in his survey of 
financial reporting for security investment decisions. Backer inter­
viewed 72 security analysts, of whom 50 were officers or partners in 
their respective firms--usually in charge of the investment research 
function. Backer found that the techniques for forecasting the probable 
future return from securities vary " . . .  from simple capitalization of
earnings per share at selected price/earnings multiples to sophisticated
95statistical methods and mathematical models." He concluded: "Security
valuation models employed by analysts indicate that future earnings is, 
by far, the most important determinant of the value of a share of common 
stock.
The basic variable common to all six valuation techniques included 
in Bing's questionnaire is earnings per share. This is true even though 
Methods 1, 2, and 3 require estimates of future dividends per share.
Since in the long run dividends are a function of earnings, the usual 
practice is to estimate future dividends per share by estimating future
94Ibid.
9SMorton Backer, Financial Reporting for Security Investment and 




earnings per share and dividend payout ratios.^
In addition, all of the valuation techniques except Method 1 
require an estimate of the security's sales price at the end of the hold­
ing period. This is explicit in Methods 2 and 3 and implicitly assumed 
in the multiplier t e c h n i q u e s . 98 The estimation of this sales price is 
also heavily dependent upon earnings per share. A common practice is to 
apply an earnings multiple to estimated earnings per share for the ter-
Q Qminal holding period. 7 The earnings multiplier or capitalization rate 
is subjectively determined by the quality of the earnings and the 
quality of the earnings is, to a large extent, a function of the volatil­
ity and growth rate of earnings per share.'*'®®
In summary, most valuation methods used in practice depend, 
directly or indirectly, upon (1) estimated future earnings per share and 
(2) a price-earnings multiplier or capitalization rate which is greatly 
influenced by the expected trend and variability of earnings per share.
The methods by which investors estimate these factors will now be ex­
amined more closely.
Earnings per share estimates. A major criticism of multiplier
^Badger, Torgerson, and Guthmann, op. cit., p. 230. An alternate 
method is to estimate dividends directly through an analysis of estimated 
cash flows. See Committee on External Reporting of the American Accoun­
ting Association, "An Evaluation of External Reporting Practices: A
Report of the 1966-68 Committee on External Reporting," The Accounting 
Review, XLIV (Supplement, 1969), 83-88.
98 .Bing, op. cit., 58.
99gadger, Thorgerson, and Guthmann, op. cit., p. 231.
•*®®Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 282.
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valuation methods is that they are so loosely structured that adequate 
consideration frequently is not given to all the factors implied in their 
usage. The practice of projecting future earnings per share as a simple 
extrapolation of past earnings per share is an example. Bellemore and 
Ritchie, in the following excerpt, imply that this procedure has been 
adopted by many analysts:
. . . many analysts in fact, although not admitting it, tend 
largely to extrapolate the going trend of earnings and dividends, 
correlating this with their quality classification of the company, 
and then to use these factors as a basis for selecting a capital­
ization rate for earnings (the price/earnings multiplier). How­
ever, the really successful investors and professional analysts are 
not those who largely extrapolate going trends, especially for 
those stocks and industries that are most popular at the moment.
On the contrary, the most important successes of investors and 
analysts rest on their ability to anticipate a change in the trend 
of earnings for industries and companies and the rate of growth 
of earnings before such a change is anticipated by the market in 
general. . . .101
This practice of projecting past earnings-per-share trends into 
the future has an important implication for earnings-per-share computa­
tions involving warrants. The timing of the recognition of the dilution 
to earnings per share caused by the exercise of -warrants is a factor 
which must be considered because this timing affects the trend and 
growth rate of the earnings per share that will be projected.
Backer found that the procedures used by the analysts he inter­
viewed for forecasting earnings per share were similar to those used 
internally for budget preparation.102 Sales are estimated first, based 
on the company's estimated share of the market, or based on the
•'■^Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., pp. 331-332. 
■^Backer, op. cit., p. 18.
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historical sales trend modified by anticipated changes in the trend.
Costs are then related to sales based on historical profit margins and 
operating ratios modified for the effect of expected changes in volume, 
prices, and costs.
Another method sometimes used by practicing analysts, and
103favored by academicians, is the return-on-investment approach. In­
vestment is usually defined as total capital, including long-term debt. 
This method has the advantage of focusing attention on the basic factors 
which influence profits--the rate of return on sales and the turnover of 
capital invested.
Although the two methods are not entirely independent of each 
other, using both techniques would allow a cross-check on the earnings- 
per-share estimates. Under either method, the projections are usually 
short-term, from one to three years.
Capitalization rates. One of the reasons for estimating future 
earnings per share is that the process of estimation allows the analyst 
to form an opinion about the quality of earnings. The capitalization 
rate which will be applied to current or future earnings per share is a 
subjective function of earnings quality. Although the quality of earn­
ings is affected by many intangible factors such as management capability, 
research and development prospects, accounting policy, and financial 
policy, it appears to be most heavily influenced by two variables--the
■^• Ŝee, for example, Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., pp. 341-342 
and Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, op. cit., pp. 409-410.
■'•^Backer, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
67
trend and variability of the trend of earnings per share. Backer ex­
plains the relationship between the stability and growth rate of earn­
ings per share and price-earnings multiples as follows:
Iii addition to the amount of annual earnings, the long-term 
trend and variations from this trend are variables, with a 
distinguishable effect on the market price of a stock. Thus 
stocks with a record of consistent and rapid growth in earnings 
tend to sell at higher P/E multiples than do stocks which have 
a record of slow growth or erratic profits. . . .105
Review of a number of research reports from various brokerage 
firms confirms these observations. The following excerpts are typical:
In view of the company's prospects for outstanding growth 
in per share earnings over the next several years, the stock of 
Hospital Corporation has the potential for above-average appre­
ciation. Despite the premium multiple, some expansion in the 
price:earnings ratio appears possible given the company's 
exceptional earnings outlook, strong management and sound 
financial position.^06
Projected earnings growth should average in excess of 207o 
annually over next three years, justifying premium multiple.107
The company's excellent outlook for earnings growth and the 
high quality of its profits as demonstrated in the current eco­
nomic climate, warrant, in our opinion, a multiple of 25 times 
earnings. ̂ 08
In Chapter 1, the apparent effect of the trend and variability 
of earnings per share on the price of Dr. Pepper and Royal Crown Cola
105Ibid., p. 17.
^^Research Department, F. I. duPont, Glore Forgan & Co., 
Hospital Coraporation of America. April 13, 1971.
■^^Research Department, duPont Glore Forgan, Incorporated, 
Shapell Industries, May 18, 1971.
i naiUOInvestment Research Department, E. F. Hutton & Company, Inc., 
Tandy Corporation, January, 1971.
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shares was demonstrated.**^ The following example of a hypothetical 
situation illustrates the effect that one assumption as to the use of 
warrant proceeds has on the absolute amount of earnings per share and on 
its trend and variability. Assumptions are as follows:
1. Net income before interest and taxes is $10,000,000 in 
Year 1 and increases 10 percent each year. The tax rate 
is 50 percent.
2. Six percent debentures in the principal amount of 
$35,000,000 are outstanding.
3. Warrants to purchase 2,000,000 shares of common stock at 
$15 per share are outstanding during Years 1-3.
4. Four million common shares are outstanding prior to 
exercise of the warrants.
5. The warrants are exercised at the beginning of Year 4 and 
the proceeds are used to retire debentures at par.
Earnings per common share are computed as follows:
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Net income before
interest and taxes $10,000,000 $11,000,000 $12,100,000 $13,310,000 
Interest 2.100.000 2.100.000 2.100.000 300.000
Net income before
taxes $ 7,900,000 $ 8,900,000 $10,000,000 $13,010,000
Taxes $ 3.950.000 4.450.000 5.000.000 6.505.000
Net income $ 3.950,000 $ 4,450,000 $5.000,000 $ 6,505.000
Earnings per common
share $0.99 $1.11 $1.25 $1.08
Percent increase 
(decrease) over
preceding period 13.1 12.1 12.1 (13.6)
109See page 15.
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If the assumption were made that warrants are exercised at the 
beginning of each period and that the proceeds earn at the interest rate 
on debt, net of tax effect, then earnings per common share and common 
share equivalents would have been as follows;
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Net income,
per above $3,950,000 $4,450,000 $5,000,000 $6,505,000
Adjustment for as­
sumed earnings on 
warrant proceeds 
(2,000,000 X $15
X .03) 900,000 900,000 900,000 __________
Adjusted net income $4,850,000 $5,350,000 $5,900,000 $6.505,000
Earnings per common 
share and common
share equivalents $0.81 $0.89 $0.98 $1.08
Percent increase 
(decrease) over
preceding period (6.9) 9.9 10.1 10.2
The percentages of increase or decrease of earnings per share in 
Year 1 over the preceding year have been included for purposes of the 
discussion which follows. In computing these percentages, the assump­
tion is that the debentures were issued with warrants attached at the 
beginning of Year 1 to refund a similar issue without warrants. If all 
other assumptions remain the same, then earnings per common share in the 
period preceding Year 1 would have been $0.87.
This example demonstrates the effect that the timing of the 
recognition of the dilution caused by the exercise of warrants can have 
on the absolute amount, the trend, and the variability of earnings per 
share. Consider an investor who bases his investment decisions on a
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simple extrapolation of past trends. Such an investor would give little 
consideration to future operating and financial changes which might 
affect earnings per share and share prices.
Assume that at the end of Year 2 this investor attempted to esti­
mate share prices as of the end of Year 4. His estimate based on earnings 
per common share would probably be considerably higher than it would if 
he used earnings per common share and common share equivalents. In 
the first place, his projection of earnings per share in Year 4 would be 
higher because the earnings in the base years are higher ($0.99 and $1.11 
versus $0.81 and $0.89). Secondly, his earnings projection would be 
higher because the trend as measured by the percentage of increase or 
decrease in earnings per share over preceding years is higher (13.870 and 
12.1Yo versus -6.9% and 9.9%).
In arriving at his price estimate, the investor would also apply 
a higher multiple to his higher estimate of earnings per share in Year 4. 
The higher multiple is the result of two factors. First, the trend of 
earnings per common share is higher than the trend of earnings per common 
share and common share equivalents. Second, the variability of the trend 
is lower if he uses earnings per common share. A favorable trend and 
variability in the trend would impress the investor and cause him to com­
pound his error by assigning a higher multiple to his higher estimate of 
earnings.
The preceding example, however, is only as good as its assump­
tions, one of which was that the warrants were exercised at the beginning 
of Year 4. If the warrants had expired without exercise, the investor's 
price estimate based on earnings per common share may well have been
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closer to actual price in Year 4 than the estimate he would have made 
based on the projection of earnings per common share and common share 
equivalents. Thus, the frequency of exercise of warrant issues also has 
a bearing on earnings-per-share computations involving warrants. This 
problem will be considered in Chapter 3.
In summary, earnings per share is a vital statistic for many 
security valuation models. In the basic model, current or estimated 
future earnings per share is one of the two variables. The other vari­
able is the earnings multiple or capitalization rate, the value of which 
is dependent, to a great extent, on the trend and variability of past 
and future earnings per share.
SIGNIFICANT ATTRIBUTES OF EARNINGS PER SHARE 
USED BY INVESTORS
In evaluating methods of computing the earnings per share of com­
panies with warrants outstanding, certain attributes of earnings per share 
are important because they affect the value that investors place on 
common stocks. These attributes, which have been discussed extensively 
in this chapter, are summarized below.
1. The absolute amount of earnings per share in any given period 
is important because it is one of the variables used in many valuation 
models. As the preceding example demonstrated, the absolute amount of 
earnings per share is affected by the timing of the recognition of the 
dilution to earnings per share which might be caused by the exercise of 
warrants. Similarly, the absolute amount of earnings per share is 
affected by the assumption which is made as to the use of warrant proceeds.
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It is a truism, of course, that the absolute amounts of earnings per 
share for successive periods affect the trend and variability of earnings 
per share which are discussed below.
2. The trend of earnings per share is an important attribute 
because investors use trend as a qualitative factor in their estimates 
of earnings multiples or capitalization rates. Investors place a higher 
value on an upward trend and a high growth rate of earnings per share 
than they do on a downward or erratic trend and a low growth rate. If 
warrants are exercised and are in fact dilutive, then trend during the 
period the warrants were outstanding is adversely affected unless recog­
nition of the dilutive effect is given from the date of issue of the 
warrants. On the other hand, if recognition of the dilutive effect of 
warrants is given in the earnings-per-share computation from date of 
issue and the warrants expire without exercise, trend is also adversely 
affected. In such a case, the trend as measured by the percentage of 
increase in earnings per share is higher than would be justified by the 
facts. The overstated trend can be attributed to the lower base-period 
earnings per share which may result from the assumption that warrants are 
exercised. The frequency of exercise of warrant issues is therefore a 
factor to be considered in evaluating earnings-per-share computational 
methods involving warrants.
3. The variability of the trend of earnings per share is also a 
factor which affects common stock valuation. Investors place a higher 
multiple on earnings with a stable growth than they do on earnings with 
an erratic growth. Financial and market risk factors are therefore in­
cluded in the earnings multiple or capitalization rate. Since the purpose
73
of security valuation models that utilize earnings per share is to 
predict subsequent market price (the dependent variable), earnings-per- 
share computational methods which allow the variability of trend (one of 
the independent variables) to be influenced by market price are question­
able .
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Prior to World War I common stocks as a class were not considered 
investments. During this period security analysis was based on the 
balance sheet. Many firms did not publish income statements and earnings- 
per-shre statistics were not cited by financial publications.
Investor acceptance of common stocks as investments followed the 
publication of E. L. Smith's book in 1924. The emphasis of valuation 
methods shifted from the balance sheet to the income statement. More 
firms began publishing income statements, but generally the detail neces­
sary to intelligently project the statements into the future was lacking. 
As a result, investors began projecting earnings per share and applying 
an earnings multiple to the projected earnings.
Earnings-per-share statistics were often misleading because the 
method of computation was not standardized. Accountants refused to in­
clude earnings per share in the financial statements because they did not 
wish to encourage valuation techniques based solely on earnings per share. 
However, accountants failed in this attempt and the earnings capitaliza­
tion model is still a basic common stock valuation technique. With the 
increasing availablility of financial information and improvements in 
income statement presentation, however, an assumption that more investors
74
now analyze the underlying variables affecting earnings per share appears 
logical.
After the stock market crash in 1929, academicians began research 
on common stock valuation models, market price behavior, and portfolio 
management. Present value theory, long used in bond analysis, was 
applied to common stock valuation. While the theory is accepted by most 
practicing analysts, it has not proved successful as a working model 
because of the impossibility of projecting cash flows for long periods 
into the future. Earnings per share is an important statistic in present 
value models, however, because dividends per share are usually predicted 
on the basis of estimated earnings per share and estimated dividend pay­
out ratios.
Beginning with the 1950's, extensive empirical testing of the 
theory of random walks was performed. A market in which changes in stock 
prices are completely random implies a perfect market in which all infor­
mation affecting security prices is available to all participants simul­
taneously. The empirical evidence indicates that common stock prices are 
sufficiently random to cast serious doubt on technical analysis tech­
niques which rely on the past behavior of prices.
As a result of the random walk research, the efficient markets 
theory evolved. In such a market, an analyst using fundamental tech­
niques can be successful if he is able to discover information not gen­
erally known to the investing public or if he can transform public 
information in some unique manner. Earnings per share continues to be 
one of the principal variables used by fundamentalists in these efforts.
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In conclusion, earnings per share is a major input to invest­
ment decision making. The attributes of earnings per share used by 
investors are the absolute amount, the trend, and the variability of the 
trend. The absolute amount of earnings per share is one of the basic 
variables in the widely-used earnings capitalization model and the trend 
and variability are major factors influencing the value of the other 
variable--the capitalization rate. Any method of computing earnings per 
share involving warrants must be evaluated in terms of the effect it has 
on these attributes.
The next chapter will analyze the characteristics of warrants 
which are important to the computation of earnings per share. The 
guidelines for computing earnings per share of companies with warrants 
outstanding will be formulated from these characteristics and from the 
attributes of earnings per share developed in this chapter.
Chapter 3
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WARRANTS
In the preceding chapter the attributes of earnings per share 
considered to be of importance to investors were determined through a 
survey of the earnings-per-share literature. Of equal importance in 
formulating guidelines for the computation of earnings per share of 
companies with warrants outstanding are the characteristics of warrants. 
These characteristics are examined in this chapter through an analysis 
of warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange.
After a brief review of the historical background of warrants, 
the warrants included in this study are described. The methods of issue 
and reasons therefor and the contractual provisions are analyzed next. 
Finally, the exercise experience of those warrants which expired during 
the period under study is determined. From these analyses, the charac­
teristics of warrants which need to be considered in earnings-per-share 
computations are formulated.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF WARRANTS
Warrants have been used as a financing tool for many years. 
Hickman cites a warrant issue in 1906,^ but Graham and Dodd attribute
Hj. Braddock Hickman, Statistical Measures of Corporate Bond Fi­
nancing Since 1900 (Princeton, New Jersey: National Bureau of Economic
Research, Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 210 as cited in Richard 
A.Stevenson and Joe Lovely, "Why a Bond Warrant Issue?" Financial 
Executive. XXXVIII (June, 1970), 17.
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the first warrant issue to American Power and Light in 1911.  ̂ Regardless 
of their date or origin, warrants first became popular during the bull 
market of the 1920's. Hickman reported that 403 of the 450 warrant 
issues from 1900 through 1943 were offered between 1924 and 1931.^
The highly volatile nature of warrant prices and their typically 
rapid decline in value threw warrants into disrepute during the depression 
and war years of the 1930's and 1940's. Hayes and Reiling cite an exam­
ple of investor experience with warrants during this period. American 
and Foreign Power Company warrants, which were attached to a $270 million 
issue of second preferred stock, attained a market value in excess of a 
billion dollars during 1929. When recapitalization of the company was 
completed in 1952, the warrants were eliminated from the capital structure 
and became worthless.^
The next increase in warrant issues came during the bull market 
from 1959 to 1961. With the drop in the market which occurred in 1962, 
warrant issues again lagged until 1967. Interest in warrants has con­
tinued since that time with a record of 123 issues being established in
1969.^ As would be expected, warrant issues appear to be most popular 
when stock prices are rising. The reason for this popularity is the
^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security 
Analysis: Principles and Technique (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1962), p. 656.
OHickman, loc, cit., as cited in Stevenson and Lovely, loc. cit.
^Samuel L. Hayes, III and Henry B. Reiling, "Sophisticated Fi­
nancing Tool: The Warrant," Harvard Business Review. XLVII (January-
February, 1969), 138.
^P. Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments," (un­
published Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970), p. 15.
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leverage which warrants provide to investors. Successful leverage is 
dependent upon rising prices for the underlying common stock.
Other factors have also contributed to the current popularity of 
warrants. The tight-money situation which prevailed in 1968 and 1969 
encouraged the use of warrants as a means of reducing interest and divi­
dend payments. In other cases, financially weak companies were forced 
to add warrants or a conversion feature to their securities in order to 
obtain additional capital.
Increased merger activity has also led to more warrant usage. 
Conglomerates, in the highly competitive market for merger candidates, 
found that warrants offered in packages with other securities permitted 
greater flexibility in meeting the particular needs of the seller. War­
rants, unlike convertible securities, were not considered residual under 
APB Opinion No. 9 and, therefore, did not enter into earnings-per-share 
computations until exercised. Conglomerates, being dependent upon con­
tinuing earnings-per-share growth for successful acquisitions, appear to 
have utilized warrants for this purpose in 1967 and 1968. The issuance 
of APB Opinion No. 15 in 1969 eliminated this advantage of warrants.
DESCRIPTION OF WARRANTS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY
The determination of the characteristics of warrants that are im­
portant to earnings-per-share computations requires the analysis of a 
representative group of warrant issues. A description of the method of 
selection of the warrants included in this study and an analysis of the 
population selected by industry and date of issue follow.
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Selection of Warrants for Study
The leading exchange for warrant listings has traditionally been
the American Stock Exchange, although in 1970 the New York Stock Exchange
£began listing warrants for the first time since 1919. Because of the 
much more stringent listing requirements, few issues are listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange. Consequently, the American Stock Exchange is 
expected to remain the leading exchange for warrant listings.^ A few 
warrant issues are also listed on the Pacific Coast Exchange and the 
Toronto Exchange.
The warrants chosen for analysis in this study are those listed 
on the American Stock Exchange. Unlike the New York Stock Exchange, the 
American Stock Exchange imposes no restrictions on the life of the war­
rants, the exercise price in relation to the market price of the under­
lying common stock, or the number of warrants issued in relation to the 
common shares outstanding on the warrant issue date. The major require­
ments of the American Stock Exchange are that the securities underlying 
the warrant issue be listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the 
American Stock Exchange and that the issue be for at least 500,000
Qwarrants. This study, therefore, includes a majority of the listed 
warrant issues.
In order to increase the number of issues studies and to gather 
data on characteristics related to the exercise of warrants, all warrants 
listed on the American Stock Exchange at any time during the period from
6"Big Board, Breaking Tradition, Plans to List Long-Term War­
rants," The Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1970, p. 6 .
^Royer, op. cit., p. 116. ®Ibid., pp. 117-118.
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January 1, 1950 through December 31, 1971 are included. Selection of 
listed warrant issues was made by examining American Stock Exchange
transactions as published in The Wall Street Journal for warrants listed
on January 2 of each year from 1950 through 1972. This method assures 
the inclusion of all warrants with the possible exception of those listed 
for part of one calendar year. The likelihood of a warrant issue being 
listed for less than one calendar year is remote.
Only warrants exercisable in common stock of the issuing company
are included. This criterion eliminates secondary offerings which do not 
result in additional shares of common stock being issued. An example is 
the five-year registered warrants issued by Amerada Hess Corporation on 
June 15, 1971 to purchase Louisiana Land and Exploration Company common 
at $40.50 per share. The exercise of these warrants will not result in 
the issuance of additional shares of Louisiana Land and Exploration 
Company because Amerada Hess holds 1,800,000 shares as an investment.
In order to determine whether warrant characteristics have 
changed over time, each characteristic analyzed is first classified by 
date of issue. The periods used for this classification are arbitrary, 
except for the years 1967-1968 and 1969-1971. This classification 
provides the basis for a comparison of the characteristics of warrants 
issued during the period when APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect with the 
characteristics of warrants issued during the period when APB Opinion 
No. 15 was in effect.
Some of the tables which follow refer to warrant series and the 
others refer to warrant issues. Warrants of the McCrory Corporation will 
be used to explain the difference between the two terms. On March 7,
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1961 McCrory Corporation offered for each share of Lerner Stores common 
stock: (a) cash in the amount of $33 or (b) $40 principal amount of 
McCrory 4 1/2% subordinated debentures due 1976 and a warrant to purchase 
1 1/2 shares of McCrory common at $20 per share until March 15, 1976.
This offer resulted in McCrory's issuing warrants to purchase 1,585,274 
shares of its common.
Subsequently on June 21, 1961 McCrory merged H. L. Green Stores 
by exchanging for each H. L. Green common share 1/5 of a share of new $100 
par 4 1/2% cumulative convertible preferred B stock and a warrant to pur­
chase 1 1/2 shares of McCrory common at $20 per share until March 15, 1976. 
Warrants to purchase 1,091,580 shares were issued as a result of this ex­
change . Each of the preceding transactions resulted in a warrant issue, 
but because the terms of the warrants issued in both transactions are 
identical except for the date of issue, only one warrant series to pur­
chase 2,676,854 common shares of McCrory Corporation is outstanding.
In a tender offer which expired on April 29, 1966 McCrory Corpora­
tion made an exchange offer to the security holders of S. Klein Department 
Stores which resulted in the issuance of warrants to purchase 2,986,955 
McCrory common shares at $20 per share to March 15, 1976 and at $22.50 
per share thereafter to March 15, 1981. This is a new warrant series 
because the terms are different from the first series. Following this 
transaction McCrory had two warrant series outstanding, but three separate 
warrant issues had occurred.
Some companies do issue warrants from a series on more than one 
occasion as is evidenced by the fact that this study includes 106 warrant 
issues from 94 warrant series. The 94 warrant series were issued by 90
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companies with four companies having used two series of warrants either 
sequentially within the time span (one company) or concurrently.
Classification of Warrant Issuers 
by Industry
The classification of companies into industrial groups has become 
increasingly difficult in recent years due to the diversification policies 
followed by many companies. The industry classifications of Table 1 are 
those of The Value Line Investment Survey.̂  Those companies not included 
in The Value Line Investment Survey were classified into its industrial 
groups on the basis of their standard industrial classification codes as 
published in Standard & Poor's Corporate Directory. ^
The most active warrant issuers, as shown by Table 1, are con­
glomerates with 19 issues, real estate investment trusts with 17, and 
holding and investment companies with 7. Warrants have, however, been 
used by a wide range of industrial groups. Table 1 includes 31 of the 68 
groups in The Value Line Investment Survey. The major groups which have 
not used warrants appear to be those in old, well-established industries 
and those in industries where a few companies are dominant. These in­
clude tire and rubber, copper, steel, maritime, railroad, aluminum, 
railroad equipment, and tobacco.
In view of the previous discussion, the fact that conglomerates 
are the most active user of warrants is not surprising. Conglomerate
^The Value Line Investment Survey (New York: Arnold Bernhard & 
Co., Inc., 1972).
■^Standard & Poor's Corporation, Standard & Poor's Corporate 
Directory (New York: Standard & Poor's Corporation, 1972).
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Table 1. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American 
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 















Aerospace 1 1 2
Air transport 2 3 1 6
Auto and truck 1 1
Auto parts 1 1 2
Baking 1 1 2
Building 2 2
Chemical 1 1
Conglomerate 1 9 9 19
Electrical equipment/
electronics 1 1 2
Finance 2 2
Food processing 2 2
Holding and investment
companies, excluding
real estate 3 1 3 7
Leasing 1 1
Machinery 3 1 2 6
Meat packing 1 1 1 3
Metals and mining 3 1 4
Mobile homes 1 1
Natural gas 1 1
Office equipment/
computer 1 1
Packaging and container 1 1
Paper 1 1
Personal services 1 1 2
Petroleum 1 2 3
Precision Instruments 1 1
Real estate 3 1 4
Real estate investment
trusts 1 16 17
Recreation 1 2 3
Retail stores 3 1 1 5
Telecommunications 1 1
Textile 1 1 2
Truck and bus lines 1 1
Totals 5 19 11 27 44 106
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, The Value Line Invest­
ment Survey, and Standard and Poor's Corporate Directory.
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managements are aggressive and willing to assume risks, as evidenced by 
their acquisitions of other companies. Such managements are less likely 
to be averse to using warrants which involve much uncertainty for the 
issuer as well as the investor. However, since many conglomerate acqui­
sitions depend upon consistently increasing earnings per share and APB 
Opinion No. 15 adversely affected the earnings per share of companies 
with warrants outstanding, the expectation would be that warrant issues 
by conglomerates would decline after the opinion was issued.
Further analysis shows this to be true. There were nine warrant 
issues by conglomerates during the 196 7-1968 period and none in the pre­
vious period from 1960-1966. The indication is that some conglomerates 
used warrants instead of convertible debentures in their acquisitions 
after the publication of APB Opinion No. 9. They did this in order to 
take advantage of the fact that convertible debentures might be classi­
fied as residual securities and adversely affect earnings per share 
whereas warrants were excluded from the residual security category. 
Analysis of warrant issues early in 1969 reveals that four additional 
issues took place before management had knowledge of the adverse affect 
that warrants would have on earnings per share under APB Opinion No. 15. 
There were, then, really 13 warrant issues by conglomerates during the 
period in which APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect and only five issues 
under APB Opinion No. 15. Further, of the nine issues in Table 1 
occurring between 1969 and 1971, seven occurred in 1969 and only two in 
1971. While other factors such as interest rates may have been influ­
ential, the evidence presented here supports the premise that conglo­
merate management's financial decisions were influenced by accounting 
rule changes.
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The major change which has occurred among warrant issuers since 
1968 is the increase in warrant issues by real estate investment trusts. 
Sixteen of the seventeen issues by this group were made during the 1969- 
1971 period.
Real estate investment trusts were authorized by Congress in 1960 
for the purpose of providing small investors an opportunity to invest in 
real estate. These trusts are similar to closed-end mutual funds, except 
that they invest in real estate rather than securities. They provide 
small investors with many of the advantages of mutual funds, such as 
diversification, pooling of resources, spreading of risk, professional 
management, and easy marketability through transferable shares or 
certificates of beneficial interest.^
Although real estate investment trusts were authorized in 1960, 
they did not become popular until the stock market decline of 1969-
1970. Investors became interested in them as a means of achieving a 
more stable investment for income and capital gains, as a tax shelter, 
and as a hedge against inflation. Many of the real estate investment 
trusts in this study made their initial stock offerings in 1970. In 
order to sell the stock in a declining market, they attached warrants to 
the shares of beneficial interest. A typical offering included a three 
to five year warrant to buy an additional share, usually at the same 
price as the warrant-stock unit was offered.
By 1971 the price of some of these issues was above the exercise
Hjay Drob, "What You Should Know about Real Estate Investment 
Trusts." The Practical Accountant, IV (May-June, 1971), 35.
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1 9price of the warrants. In several of these trusts the number of war­
rants outstanding is equal to the number of shares outstanding. As a 
consequence, the dilution recognized in primary and fully diluted earn­
ings per share is material. Since the trusts must distribute at least 
90 percent of their ordinary income to shareholders in order to qualify 
and such distributions are on actual shares outstanding, dividends per 
share in some cases are higher than earnings per share although the 
distribution is from current earnings.
One additional characteristic of the industry groups in Table 1 
requires investigation. Warrants are attractive to investors because 
the leverage that they offer over the related common stock can be used 
to amplify profits. One of the requirements for successful leverage is 
a fluctuation in the market price of the underlying common stock. Com­
panies with highly volatile stock prices are more likely to issue
warrants because their warrants would offer more leverage to investors.
13To verify this condition, the beta factors of the companies included
■^M. H. Rich, "Will APB No. 15 Confuse Investors in REITs?" The 
Practical Accountant. IV (May-June, 1971), 39.
1 ̂iJBeta as computed by The Value Line Investment Survey is de­
scribed as follows:
A measure of the sensitivity of a stock's price to overall 
fluctuations in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Average. A 
Beta of 1.5 indicates a stock tends to rise (or fall) 1.5% with a 
1% rise (or fall) in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Average. 
The 'beta factor' is derived from a least squares regression 
analysis between weekly percent changes in the price of a stock 
and weekly percent changes in the New York Stock Exchange Average 
over a period of five years. In the case of shorter price 
histories, a smaller time period is used, but never less than 
two years.
See The Value Line Investment Survey (New York: Arnold Bernhard & Co.,
Inc., 1974), p. 225 of the October 11, 1974 Edition 1.
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in The Value Line Investment Survey were analyzed. The median beta was 
1.56 and the range was from .41 to 2.21. Only five of the 37 companies 
included in The Value Line Investment Survey had beta factors less than 
one. In other words, a one percent change in the level of the stock 
market would probably result in a 1.56 percent change in the common 
stock price of the median company which issues warrants. The conclusion 
is that most of the companies in this study do have volatile stock 
prices.
The volatility of stock prices of companies with warrants out­
standing has implications for earnings-per-share computations of com­
panies with warrants outstanding. Under the treasury stock method of 
APB Opinion No. 15. earnings per share varies inversely with the market 
price of the company's common stock.^ The result is that variability 
is introduced into earnings per share solely as a result of the method 
of computation.
In summary, warrants have been issued by companies operating in 
a wide range of industrial groups. However, the stock prices of these 
companies are generally more volatile than those of the average company. 
Conglomerates have been most active in issuing warrants, particularly 
during the period when APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect. Many real 
estate investment trusts are currently issuing warrants with their common 
stock offerings. The nature of their operations points out a weakness 
in earnings per share as promulgated by APB Opinion No. 15. This
^The treasury stock method of computing earnings per share is 
analyzed in Chapter 5.
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weakness is one of the factors which must be considered in formulating 
guidelines for earnings per share computations.
METHOD OF ISSUE AND REASONS THEREFOR
Warrants are unlike most debt and equity securities because they
1 Care very seldom offered alone for cash. J Instead, they are usually 
attached to other securities to facilitate their sale or to reduce 
interest or dividends. Warrants are also used in acquisitions and re­
organizations to provide a potential equity interest to the holders of 
the securities being acquired or exchanged. In short, warrants are not 
a direct source of capital when issued; they are a catalyst which 
management can use as an aid in raising capital from other sources.
Most of the warrants in this study were issued with another secu­
rity in exchange for cash. As indicated by Table 2, 59 of the 106 issues, 
or 56 percent, were issued in this manner. Except for the period prior 
to 1950, this method of issue has dominated all others, and its fre­
quency of use appears to be increasing.
The second most frequent use of warrants was for acquisitions. 
Warrants were issued alone or in conjunction with other securities 32 
times, or 30 percent of the total issues, for the acquisition of the 
securities of another corporation. With the current decline in merger
^Royer, in an analysis of 167 warrant issues, reports one in­
stance in which warrants alone were offered for cash to an institutional 
investor and to a director of the company. See Royer, op. cit., p. 58. 
Schwartz advocates offering warrants alone for cash in public offerings 
in order to avoid the sale of common stock at a discount from market.
See William Schwartz, "Warrants: A Form of Equity Capital," Financial 
Analysts Journal, XXVI (September-October, 1970), 87-101.
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Table 2. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American 
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 


















1. Issued as a unit 
with other 
securities for 
cash 12 9 11 27 59 56
2. Issued alone or as 
a unit with other 
securities as 
part consideration 
for the securities 
of another 
corporation 3 2 5 11 11 32 30
3. Issued alone or as a 
unit with other 
securities in ex­
change for other 
securities as part 
of a reorganization 2 2 1 3 8 7
4. Issued as a dividend 
to stockholders 1 3 4 4
5. Other uses 3 3 3
Total 5 16 14 27 44 106 100
Source; Compiled from The Wall Street Journal. Moody's Industrial 
Manua1, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, 
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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activity, this method of issuing warrants has declined from 41 percent 
of the issues in 1967-1968 to 25 percent of the issues in 1969-1971.
Warrants were issued alone or in conjunction with other securi­
ties in exchange for other securities as part of a reorganization or re­
capitalization eight times, or 7 percent of the total issues. This is 
one of the oldest uses of warrants. The newest use of warrants is for 
a distribution to stockholders in lieu of or in addition to cash or 
stock dividends. Four issues, or 4 percent of the total issues, were 
for this purpose. Other uses accounted for 3 percent of the total. A 
more detailed discussion of these methods of issuing warrants follows.
Issued with Other Securities 
for Cash
The security most frequently offered with warrants in exchange
for cash was straight debt, usually subordinated debentures. As shown
in Table 3, 30 warrant issues out of 59, or 51 percent, were attached to
non-convertible bonds.
There are two basic reasons for attaching warrants to bond issues.
First, a straight bond might require an interest rate so high as to be
unattractive to the lender. Lenders sometimes avoid making loans with
high interest rates because of the implication that the lender is making
16loans that are too risky. If attaching a warrant to the bond reduces 
the effective interest rate to a level acceptable by the lender, then 
the issuer has obtained funds which might otherwise have been unattain­
able .
■^Richard a. Stevenson and Joe Lovely, "Why a Bond Warrant Issue?" 
Financial Executive. XXXVIII (June, 1970), 17.
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Table 3. Classification of Securities Issued with Warrants to Raise Cash 
by Type and Date of Issue; Fifty-Nine Warrant Issues Listed on the Ameri­




















Straight debt 8 7 9 6 30 51
Convertible debt 1 2 3 5
Common stock 3 1 1 19 24 41
Other 1 1 2 3
Total 12 9 11 27 59 100
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's 
Bank and Finance Manua1, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual 
Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Second, straight-debt funds may be available at interest rates so 
high that they are unacceptable to the borrower. Payment of such high 
interest rates might be interpreted as a financial weakness of the bor­
rower. Or, if the firm has liquidity problems, the lower interest rates 
provided by the bond-warrant unit may reduce the cash outflow to an 
acceptable level. Further, if the warrants are exercised, there will be 
an additional cash inflow.
The two reasons given for attaching warrants to straight debt 
are also applicable to convertible debt. What advantage does the bond- 
warrant unit have over a comparable convertible security? Opinions are 
varied. Stevenson and Lovely contend that a bond-warrant package can 
be issued at a higher price than an equivalent convertible bond because
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of the additional options offered by the bond-warrant. These additional 
options are due to the separability of the bond and the warrant. A bond- 
warrant holder can: (1) sell the bond and hold the warrant, (2) hold the
bond and sell the warrant, or (3) hold the bond and exercise the warrants. 
None of these options is available to the convertible bond h o l d e r . I n  
addition, convertible bonds usually have a call privilege which intro­
duces uncertainty about the expiration date whereas very few warrant 
issues are subject to call.^®
For these reasons, the number of shares offered in the warrant 
option per bond can be less than the number of shares contained in the 
conversion option per bond. At issue date, the conversion price of the 
bond multiplied by the number of shares equals the par value of the con­
vertible bond. The only means by which the number of shares can be re­
duced is by increasing the conversion price. But the market tends to 
discount the conversion feature if the conversion price is placed too 
high. Hayes and Reiling found that the average conversion premium on a 
sample of convertible debentures sol-1 in 1968 was 11.5 percent. They
19state that investment bankers use 10 to 15 percent as a working guide.
The exercise value of warrants attached to a bond is seldom equal 
to the bond's par value. Hayes and Reiling found the relationship to be
o n65 percent in 1968. Royer, in his study of 71 units issued between 
17Ibid., 18.
•*-®Samuel L. Hayes, III and Henry B. Reiling, "Sophisticated 




1950 and 1969, found the ratio of the exercise value to the par value was 
48 percent.^ Since the issuer can vary the number of warrants offered 
with each bond, there is more flexibility in setting the exercise price. 
Table 7 on page 115 indicates that the median exercise price for the 30 
straight debt-warrant units in this study was 4 percent above the market 
price of the related common stock on the issue date. But the range was 
very wide, from more than 25 percent below market to more than 25 per­
cent above market.
Since fewer shares are optioned per bond in a bond-warrant unit 
than are optioned in an equivalent convertible bond, potential dilution 
of shares outstanding is greater if convertible bonds are employed.
Hayes and Reiling imply that, as a result of less dilution in shares,
22there will also be less dilution in earnings per share. Royer con-
2 3eludes that no such generalizations can be made. By making certain 
restrictive assumptions, Royer demonstrates that earnings per share can 
be lower under the bond-warrant option than under the convertible bond 
option. But this occurs only when earnings per share before exercise or 
conversion is lower than earnings per share after exercise or conversion. 
In other words, neither the convertible bonds nor the warrants were 
dilutive to earnings per share.
What Royer has demonstrated is the effect of unfavorable leverage
^P. Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments," (un­
published Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970), p. 
228.
22Hayes and Reiling, op. cit., 142.
23R0yer, op. cit., pp. 229-232.
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on earnings per share. When a company is in the unfortunate position of 
having a rate of return on assets that is lower than the interest rate 
on its debt then conversion of all bonds will increase earnings per 
share more than retirement of a portion of the bonds (40 percent in 
Royer's illustration) from warrant proceeds. The conclusion is that a 
bond-warrant issue will always produce less dilution in earnings per 
share than an equivalent convertible bond issue, provided that the pro­
ceeds from the warrants are employed in such a manner as to earn a rate 
of return that is equal to or greater than the interest rate that was
paid on the bonds which were converted.
Theoretically, bond-warrant issues also have cash flow advantages 
over an equivalent convertible bond issue. There are two reasons. First, 
the bond discount deductible for tax purposes is likely to be greater in 
a bond-warrant issue because tax regulations require the proceeds to be 
allocated between the bond and the warrant. Regulations do not allow a 
similar allocation to the conversion option of a convertible security.
The result is that the bond-warrant issue discount is likely to be
greater, thus requiring less cash outflow for taxes.
Second, warrants will provide additional cash inflow if they are 
exercised. The terms of convertible bond issues generally do not provide 
for the payment of additional cash when the bonds are converted. How­
ever, the warrant issuer has very little control over the cash flow from 
warrant exercise. Generally a few warrants may be exercised each year, 
but most will not be exercised until the expiration date nears. There 
is, of course, the possibility that the warrants will not be exercised at
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expiration because the market price of the stock may be below the exer­
cise price.
Another minor advantage of warrants attached to bonds is that 
they may allow a firm to increase its financial leverage if the use of 
warrants has the effect of making an otherwise unsaleable issue saleable. 
The firm can control leverage subsequent to issue by retaining the right 
to accept bonds at par in the exercise of the warrants. Leverage might 
be important for a company which needs new funds but finds that its 
existing debt-equity ratio makes it difficult to obtain them.^
As shown in Table 3, warrants were attached to common stock in 
24 of the 59 issues for cash. Their use for this purpose is increasing.
In the 1969-1971 period, 70 percent of the issues were attached to common 
stock. Fourteen of these 19 issues were by real estate investment trusts.
Warrants are issued with common stock to avoid underpricing of 
a new common stock issue. Normally an issue of common stock must be 
offered at less than its current market value if it is to be success­
fully marketed. If the stock is fully priced when the new issue is 
offered, the current market price may have to be discounted by as much 
as 10 percent.25 gy attaching warrants to the issue, the common stock 
can be sold at market. Avoiding a discount from underpricing might be 
important if the company is planning to make acquisitions with its 
common stock within the near future.
When a warrant is attached to preferred stock, the dividend can
^Richard A. Stevenson and Joe Lovely, "Why a Bond Warrant Issue?" 
Financial Executive. XXXVIII (June, 1970), 20.
25Hayes and Reiling, op. cit., 143.
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be reduced which results in a reduction of cash outflows for dividends. 
The same effect can be achieved with common stock in that fewer shares 
of warrant-common stock units will be issued to produce a given amount 
of funds.
Issued Alone or with Other 
Securities as Part of the 
Consideration for the Securities 
of Another Corporation
Acquisition-oriented companies that use warrants as part of their 
offer have usually combined them with one other security. As indicated 
by Table 4, this was true for 65 percent of the issues. Warrants were 
most frequently attached to straight debt, although in the 1969-1971 
period common stock was equally favored.
There appears to be a trend, however, toward more complicated 
exchanges. In the 1967-1968 period only about 9 percent of the issues 
involved warrants and two other securities. In the 1969-1971 period 
this increased to more than 45 percent of the cases. During this period, 
the preferred combination of securities was convertible debt and common 
stock.
There were two occasions when warrants were the only security 
offered in exchange for the securities of another corporation. In 1968 
Ryder Systems, Inc. acquired M. and G. Motor Convoy, Inc. for cash and 
warrants. The warrants were privately held until 1971 when they were 
offered at $27.50, which included a premium of $2.50. In late 1969 
Atlantic Richfield issued warrants to Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. in 
exchange for a warrant to purchase a similar number of Sinclair shares 
held by Gulf + Western. Gulf + Western and Atlantic Richfield had both
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Table 4. Classification of Securities Issued with Warrants as Part of 
the Consideration for the Securities of Another Corporation by Number 
and Types of Securities and by Date of Issue; Thirty-two Warrant Issues 
Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 
1950 and December 31, 1971
Number of Issues
















No other securities 1 1 2 6
One type of security
Straight debt 3 4 2 9 28
Convertible debt 2 2 6
Preferred stock 2 2 6
Convertible preferred
stock 1 1 2 6
Common stock 2 1 1 2 6 19
Two types of securities
Straight debt and
common stock 1 1 3
Convertible debt and
common stock 3 3 10
Preferred and common
stock 3 3 10
Other combinations 1 1 2 6
Total 3 2 5 11
-
11 32 100
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial
Manua1, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual. 
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with Securities and Exchange Commission.
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made tender offers to Sinclair stockholders, and Atlantic Richfield was 
the successful bidder.
Warrants are used in acquisitions and mergers because of the 
flexibility they offer. In the second half of the 1960's, merger activ­
ity increased to the extent that a seller's market existed. For an 
offer to be acceptable, it had to be ". . . tailored to meet the unique 
price, income, and tax objectives of the target company's security 
holders."2  ̂ Warrants offered a means of meeting these objectives.
During the 1967-1968 period when merger activity was at its peak, 
warrants offered equity participation to the sellers without an imme­
diate adverse affect on earnings per share of the acquiring company.
As previously discussed, convertible securities did not offer the same 
advantage ,2^
The following tabulation, prepared from The Value Line Warrant
O QS e r v i c e shows how valuable warrants were as a merger currency during 








2 7'For support of this position, see Hayes and Reiling, op. cit., 
143, Stevenson and Lovely, op. cit., 19, Royer, op. cit., p. 51.
2®"The New Warrant Game," The Value Line Warrant Service, 
December 16, 1969, p. 1.
Warrant Value as 
Percent of Total Value 
Acquired Company of Package (Estimated)
Seaboard Finance 41
Great American Holding 38
Lori Hard 31
United Fruit 3 3
Greatamerica 21
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The competition between Bangor Punta and Chris-Craft in their 
efforts to acquire Piper Aircraft Corporation illustrates the role war­
rants have played in acquisitions. In May, 1969 Bangor Punta announced 
an agreement to acquire more than 500,000 shares of Piper from the Piper 
family. Included in the deal were warrants to purchase 1,100,000 shares 
of Bangor Punta common. Chris-Craft had previously made a public offer 
for Piper shares by tendering one share of its $2 preferred and a warrant 
to buy two Chris-Craft common shares at $25 per share for each Piper 
common share. As a result of the Bangor Punta announcement, Chris-Craft 
raised its offer by adding $10 cash to the previous offer.
Any acquisition which includes warrants or convertible debt 
offered in exchange for common stock precludes a tax-free transaction, 
as explained by Hayes and Reiling:
In an exchange for common stock, preferred stock, whether con­
vertible or nonconvertible, constitutes a continuing equity interest 
for tax purposes; whereas debentures, whether nonconvertible or con­
vertible, are debt. A warrant is only a contract right to purchase 
common stock, and therefore is not an equity interest.29
However, bond-warrant units offered in exchange for common stock 
can result in the deferral of tax, provided the exchange qualifies as an 
installment sale. The requirements are:
. . .  To qualify as an installment sale, the sales price must 
exceed $1,000 and not more than 30 percent of the sales price must 
be received by the seller in the year of sale. Since the Internal 
Revenue Service considers the bond portion of the bond-warrant 
unit as payment received when the bond is disposed of rather than 
in the year of sale, the seller will be able to postpone part of 
the tax on his capital gain, so long as the fair market value of
2%ayes and Reiling, op. cit., 146.
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the warrant segment of the bond-warrant package does not exceed 
30 percent of the total package
A convertible bond offers even more deferral possibilities than 
the bond-warrant unit because no allocation of the option is required. 
Offsetting this advantage, however, is the flexibility offered by the 
bond-warrant unit. Should the seller need funds, he can sell the war­
rants and continue to hold the bonds, an option not available to the 
convertible bond holder.
Issued Alone or with Other
Securities in a Reorganization 
or Recapitalization
One of the oldest uses of the warrants included in this study is 
for reorganizations and recapitalizations. Warrants are recognized as 
useful for this purpose as a means of giving former common stockholders, 
who would otherwise be eliminated in the recapitalization, a potential 
equity interest in the recapitalized firm.
An example is the recapitalization plan of Ward Baking Company 
(now Ward Foods,Inc.). On September 15, 1945 a recapitalization plan 
was placed into effect which exchanged for each $7 preferred share 1/4 
share of new 5 l/27o voting cumulative preferred, par $100 and 2 1/2 
shares of $1 par common stock. Each class A common share received one 
share of the new $1 par common and a warrant to purchase one common share 
at $12.50 until March 31, 1951 and at $15 thereafter until April 1, 1956. 
Each two class B common shares received one warrant of the same series. 
The class B common stockholder was therefore able to recoup the value
JUStevenson and Lovely, op. cit., 18.
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of 1/2 a warrant from his investment where otherwise he would probably 
have received nothing.
More recently warrant issues have been used to reduce debt and 
simplify capital structure. For example, Whittaker Corporation used 
this device to redeem $43,000,000 of debentures with $21,500,000 of sub­
ordinated debentures. It offered a unit consisting of $500 principal 
amount of 10% subordinated debentures due 1988 and warrants to purchase 
40 shares at $50 per share for each $1,000 principal amount of 4 1/2% 
debentures.
Issued as a Dividend
One of the newest uses of warrants is as dividend distributions 
to stockholders. Four such issues, all of which occurred in late 1968 
or early 1969 prior to the release of APB Opinion No. 15. are included 
in this study. Four other issues were made during this period but they 
are not included in this study because they have not been listed on the 
American Stock Exchange.
While the argument might be advanced that warrants are issued 
with debt primarily for the purpose of negotiating lower interest rates, 
no such argument is feasible for warrants distributed to stockholders. 
Theoretically, there is no dilution of the stockholder's interest because 
the distributions are pro rata. If the stockholders sell their warrants, 
they are not getting something for nothing because they are giving up a 
right which may have substantial value in the future and which may reduce 
their proportionate investment in the company if it prospers.
31"The New Warrant Game," The Value Line Warrant Service. December 
16, 1969, p. 2 .
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Warrant distributions to stockholders may be compared to stock 
dividends. The initial conclusion might be that such distributions are 
inferior to stock dividends because the stockholder is required to pay 
cash before obtaining the additional stock. However, warrant distribu­
tions do not dilute earnings per share as long as the exercise price is 
above the market price of the underlying common. In addition, warrants 
do not require a larger cash dividend outlay until exercise. Stock divi­
dends will increase cash outflows immediately if the same dividend per 
share is maintained.
Neither stock dividends nor warrant dividends reduce the stock­
holders' prorata interest in the company. If the additional shares 
received as a stock dividend are sold, then a reduction of the seller's 
interest has occurred. But the sale of warrants received as dividends 
does not have the same immediate effect. There is no reduction in the 
proportionate interest in the company and there will be none until the 
warrant is exercised. If the warrant is not exercised, there is no di­
lution of the seller's prorata interest or of earnings per share. In 
addition, the stockholder has received a premium from the sale of his 
warrants.
Warrant distributions to stockholders may also be compared to 
rights offerings to subscribe to additional shares of stock. Rights 
offerings fill an immediate requirement for additional capital because 
they are short-term options which usually run for no more than 45 days.
If the stockholder exercises his rights, then there is no change in his 
proportionate interest in the company.
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Unlike rights offerings, the distribution of warrants to stock­
holders will not provide additional capital for several years, if at all. 
In fact, there may be no need for additional equity capital when the war­
rants are exercised. Further, management can hardly justify setting a 
price currently for the equity capital it plans to raise several years 
in the future. An exercise price set currently may have no relation to 
the stock's future value.
Schwartz has concluded that the purpose of these dividend war- 
rants was to establish a market for them. They could then be used as 
a merger currency in future acquisitions. The facts gathered in this 
study support this theory. Bangor Punta issued its Series C warrants as 
a distribution to its stockholders in February, 1969. In May, 1969 it 
used them in the acquisition of Piper Aircraft Company. Ward Foods, Inc. 
and U. S. Smelting & Mining Co. (U-V Industries, Inc.) have both 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to negotiate mergers with warrants originally 
issued as dividends. Whittaker Corporation issued warrants to its 
stockholders as a dividend in March, 1969. Although Whittaker Corpora­
tion has not used these warrants in an acquisition, it did use them to 
redeem its subordinated debentures.
Other Uses
Three warrant issues in this study are rather unusual and will 
be discussed briefly. In 1968 Fibreboard Corporation issued 10-year
William Schwartz, "Warrants: A Form of Equity Capital," Fin­
ancial Analysts Journal, XXVI (September-October, 1970), 98.
•^See pages 100 and 101.
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warrants to purchase 729,222 of its shares at $22.50 and paid cash of 
$41,018,760 to Tenneco, Inc. in exchange for 1,823,056 of its shares held 
by T e n n e c o . T h e  warrants were subsequently listed after a secondary 
offering by Tenneco in June, 1969.
During fiscal 1968 and 1969, Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. 
issued to certain key employees under a restricted warrant plan approxi­
mately 500,000 warrants to purchase its stock at $55 per share. Such a 
plan appears to have some advantages over a qualified stock option plan. 
Although the employee must pay income tax on the market value of the 
warrant at date of receipt (a deductible expense for the issuing com­
pany), appreciation recognized on the sale of the warrants is a capital 
gain if the warrants are held for six months. Stock acquired through a 
qualified stock option plan must be held for at least three years before 
it receives capital gains treatment.
Another advantage of warrants is their negotiability. Rather than 
borrowing money to exercise stock options under a qualified plan and then 
selling much of the acquired stock to pay the loan, an employee granted 
warrants can exercise a portion of the warrants and sell the others.
In late 1968 LTV, Inc. (Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.) issued warrants 
in a package designed to improve earnings per share and to increase the 
company's borrowing capacity. The company offered 1.1 units consisting 
of 1 share of Braniff Airlines special stock, Class A; 0.6 shares of 
National Car Rental special stock, Class A; 0.33 shares of Computer Tech­
nology, Inc. common stock; and 1.1 warrants to purchase LTV common stock
Q f
-^These figures reflect a 2 for 1 stock split made on November 1,
1968.
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at $101.96 (as adjusted) per share until January 15, 1978 in exchange for 
a share of LTV common stock. The company also offered various multiples 
of the same unit for approximately $250 million of its debt securities. 
Nearly 2,000,000 shares were acquired in this offer. The result was that 
the outstanding shares were reduced by about 50 percent, but the poten­
tial dilution of outstanding shares through the exercise of warrants is 
approximately 60 percent.
This warrant issue appears to have been designed specifically to
take advantage of APB Opinion No. 9 by substituting warrants for common 
ISstock. Unfortunately, the reduction in shares came during the period 
when the company began experiencing losses and resulted in an increase 
of the net loss per share rather than the anticipated increase in earn­
ings per share. If the company returns to a profit position, common 
stock equivalents under APB Opinion No. 15. assuming the exercise price 
of the warrants is less than the market price of the common, will reduce 
earnings per share and thus defeat one of the purposes of reacquiring the 
shares.
In summary, warrants have been issued in a variety of methods, 
but they are usually attached to other securities. Only two cases were 
encountered in which warrants were issued alone in exchange for other 
securities. Warrants have been issued alone as distributions to stock­
holders prior to the release of APB Opinion No. 15, apparently to take 
advantage of the provisions of APB Opinion No. 9. There were no cases
35Samuel L. Hayes, III and Henry B. Reiling, "Sophisticated 
Financing Tool: The Warrant," Harvard Business Review. XLVII (January-
February, 1969), 143.
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in which warrants were issued alone to raise cash, although this use has 
been advocated. D
The primary purpose of issuing warrants does not appear to be 
that of raising equity capital. The basic reason for attaching warrants 
to securities issued to raise cash is to facilitate the sale of the issue. 
The warrants add value to the package and make it more attractive to in­
vestors. Consequently a company which might otherwise have been unable 
to do so is able to successfully float a security issue. The results of 
attaching warrants are reflected in a lower interest or dividend rate 
and in the higher value received from the sale of the securities.
The primary reason for issuing warrants in a merger agreement 
also appears to be that of facilitating the agreement. Warrants add 
value to the total package and offer a potential equity interest in the 
acquiring corporation to security holders of the acquired corporation. 
Further, under APB Opinion No. 9, dilution of earnings per share would 
not be reflected until the warrants were exercised.
In recapitalizations and reorganizations warrants are also used 
to make the deal more palatable to security holders whose interests are 
being reduced or eliminated. In particular, common stockholders can be 
issued warrants as a means of retaining a potential equity interest if 
the common stock is being eliminated in the reorganization.
The establishment of a merger currency appears to have been the 
major reason for issuing warrants as dividends. If the warrants were 
issued in lieu of a stock dividend, they had the additional advantage,
-^See footnote 15, page 88.
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under APB Opinion No. 9, of not being dilutive to earnings per share 
until exercised. Even under APB Opinion No. 15, warrants are not dilu­
tive until the market price of the common stock exceeds the exercise 
price of the warrants. In addition, warrants do not require an imme­
diate increase in cash outflows for dividends. Stock dividends do 
require additional funds for dividends if the same dividend rate is to 
be maintained.
The conclusion is that management does not issue warrants for 
the purpose of raising future equity capital. Yet, by the inherent 
nature of the warrant instrument, equity capital which may result in the 
dilution of earnings per share will be raised at some future date if the 
warrants are exercised. This point must be considered in formulating 
guidelines for earnings-per-share computations.
CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS OF WARRANTS IN THE STUDY
Management has great flexibility in setting the terms of warrant 
contracts. Warrants can be tailored to fit the financial requirements of 
a company through such contractual provisions as: (1) the exercise
price, (2) escalations in the exercise price, (3) the means of payment 
of the exercise price, (4) the warrant life, and (5) the anti-dilution 
provisions. Once the warrants have been issued, however, management 
loses practically all control over the warrants as they become subject 
to the whims of warrantholders and the market place. The contractual 
provisions of the warrants in this study are analyzed in this section.
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Exercise Price
A basic consideration in setting the exercise price of a warrant 
is the market price of the underlying common stock. The lower the exer­
cise price in relation to the common price, the greater will be the 
initial value of the warrant. Consequently, fewer warrants will have to 
be issued in a given transaction and the potential dilution of shares 
outstanding will be lower.
No such generalization can be made about the potential dilution 
of earnings per share. Dilution of earnings per share will occur when 
the percentage increase in shares outstanding from warrants exercised is 
greater than the percentage increase in earnings from the warrant pro­
ceeds. Whether issuing fewer warrants with a lower exercise price or 
more warrants with a higher exercise price results in more or less dilu­
tion of earnings per share depends upon four factors. These factors are:
(1) the rate being earned on assets already invested, (2) the rate earned 
on warrant proceeds, (3) the number of common shares outstanding prior 
to the exercise of warrants, and (4) the number of shares issued for 
warrants. Under certain conditions, issuing fewer warrants at a lower 
exercise price will result in less dilution; under other conditions the 
result will be higher dilution than if more warrants were issued at a 
higher exercise price.
The original warrantholder, whether he received the warrants 
attached to securities he purchased, through an exchange of securities 
he held, or through a dividend, is interested in the total value he re­
ceives in exchange for the consideration given. He is, therefore, prob­
ably not concerned with whether he receives a Smaller number of warrants
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with a lower exercise price or a larger number of warrants with a higher 
exercise price as long as the total value is the same. But subsequent 
investors in the warrants would prefer warrants having high leverage. 
Leverage is highest when the exercise price is high in relation to the 
market price of the common. This relationship is demonstrated in the 
following analysis of the warrant, stock, and exercise price relation­
ships of Molybdenum Corporation of America:
Common Stock Warrants Leverage
Exercise Increase Increase Ratio (Percent
Price/ Over Over Warrant Price
Common Preceding Preceding Increase/
Price Period Price Period Percent Common
Date (Percent) Price_____ (Percent) (Adjusted) (Percent) Price Increase)
10/23/57 190.5 $15,750 $ 3.500
12/31/57 167.8 17.875 13.5 6.125 75.0 5.6
12/31/58 79.2 37.625 110.5 21.163 245.5 2.2
12/31/59 54.6 53.875 43.1 36.516 72.7 1.7
Molybdenum set its exercise price at $30 which was high in rela­
tion to the stock price. The result was that warrantholders benefited 
from high leverage. During the period from October 23, 1957, when the 
warrants were listed, to December 31, 1957, the warrant price increased 
5.6 times as rapidly as the stock price. Had the exercise price been set 
below the market price, as would have been the case at December 31, 1958, 
leverage would have been considerably reduced. During the succeeding 
year, the market price of the warrants increased only 1.7 times as fast 
as the common price.
As the preceding discussion points out, the relationship of the 
exercise price to the market price of the underlying common stock on the 
date of issue influences the value that the warrant will add to the total
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package of securities being offered. Subsequent changes in the exercise 
price will also affect the value of the warrant and may induce exercise 
prior to the expiration date of the issue. In addition, the value of the 
warrant is affected by the method of payment of the exercise price. A 
discussion of these aspects of the exercise price follows.
Exercise price in relation to the market price of the common on 
date of issue. In this study, the exercise price of 106 warrant issues 
was compared to the market price of the underlying common stock on the 
approximate date of issue. In a few cases, predominantly real estate 
investment trusts, prices were not available on the date of issue because 
the firms had not yet qualified for listing on an exchange. In these 
cases the average of the over the counter high and low prices for the 
period in which the issue occurred was used. The resulting bias is not 
material because the range, as measured by the difference between the 
high and the low price, was small.
Warrant issuers in the period from 1950 to 1972 have tended to 
set the exercise price at about 110 percent of the market price of the 
related common stock on the date of issue, as shown in Table 5. The 
median was below this amount in only one period, 1967-1968, when it was 
103 percent. The decrease in this period is attributable to several 
warrant issues in which warrants were used as a merger currency. In­
cluded in the 1967-1968 period are National General Corporation's merger
of Great American Holding, Lowe's Theatres' merger of Lorrilard, and
37Ling-Temco-Vought's merger of Greatamerica. These companies and others
•^See page 98.
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Table 5. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of 106 Warrant Issues 
Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 
and December 31, 1971 with the Price of the Related Common Stock on the 
Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Date of Issue
Number of Issues
Exercise Price as a 
















Less than 75 percent 1 1 2 4 4
75 percent to 84 percent 2 2 4 4
85 percent to 94 percent 1 1 1 4 7 7
95 percent to 104 percent 2 2 8 12 24 23
105 percent to 114 percent 7 4 7 10 28 26
115 percent to 124 percent 2 2 2 7 13 12
125 percent to 134 percent 1 2 2 4 9 8
135 percent or more 3 3 2 9 17 16
Total 5 16 14 27 44 106 100
Median 139% 110% 112% 103% 113% 110%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial
Manua1, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, 
Moody's Bank and Finance Manua1, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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chose to increase the value of the warrants in the security package of­
fered the acquired company's stockholders by setting the exercise price 
low in relation to the related common price.
The increase in the median to 113 percent in the 1969-1971 period 
is caused by the 16 real estate investment trust issues included. These 
trusts, with a median of 116 percent, tended to set the exercise price 
higher than the median for the group.
As indicated by Table 6, the exercise price is usually set low in 
relation to the market price of the common stock when warrants are 
attached to another security and the package is offered for cash. The 
median exercise price was 7 percent above the market price of the re­
lated common stock on date of issue. In contrast, when warrants are 
issued as part of a reorganization or recapitalization, the median ex­
ercise price was 35 percent above the market price of the common on the 
date of issue of the warrants. The exercise price is also generally set 
high when warrants are issued as a dividend to stockholders.
These differences in median exercise prices suggest that manage­
ment is less concerned with the value that warrants add to the package 
when it is dealing with its own security holders than when it is offer­
ing securities to the public. Ceteris paribus, those warrants with an 
exercise price that is high in relation to the underlying common price 
are less likely to be exercised. The result is that management, in its 
efforts to obtain current funds, pursues a financial policy likely to 
dilute the equity of current stockholders for the benefit of future 
stockholders who exercise the warrants attached to the financing instru­
ment .
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Table 6. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of 106 Warrant Issues 
Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 
and December 31, 1971 with the Price of the Related Common Stock on the 
Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Use
Number of Issues
Use
Exercise Price as a 





























Less than 75 percent 3 1 4
75 percent to 84 percent 3 1 4
85 percent to 94 percent 2 5 7
95 percent to 104 percent 17 4 1 1 1 24
105 percent to 114 percent 18 7 1 1 1 28
115 percent to 124 percent 8 3 1 1 13
125 percent to 134 percent 5 3 1 9
135 percent or more 3 9 4 1 17
Total 59 32 8 4 3 106
Median 107% 113% 135% 119% 105% 110%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial
Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, 
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Further analysis of warrant-security units offered for cash, as 
shown in Table 7, discloses that the exercise price was set lower when 
the warrants were attached to a debt instrument than when attached to 
common stock. The median exercise price was 4 percent above the related 
common price when the warrant was attached to straight debt and 16 per­
cent above the related common price when attached to common stock. This 
is further confirmation of the earlier point that management's financial 
policy with regard to warrants favors future stockholders to the detri­
ment of current stockholders.®® This policy has special significance 
for companies with common stock having preemptive rights. Theoretically 
these stockholders would suffer no dilution through a warrant-common 
stock offering because they have the opportunity to purchase their pro 
rata share of the new common being issued. But common stockholders do 
not have these preemptive rights when warrants are attached to straight 
debt. These warrants, however, have a lower exercise price and are 
therefore more likely to be exercised and cause dilution.
Management also establishes a lower exercise price in relation to 
the common price when it issues a warrant-straight debt unit for the se­
curities of another corporation. In Table 8, the median exercise price 
is 18 percent above the market price of the related common when the war­
rant is attached to a straight-debt instrument. But if the warrant is 
attached to common stock, the median exercise price is 30 percent above
O QJOThis statement assumes alternate methods of financing which are 
not potentially dilutive are available. If a company is in such dire 
need of funds that it can avoid bankruptcy only by selling a warrant- 
security issue, then current stockholders may be benefited despite the 
future dilution to their equity.
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Table 7. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of Warrants Issued 
with Securities to Raise Cash with the Price of the Related Common Stock 
on the Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Type of Security; 
Fifty-nine Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any 
Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
Number of Issues
Exercise Price as a 











Less than 75 percent 3 3 5
75 percent to 84 percent 3 3 5
85 percent to 94 percent 1 1 2 3
95 percent to 104 percent 10 7 17 29
105 percent to 114 percent 10 2 4 2 18 31
115 percent to 124 percent 2 6 8 14
125 percent to 134 percent 1 4 5 8
135 percent or more 3 3 5
Total 30 3 24 2 59 100
Median 104% 108% 116% 107% 107%
Source; Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial 
Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, 
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Table 8. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of Warrants Issued with Securities as Part of the 
Consideration for the Securities of Another Corporation with the Price of the Related Common Stock on 
the Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Number and Types of Securities; Thirty-Two Warrant 
Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
Number of Issues
Exercise Price as 
a Percentage of 
the Stock Price





















Less than 75 percent 1 1 3
75 percent to 84 percent
85 percent to 94 percent 4 1 5 16
95 percent to 104 percent 1 2 1 4 13
105 percent to 114 percent 2 2 1 2 7 22
115 percent to 124 percent 2 1 3 9
125 percent to 134 percent 1 1 1 3 9
135 percent or more 2 3 2 2 9 28
Total 2 9 6 6 3 3 3 32 100
Median 113% 118% 130% 92% 161% 166% 110% 113%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual, 
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 116
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the market price. If the warrant is issued in combination with both pre­
ferred and common stock, the median exercise price is 66 percent above 
the related common price.
The potential life span of the warrant issue also appears to have 
some influence on the setting of exercise prices. As indicated in Table 
9, the median exercise price in relation to the common price on the date 
of issue is higher for warrant issues with extremely short and extremely 
long life spans. The perpetual warrants in this study have a median 
exercise price 41 percent above the market price of the common.
Similarly, warrants with a life span of less than four years have a 
median exprcise price 31 percent above the common price.
Companies issuing perpetual warrants would be expected to set the 
exercise price high in relation to the market price of the common. If 
this were not done, the warrants would soon lose their attractiveness to 
investors; with the rise in the price of the common over time, leverage 
would be reduced to the point where it would not be particularly advan­
tageous .
The reason for setting the exercise price high when the life span 
of the issue is short is not so obvious. An analysis of the issues in 
this study indicates that newly formed companies, usually in a high risk 
industry such as mining or in a new industry such as mobile homes, have 
set the exercise price high in relation to the market price of the 
common. Generally the warrants were attached to common stock issued on 
a preemptive basis. The conclusion is that the managements of these new 
and rapidly expanding companies expected a high growth rate in earnings 
and stock prices. By setting the exercise price high and by attaching
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Table 9. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of 106 Warrant Issues 
Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 
and December 31, 1971 with the Price of the Related Common Stock on the 
Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Potential Life Span
Number of Issues
Exercise Price as a 
Percentage of the 
Stock Price

























Less than 75 percent 3 1 4
75 percent to 84 percent 1 2 1 4
85 percent to 94 percent 1 4 1 1 7
95 percent to 104 percent 10 10 1 1 2 24
105 percent to 114 percent 1 8 12 5 1 1 28
115 percent to 124 percent 7 3 1 1 1 13
125 percent to 134 percent 1 3 5 9
135 percent or more 1 6 8 2 17
Total 3 36 47 9 4 3 4 106
Median 131% 112% 108% 111% 105% 104% 141% 110%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports,and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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more warrants to each unit of capital sold, a larger amount of capital, 
needed for expansion purposes, could be raised when the warrants were
o qexercised. 3
One additional aspect of Table 9 requires comment. Warrants with 
life spans in the 20-23 and 24-27 year classifications have low exercise 
prices in relation to the underlying common stock prices--5 percent and 
4 percent, respectively, above the common price on the date of issue.
The expectation would be that warrants with long lives would have a high 
exercise price in relation to the common price for two reasons. First, 
a high exercise price would provide better leverage for a longer period 
of time if the common price advances over time as would be expected under 
normal circumstances. Second, ceteris paribus, the higher the exercise 
price, the lower the dilution of asset values, common stock prices, 
earnings per share, and the market price of the common stock if the war­
rants are exercised.
Table 9 is based on the initial exercise price and does not con­
sider exercise price escalations. Of the seven issues included in these 
two classifications, the terms of three include one or more exercise 
price escalations. Two other issues are callable, an indication that 
management may force their exercise prior to their expiration dates.
Changes in exercise price. One of the means by which management 
can possibly induce the exercise of warrants prior to their expiration
3%his policy of setting the exercise price high does not always 
achieve its purpose. Two of the three companies issuing warrants with a 
life span of less than four years raised very little additional capital 
because the exercise price of the warrants was higher than the market 
price of the common in the period just prior to expiration of the war­
rants. The warrants of the third company have not expired.
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is through an escalation of the exercise price. This is not a particu­
larly effective device for timing the inflow of funds, however, because 
the escalated exercise prices and dates of escalation are stipulated in 
the original agreement. The factors which determine whether the warrants 
will be exercised in the period immediately prior to an exercise price 
escalation are, therefore, not directly under the control of management.
The conditions precedent to exercise are that the theoretical 
value of the warrant be positive and that the theoretical value of the 
warrant and its market price be approximately equal. A pending step-up 
in the exercise price has much the same effect as the approaching ex- 
priation date of a warrant issue. The premium tends to decline steadily, 
beginning about 12 to 15 months before the escalation is effective, so 
that the market price of the warrant tends to approach its theoretical 
v a l u e . A  warrantholder may be forced to exercise the warrant into 
common stock because the value of the warrant will decline when the new 
exercise price becomes effective.
Other factors in addition to the conditions precedent just dis­
cussed also influence the warrantholder. These include the amount of the 
increase in exercise price and the length of the period that the warrant 
is exercisable at the higher exercise price. The shorter this period is 
and the greater the exercise price increase, the greater the probability 
that the warrantholder will exercise.
The warrants and 5 percent subordinated debentures issued by
^^William Schwartz and Julius Spellman, Guide to Convertible 
Securities (New York: William Schwartz and Julius Spellman, 1968),
p. 28.
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Armour and Company in December, 1954 in exchange for its $6 convertible 
preferred stock illustrate these points. The exercise price of the war­
rants was $12.50 until December 31, 1956, $15 thereafter until December 
31, 1959, $17.50 thereafter until December 31, 1961, and $20 from then 
until December 31, 1964 when the warrants expired. During the 1956-1957 
fiscal year when the exercise price increased by 20 percent, warrant- 
holders exercised approximately 36 percent of the 500,000 warrants 
originally issued. In addition to the current increase in exercise price, 
the warrantholders were probably incluenced by the fact that another 
sizeable increase in the exercise price would occur in three years.
Twenty-one of the 94 warrant series included in this study con­
tained a provision for one or more escalations in the exercise price.
The range in the number of increases was from one to six with a median 
of one. Most of the issues^ having exercise price escalations were 
attached to debt instruments. Thirteen, or 59 percent, of the 22 issues 
having price escalations were attached to straight-debt securities 
issued to raise cash. Only one issue was attached to common stock 
issued for the purpose of raising cash.
The large number of issues having price escalations which were 
attached to straight debt, versus the small number attached to common 
stock, offers some insight into the setting of the initial exercise 
price. Table 7 on page 115 indicates that the median exercise price 
for warrants issued with straight debt was set 4 percent above the
^The distinction between a series and an issue should be noted. 
There were 21 series comprising 22 issues with price escalations.
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market price of the common on the date of issue, in contrast to a 16 
percent median for warrants issued with common stock. Management 
appears to set the initial exercise price low when warrants are attached 
to debt in order to increase the value of the warrants in the warrant- 
debt package and thereby reduce the interest on the debt. Potential 
dilution in shares outstanding is reduced by this policy. At the same 
time, potential dilution in earnings per share is less because of the 
escalated exercise prices if the assumption is made that the warrants 
will not be exercised until the period immediately preceding their 
expiration.
A recent innovation in warrant agreements allows management some 
control over the timing of the exercise of warrants by reduction in the 
exercise price. The agreements stipulate the percentage of decrease in 
the exercise price and the minimum period of time that the reduction 
must remain in force. Reduction of the exercise price by a significant 
amount for a short period of time makes it advantageous for warrant- 
holders to exercise their warrants before the price returns to its 
previous level.^ This feature would be particularly advantageous if 
the exercise price exceeded the market price of the common stock near the 
expiration date of the warrants. If management needed funds, it could 
reduce the exercise price below the market price, thus receiving funds 
through the exercise of the warrants and at the same time benefiting 
the warrantholders.
/ oThe reduction must be temporary or the only effect would be an 
increase in the price of the warrant by approximately the amount of the 
reduction in the exercise price. See Richard A. Stevenson and Joe Lovely, 
"Why a Bond Warrant Issue?" Financial Executive. XXXVIII (June, 1970), 19.
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Of the 94 series in this study, eight included a provision in 
the agreement for reduction of the exercise price. The amount of the 
reduction ranged from 25 percent to 33 1/3 percent. The first series 
to include this provision was Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. (LTV Corp.).^
The last issue to include this stipulation was by Gould, Inc. on July 31, 
1969.
The reduction-of-exercise-price feature was not included in any 
of the series in this study issued after July, 1969. The reason was 
probably an announcement by the American Stock Exchange that it would 
no longer list warrants with this provision unless the issuer agreed to 
forgo the right to reduce the exercise price while the warrants were 
listed.^ This action was taken by the American Stock Exchange in the 
interest of providing an orderly market in warrants. Reducing the 
exercise price causes conversion of the warrants into common and at the 
same time it stimulates a rush of buy orders for the warrants.
Means of payment. Most warrant agreements stipulate that the ex­
ercise price is payable in cash. However, in recent years warrants ex­
ercisable by either cash or debt at par value have become increasingly 
popular. Such warrants are similar to convertible debt in that they 
provide a means of converting debt into equity. The conditions precedent 
for conversion are that the warrants have a market value greater than
Four of the remaining seven series containing a reduction-of- 
exercise-price provision were issued by companies affiliated with Ling- 
Temco-Vought , Inc.
^"American Board Says It Will No Longer List Certain Stock War­
rants,” The Wall Street Journal. July 7, 1969, p. 26.
124
zero and that the related debt sell at a discount near the expiration 
date of the warrants. The effect of the debt option is to lower the 
effective exercise price when the debt is selling at a discount. This 
feature does not offer management much control over cash inflows or 
debt-equity ratios, however, because the terms for the warrant-debt 
issue must be stipulated prior to the original issue date.
Whether the warrants will be exercised by a cash payment or by 
presentation of debt at par, or not exercised at all, will depend on the 
market forces in effect when the expiration date of the warrants 
approaches. Some control over the method of exercise can be established 
through the setting of the exercise price of the warrants and the setting 
of the nominal interest rate and the maturity date of the debt. The 
exercise price should be set low enough so that the warrants will have 
a market value greater than zero near their expiration date. The 
nominal rate of interest on the debt should be set lower than the pre­
vailing interest rate so that the debt will initially sell at a discount.
The maturity date of the debt should be set later than the expiration 
date of the warrants to increase the possibility of the debt selling at 
a discount prior to the expiration date of the warrants. As the maturity 
date of debt approaches, the discount tends to disappear.
Twenty-one of the 94 warrant series in this study were issued
with the exercise price payable in cash or debt securities. Fourteen of 
these series were attached to debt issues for the purpose of facili­
tating their sale. Most of the remaining series were offered as part of 
a package of securities in mergers and acquisitions.
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Period of Exercise
A basic factor influencing the exercise of warrants is the ex­
piration date of the issue. The life span of the warrants included in 
this study and provision for reduction of that span are analyzed in this 
section.
Warrant life. As Table 10 shows, the life span of 78 percent of 
the warrant issues included in this study varied between 4 and 11 years.
The median life span was 10 years. Table 10 does provide some evidence
of a trend toward a shorter warrant life. The median life of five years
for the 1969-1971 period is lower than the median in any other period.
The shorter life span during this period can be attributed primarily to 
real estate investment trusts. Of the 44 issues during this period, 16 
were by real estate investment trusts with a median life of five years. 
However, even with the exclusion of real estate investment trusts, the 
trend toward a shorter life span is evident. The median life span of 
the remaining 28 issues during this period is approximately 7 1/2 years.
A definite trend away from perpetual warrants is shown in Table 
10. The last such issue was by the Alleghany Corporation in 1952. The 
other three issues originated in the late 1920's and in 1936 as the re­
sult of mergers. One of these issues, that of the United Corporation, 
was cancelled by court order in 1955 as the result of a reorganization. 
Apparently corporations no longer find desirable a capital structure 
which includes a call on their common stock for an indefinite period. 
Theoretically, perpetual warrants which have no special features such as 
escalations in the exercise price would never be exercised. From the
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Table 10. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American 
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 

















Less than 4 1 1 1 3 3
4 to 7 2 2 3 29 36 34
8 to 11 2 10 4 20 11 47 44
12 to 15 1 5 2 1 9 8
16 to 19
20 to 23 1 2 1 4 4
24 to 27 1 1 1 3 3
Perpetual 3 1 4 4
Total 5 16 14 27 44 106 100
Median (Years) Perpetual 10 11 10 5 10
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual. Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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point of view of investors, these warrants are desirable as long as the 
relationship between the exercise price and the underlying common stock 
price is such that leverage is favorable.
Warrants which were issued as part of a unit for cash tended to 
have a shorter life than those issued for any other reason. As indi­
cated in Table 11, they had a median life of 5 1/2 years as compared to 
a median life of 10 years for all the issues included in this study. 
Further analysis of these 59 issues in Table 12 discloses that this 
shorter life span is associated with those issues which were attached 
to common stock. Included in this group of 24 issues are 14 issues by 
real estate investment trusts. The median life span of these issues is 
five years. Table 13 shows that warrants attached to common stock and 
issued as a unit in exchange for the securities of another corporation 
also have a median life shorter than any other warrant-security unit 
issued for this purpose. Only warrants issued without any other securi­
ties attached have a shorter median life.
Provisions for reduction of life. A few warrant agreements in 
recent years have included a provision for redemption of the issue at the 
option of the issuer. Four of the 94 warrant series under study included 
this feature. This option provides management with a means of forcing 
exercise when the theoretical value of the warrant is positive and in 
excess of the call price. If the theoretical value of the warrants is 
less than the call price, warrantholders will present the warrants for 
redemption if a call is issued.
While callable warrants offer management better financial plan­
ning and control of cash flows, they offer no comparable advantages to
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Table 11. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American 
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 
































Less than 4 3 3
4 to 7 28 6 2 36
8 to 11 20 17 4 3 3 47
12 to 15 3 4 1 1 9
16 to 19
20 to 23 3 1 4
24 to 27 2 1 3
Perpetual 3 1 4
Total 59 32 8 4 3 106
Median (Years) 5 1/2 10 10 10 9 1/2 10
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Table 12. Classification of Warrants Issued with Securities to Raise 
Cash by Potential Life Span and by Type of Security; Fifty-Nine Warrant 
Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between 
January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
Number of Issues













Less than 4 1 2 3 5
4 to 7 5 2 20 1 28 48
8 to 11 18 2 20 34
12 to 15 2 1 3 5
16 to 19
20 to 23 3 3 5
24 to 27 2 2 3
Perpetual
Total 30 3 24 2 59 100
Median (Years) 10 5 5 10 5 ]/2
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual.
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual. Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Table 13. Classification of Warrants Issued with Securities as Part of the Consideration for the 
Securities of Another Corporation by Potential Life Span and by Number and Types of Securities; Thirty- 
Two Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and 
December 31, 1971
Number of Issues
Potential Life Span 
of Warrants (Years)





















4 to 7 2 3 1 6 19
8 to 11 5 3 4 3 2 17 53
12 to 15 3 1 4 13
16 to 19
20 to 23 1 1 3
24 to 27 1 1 3
Perpetual 3 3 9
Total 2 9 6 6 3 3 3 32 100
Median (Years) 7 10 8\ 10 11 \ Perpetual 10 10
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual, 
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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investors. The redemption feature of callable warrants severely limits 
their premium value, especially when the theoretical value exceeds the 
call price. No investor would be willing to pay more than the theoreti­
cal value of a warrant if that warrant is being called at a lower price.
The premium is also likely to be less when the warrant has no 
theoretical value and the call price is low. The plight of investors in 
Keys Fibre warrants indicates the reason. These warrants, issued in 
1960, had a stated life of 10 years and were callable at any time at $1 
each. When the company issued a redemption call in 1967, the warrants 
were trading at approximately $4. Since the warrants had no theoretical 
value, their price immediately dropped to the call price of $1.^ The 
call feature, although advantageous to management, is not likely to be 
accepted by investors because of the hazards it presents.
Anti-dilution Provisions
Most warrant agreements contain an anti-dilution provision. This 
feature is designed to protect warrantholders from a decline in the value 
of their warrants which would result from stock splits and stock divi­
dends and from the issuance of additional common stock at a price below 
the current market price of the common stock or the exercise price of 
the warrant. The usual procedure is to increase the number of shares a 
warrant will purchase by the percentage increase in common shares out­
standing. The exercise price is reduced proportionally, so that it 
reflects the approximate decline in market price of the common shares
^Schwartz and Spellman, op. cit., p. 24.
132
resulting from the issuance of additional shares at a price below the 
current market price. The net result is that a warrantholder can pur­
chase the same proportion of outstanding shares at the same total cash 
as that prevailing before the issuance of additional shares.
Sperry Rand Corporation warrants illustrate this point. Warrants 
to purchase 2,200,000 common shares at $25 per share to September 16,
1963 and at $28 per share thereafter until September 15, 1967 were 
attached to Sperry Rand's 5 1/2 percent debentures dated September 1,
1957. After stock dividends of 2 percent in March of 1961, 2 percent 
in September, 1961 and 4 percent in 1962, the original 2,200,000 common 
shares reserved for warrants had increased to 2,376,000 shares. Each
warrant carried the right to purchase 1.08 shares for $25. The exercise
price per share, therefore, had been reduced to $23.15 as a result of 
the stock dividends. Most of the warrants were exercised in 1967 at an 
exercise price of $28 per 1.08 shares, or $25.93 per share.
Armour and Company warrants provide an exception to the general 
rule that warrantholders are usually protected against dilution. Its 
10-year warrants, issued in 1954 under a recapitalization plan, were not 
protected against dilution from stock dividends. During this period, 
Armour declared two 10 percent stock dividends. Warrantholders who held 
their warrants for most of the 10-year period before exercising them 
therefore received approximately 17 percent fewer shares than those war­
rantholders who exercised their warrants prior to the first stock dividend 
and held the shares for an equivalent period. In addition, the exercise
price per share was 21 percent higher than it would have been had the
warrant agreement included an anti-dilution provision for stock dividends.
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In summary, management has exercised a considerable amount of 
flexibility in setting the contractual terms of the warrants it issues. 
This flexibility is achieved through the setting of the exercise price, 
provision for changes in the exercise price and the means of payment of 
the exercise price, and through establishment of the warrant life and 
provisions for the reduction of the warrant life. There is, however, 
a practical limit to this flexibility because the warrant terms must be 
acceptable to investors. In addition, this flexibility may not result 
in significant benefits to management in its financial planning function 
because the terms of the warrant agreement are stipulated at issue date 
and such terms may not achieve the desired results 10 or 15 years in the 
future.
In setting the exercise price of warrants, management appears to 
favor future stockholders to the detriment of its current stockholders. 
This is evident when the ratio of the exercise price to the common stock 
price at date of issue is examined. On the average, this ratio is lower 
for warrants issued to potential stockholders. For example, the median 
exercise price is only 4 percent above the market price of the common 
when warrants are attached to straight debt for the purpose of raising 
cash. If the warrant is attached to common stock for the purpose of 
raising cash, the median exercise price is 16 percent above the common 
stock price.
Since common stock is often issued on a preemptive basis to cur­
rent stockholders and debt is not, current stockholders assume the risk 
of greater potential dilution of asset values and earnings per share when 
warrants are attached to debt rather than common stock if the assumption
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is made that the total value of both security packages is equal and the 
number of warrants issued is the same for each package. The risk of 
greater potential dilution is further compounded by virtue of the fact 
that the warrants with the lower exercise price are more likely to be 
exercised.
Two factors, to some extent, offset the risk of greater dilution 
to current stockholders from the issuance of warrant-debt securities. 
Current stockholders benefit from the lower interest rate which the war­
rant-debt security offers. In addition, 13 of the 30 warrant issues 
attached to straight debt have one or more exercise price escallations 
prior to their expiration date. If these warrants are held to expira­
tion, dilution in asset values and earnings per share will be reduced 
because of the higher exercise prices.
The ratio of the exercise price to the price of the common stock 
is also lower when warrants are issued as part of the consideration for 
securities of another corporation. The median exercise price is 13 
percent above the common price when warrants are issued for this purpose. 
In contrast, the median exercise price is 19 percent above the price of 
the common stock when warrants are issued to current stockholders as 
dividend distributions and 35 percent when warrants are issued to cur­
rent shareholders as part of a reorganization or recapitalization.
The assumption is that the exercise price is set low for warrants 
issued in mergers in order to increase the total value of the security 
package offered the security holders of the acquired corporation. In 
addition, warrants may be included in the package in order to provide a 
potential equity interest to certain security holders of the acquired
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corporation. The result is greater potential dilution to current stock­
holders in either case, assuming the same number of warrants could have 
been issued at a higher exercise price.
Management must consider the life span of warrants in setting ex­
ercise prices if dilution is to be minimized. Ceteris paribus, the 
longer the life span, the higher should be the exercise price. The man­
agements of companies included in this study have not always followed 
this practice. There is, however, a tendency to incorporate exercise 
price escalations into long-term warrant agreements. In addition, a few 
warrant issues contain a call feature which can be used to force the 
exercise of warrants at an appropriate time.
From the point of view of the investor, a call feature is unde­
sirable because it limits the premium, and hence the leverage, of the 
warrant. A desirable feature for the investor is protection against 
dilution of the common equity of the issuing corporation. Because of 
these investor considerations, the anti-dilution feature is included in 
most agreements, but the call feature is rarely incorporated into the 
agreement.
The conclusion is that management must assume the responsibility 
for warrant issues because it sets the terms of the warrant agreement. 
Warrants are a risky means of facilitating the sale of other securities 
which are issued to achieve the goals of the corporation that are estab­
lished by management. Financial statements reflect the benefits of this 
risk through lower cash outflows for interest and/or dividends. Manage­
ment should also be accountable to current stockholders for the cost of 
these benefits which includes potential dilution of control, asset values,
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earnings per share, and of the market price of the common stock. This 
accountability must be considered in formulating guidelines for earnings- 
per-share computations.
EXERCISE OF WARRANTS
The conditions precedent necessary to induce warrantholders to ex­
ercise their warrants are that the theoretical value of the warrants be 
positive and that the market price of the warrants be close to their 
theoretical value. Since these conditions are not always met, poten­
tial dilution of outstanding shares is usually greater than the actual 
dilution. An analysis of the potential and actual dilution and the timing 
of exercise of the warrants included in this study follows.
Potential Dilution
Potential dilution, for purposes of this study, is defined as the 
ratio of the number of common shares under option by virtue of a warrant 
issue or series to the sum of: (1) the number of common shares outstand­
ing at the end of the period during which the warrants were issued and
(2) the number of common shares under option. This ratio is, in effect, 
the dilution in control that current stockholders will experience if all 
warrants are exercised and no additional shares of common stock are issued 
during the period prior to exercise.
As shown by Table 14, the median potential dilution of the 94 
warrant series under study was 20.0 percent. The potential dilution in 
shares outstanding increased substantially in the 1969-1971 period.
Except for the period prior to 1950, the median potential dilution of
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Table 14. Classification of 94 Warrant Series Listed on the American 
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 
by Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Date of the First 




Number of Series Issued















Less than 5.0 2 1 4 7 7
5.0 to 9.9 4 1 2 3 10 11
10.0 to 14.9 6 2 4 3 15 16
15.0 to 19.9 2 3 6 4 15 16
20.0 to 24.9 1 1 1 2 2 7 7
25.0 to 29.9 1 2 1 4 8 9
30.0 to 34.9 2 1 1 2 5 11 12
35.0 to 39.9 1 1 2 4 4
40.0 to 44.9 1 1 2 2
45.0 to 49.9 1 6 7 7
50.0 and over 2 6 8 9
Total 5 16 13 21 39 94 100
Median 33.3% 12 .1% 19.8% 19.4% 30.0% 20.0%
Source; Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual, 
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual. Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manua1, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common 
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of: 
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period 
during which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares 
under option.
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30.0 percent for che 1969-1971 period is the highest of any period.
This increase in potential dilution was caused by the 15 warrant series 
issued by real estate investment trusts. Warrants issued by these real 
estate investment trusts had a median potential dilution of 49.9 percent 
with a range from 22.0 percent to 50.0 percent. In contrast, the re­
maining 24 series in the 1969-1971 period had a median potential dilu­
tion of only 17.7 percent. Table 15 presents the same information as 
Table 14, except that the analysis is by warrant issue rather than war­
rant series. The median potential dilution on this basis is 18.8 percent.
Analysis of the 106 warrant issues by use (Table 16) reveals no 
material differences in the median potential dilution except that war­
rants issued as dividends have less potential dilution than any other use. 
When the 59 warrant issues attached to other securities for the purpose 
of raising cash are analyzed by type of security, however, the median 
potential dilution of those warrant issues attached to common stock is 
significantly greater. As indicated by Table 17, the median potential 
dilution of warrants issued with common stock is 33.3 percent. This com­
pares with a median of 12.8 percent when the warrants are attached to 
straight debt. Perhaps management is less concerned about potential 
dilution of the stockholder's equity under such circumstances because 
many common stock issues are on a preemptive basis.
Fourteen of the 24 warrant issues shown in Table 17 as being 
attached to common stock were by real estate investment trusts. The 
median potential dilution of shares outstanding for these 14 issues was 
49.9 percent, as compared with 11.2 percent for the remaining 10 issues. 
Most of the warrants issued by these real estate investment trusts were
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Table 15. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American 
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 



















Less than 5.0 2 1 3 4 10 9
5.0 to 9.9 4 1 4 7 16 15
10.0 to 14.9 6 2 4 5 17 16
15.0 to 19.9 2 4 7 3 16 15
20.0 to 24.9 1 1 2 2 3 9 8
25.0 to 29.9 1 2 1 4 8 8
30.0 to 34.9 2 1 2 5 10 9
35.0 to 39.9 1 1 2 2
40.0 to 44.0 1 1 2 2
45.0 to 49.9 2 6 8 8
50.0 and over 2 6 8 8
Total 5 16 14 27 44 106 100
Median 33.07. 10.8% 19.4% 16.4% 23.7% 18.8%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual. Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common 
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of: 
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period 
during which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares 
under option.
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Table 16. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American 
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 
by Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Use
Number of Issues































Less than 5.0 7 2 1 10
5.0 to 9.9 7 6 2 1 16
10.0 to 14.9 13 2 1 1 17
15.0 to 19.9 8 6 1 1 16
20.0 to 24.9 5 3 1 9
25.0 to 29.9 3 3 1 1 8
30.0 to 34.9 5 3 1 1 10
35.0 to 39.9 1 1 2
40.0 to 44.9 1 1 2
45.0 to 49.9 6 2 8
50.0 and over 4 3 1 8
Total 59 32 8 4 3 106
Median 17.7% 20.2% 19.2% 13.4% 26.1% 18.8%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manua1, Moody's Transportation Manual. Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manua1, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common 
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of: 
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period during 
which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares under 
option.
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Table 17. Classification of Warrants Issued with Securities to Raise Cash 
by Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Type of Security; 
Fifty-Nine Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any 
Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
Number of Issues












Less than 5.0 4 1 2 7
5.0 to 9.9 6 1 7
10.0 to 14.9 8 1 4 13
15.0 to 19.9 5 2 1 8
20.0 to 24.9 3 1 1 5
25.0 to 29.9 2 1 3
30.0 to 34.9 1 4 5
35.0 to 39.9
40.0 to 44.9 1 1
45.0 to 49.9 6 6
50.0 and over 4 4
Total 30 3 24 2 59
Median 12.8% 11.8% 33.3% 18.5% 17.7%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal. Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common 
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of:
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period during 
which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares under option.
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attached to the original public offering of their shares of beneficial 
interest. The effect, therefore, is the same as if the shares had been 
issued on a preemptive basis. Each shareholder has the opportunity to 
retain his pro rata interest in equity by exercising his warrants.
Table 18 analyzes the potential dilution of warrants attached to 
securities issued in acquisitions and mergers by the type of security 
with which the warrant was combined. The conclusion is that the number 
of warrants issued, and therefore the potential dilution, is simply one 
of many factors entering into the terms of the agreement. When the 
warrants are attached to common stock, however, the median potential 
dilution of 16.6 percent is lower than the median of 20.2 percent for 
the group. Apparently managements of the acquiring firms are concerned 
about the potential dilution of warrants in such cases because the 
security holders of the acquired firms are receiving equity securities 
from the outset.
Potential dilution is less in those issues in which the exercise 
price is set near or slightly above the market price of the common on 
date of issue. In general, as the exercise price is set higher in rela­
tion to the common price, the potential dilution increases. As indicated 
by Table 19, the median potential dilution was 15.2 percent when the 
exercise price was from 105 to 114 percent of the common price. When 
the exercise price was in the range from 115 to 124 percent of the common 
price, the median potential dilution increased to 30.5 percent. This 
result is not unexpected because as the exercise price is increased in 
relation to the common price, the less the warrant contributes to the 
value of the total package of securities being offered. Consequently,
Table 18. Classification of Warrants Issued with Securities as Part of the Consideration for the 
Securities of Another Corporation by Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Number and Types of 
Securities; Thirty-Two Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 
1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
Number of Issues
Potential Dilution of 
Shares Outstanding 
(Percent)




















Less than 5.0 1 1 2
5.0 to 9.9 1 1 1 3 1 7
10.0 to 14.9 2 2
15.0 to 19.9 2 1 1 2 6
20.0 to 24.9 2 1 3
25.0 to 29.9 1 2 3
30.0 to 34.9 1 2 3
35.0 to 39.9 1 140.0 to 44.9 1 1
45.0 to 49.9 1 1
50.0 and over 1 1 1 3
Total 2 9 6 6 3 3 3 32
Median 4.4% 22.07= 16.67= 9.67= 22.07= 33.37= 17.07= 20.27=
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual, 
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage of the number of common shares under option by virtue of a 
warrant issue or series to the sum of: (1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the 
period during which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares under option.
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Table 19. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American 
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 
by Potential. Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Initial Exercise Price 
Expressed as a Percentage of the Price of the Related Common Stock on the 





























Less than 5.0 2 2 3 1 1 1 10
5.0 to 9.9 1 3 7 1 4 16
10.0 to 14.9 1 1 7 4 1 1 2 17
15.0 to 19.9 1 1 1 4 4 2 1 2 16
20.0 to 24.9 1 1 1 3 1 2 9
25.0 to 29.9 1 1 1 2 3 8
30.0 to 34.9 1 3 1 2 1 2 10
35.0 to 39.9 1 1 2
40.0 to 44.9 1 1 2
45.0 to 49.9 1 1 2 2 2 8
50.0 and over 1 1 3 3 8
Total 4 4 7 24 28 13 9 17 106
Median 21.9% 20.7% 16.3% 15.4% 15.2% 30.5% 22.6% 19.1% 18.8%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual.
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual. Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common 
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of: 
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period during 
which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares under 
option.
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in a given transaction, more warrants will have to be issued than would 
be the case if the exercise price were set lower.
APB Opinion No. 15 becomes somewhat paradoxical when it is con­
sidered in the light of the facts discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
Under the treasury stock method, warrants are not dilutive until the 
market price of the common stock exceeds the exercise price. Yet, the 
higher the exercise price in relation to the market price of the common, 
the higher potential dilution is likely to be. On the other hand, the 
possibility exists that actual dilution might be less when the exercise 
price is set high in relation to the common stock price. Actual dilution 
might be less because the likelihood of the market price of the common 
exceeding the exercise price of the warrant is less, ceteris paribus, 
when the exercise price is set high in relation to the common price.
Actual Dilution
Actual dilution, as used in this study, is the ratio of the num­
ber of common shares issued through the exercise of warrants to the num­
ber of common shares outstanding at the end of the period in which the 
warrant issue expires. Actual dilution will seldom be as great as the 
potential dilution as defined in this study. This is true even if all 
of the warrants are exercised because during the period in which the 
warrants are outstanding most companies will have issued additional 
shares of common. The warrantholder may not be protected against the 
dilution caused by the issuance of these additional shares either be­
cause the warrant agreement excludes certain types of common stock issues 
or because the right to purchase common existed prior to the warrant
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agreement. Examples of the former are warrant agreements which exclude 
from their anti-dilution provisions small stock dividends of less than 
1 or 2 percent and those which exclude shares issued under employee stock 
option plans. An example of the latter might be shares issued through 
the conversion of convertible securities outstanding prior to the war­
rant agreement.
Actual dilution will also be less than potential dilution because 
less than 100 percent of the warrants will be exercised in most cases. 
Even in successful issues where the market price of the common exceeds 
the exercise price of the warrants in the period immediately preceding 
the expiration date of the warrants, some warrants are not exercised.
For example, there were warrants to purchase 2,376,000 shares of Sperry 
Rand Corporation stock outstanding in the period preceding their expira­
tion on September 15, 1967. During this period the market price of 
Sperry Rand common exceeded the exercise price of the warrants. Yet 
warrants to purchase approximately 48,000 shares were not exercised.
There were 20 warrant issues listed on the American Stock Ex­
change which expired between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971.
Table 20 compares the potential dilution of the common equity of these 
companies with the actual dilution which was experienced. There were 
five issues, or 25 percent of the total issues under analysis, which had 
a potential dilution greater than 15 percent. Yet no issue resulted in 
an actual dilution as high as 15 percent. In fact, three of these issues 
resulted in dilution of less than 3 percent.
One of the arguments of those opposed to reflecting warrants in 
earnings-per-share computations is that many warrants are not exercised
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aTable 20. Comparison of Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding with 
Actual Dilution of Shares Outstanding;^* Twenty Warrant Issues Listed on 






















Less than 3.0 2 2 10.0
3.0 to 5.9 3 3 15.0
6.0 to 8.9 2 1 3 15.0
9.0 to 11.9 2 2 1 5 25.0
12.0 to 14.9 1 1 2 10.0
15.0 to 17.9
i8.0 to 20.9 1 1 2 10.0
21.0 to 23.9 1 1 5.0
24.0 to 26.9
27.0 to 30.0 1 1 2 10.0
Total 12 1 4 1 2 20 100.0
Percent
of total 60.0 5.0 20.0 5.0 10.0 100.0
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual.
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank 
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of:
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period 
during which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares 
under option.
bThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common
shares issued through the exercise of warrants to the number of common
shares outstanding at the end of the period in which the warrant issue 
expired.
cMedian, potential dilution: 10.4%..
^Median, actual dilution: 2.1%.
148
and, hence, do not cause dilution. Without prejudging the merits of the 
argument, it is clear than many warrants are in fact not exercised and 
this fact must be considered in formulating guidelines for earnings-per- 
share computations of companies with warrants in their capital structure. 
For the 20 warrants included in this study, the median of the potential 
dilution was 10.4 percent, a figure significantly greater than the median 
of the actual dilution encountered, 2.1 percent. The principal reason 
for this difference is reflected in Table 21, which shows that the median 
of the percentage of warrants exercised was 59 percent.
Table 21 also provides data on the exercise experience of warrant 
issues in which the exercise price was set high in relation to the market 
price of the common stock on the approximate date of issue. There were 
eight issues in which the exercise price was 125 percent or more of the 
market price of the common on the approximate date of issue. The median 
percentage of exercise of these issues was 8 percent as compared with 59 
percent for the group. For the population under study, the conclusion 
is that, in general, the higher the ratio of the exercise price of the 
warrant to the price of the underlying common stock on the approximate 
date of issue, the lower is the likelihood of exercise.
Timing of Exercise
The basic factor influencing the time of the exercise of the war­
rants in this study was the expiration date of the warrants. The median 
percentage of exercise of the 20 warrants in this study was approximately 
59 percent. However, as indicated by Table 22, the median percentage of 
exercise in the period immediately preceding the period of expiration of
Table 21. Classification of Twenty Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange which Expired 
between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 by Percentage Exercised and by Initial Exercise Price 
Expressed as a Percentage of the Price of the Related Common Stock on the Approximate Date of Issue
Number of Issues
Percentage Exercised
Exercise Price as a Percentage 

















Less than 10 percent 2 1 2 2 7
10 percent to 19 percent 1 1 2
20 percent to 29 percent
30 percent to 39 percent 1 1
40 percent to 49 percent
50 percent to 59 percent
60 percent to 69 percent
70 percent to 79 percent
80 percent to 89 percent 1 2 3
90 percent to 100 percent 1 1 4 1 7
Total 1 1 1 7 2 2 6 20
Median 84% 86% 97% 97% 50% 50% 19% 59%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody’s Industrial Manual, Moody’s Public Utility Manual, 
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Table 22. Classification of Twenty Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange which Expired 
between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 by Percentage Exercised and by Period of Exercise Relative 
to Expiration Date
Number of Issues
Number of Accounting Periods 




more 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Less than 1.0 percent 12 12 11 10 10 10 9 10 10 9 6
1.0 percent to 4.9 percent 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 1
5.0 percent to 9.9 percent 1 2 1 1 1
10.0 percent to 14.9 percent 1 2 1 1 1
15.0 percent to 19.9 percent 1 1
20.0 percent to 29.9 percent 1 1
30.0 percent to 39.9 percent 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
40.0 percent to 49.9 percent 1 1 1
50.0 percent to 59.9 percent 1 1 2 1
60.0 percent to 69.9 percent 1 1
70.0 percent to 79.9 percent 1 2 2 2
80.0 percent to 84.9 percent 1 1 2 1
85.0 percent to 89.9 percent 2
90.0 percent to 94.9 percent 1
95.0 percent to 100.0 percent 7
Total 12 13 13 14 15 17 17 20 20 20 20
Median 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 0.6% 0.8% 1.8% 59.3%
Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal. Moody's Industrial Manua1, Moody's Public Utility Manual. 
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K 
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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each issue was just 1.8 percent. The conclusion is that warrants are not 
exercised until shortly before expiration unless there are other factors, 
usually contained in the warrant agreement, which induce early exercise.
The second most influential factor in inducing exercise of the 
vjarrants in this study was an escalation in the exercise price of the 
warrants prior to their expiration date. As shown in Table 22, there 
were four warrant issues in which 50 percent or more of the warrants had 
been exercised by the third period preceding the period of expiration.
An analysis of these four issues reveals that the terms of each issue in­
cluded at least one escalation of the exercise price. In fact, the four
46issues had a total of 11 escalations of the exercise price.
One other factor was observed to have influenced the timing of 
the exercise of the 20 warrants in this study for which a complete history 
is available. Assuming the conditions precedent to exercise are met, 
announcement of a sizeable stock dividend will cause some warrant- 
holdcrs to exercise if the warrant issue is not protected against dilu­
tion from stock dividends. This appears to have happened in the case of 
Armour and Company warrants. In fiscal 1959 Armour issued a 10 percent 
stock dividend. Almost 5 percent of its warrants were exercised in this 
period, apparently because the warrants were not protected against dilu­
tion from stock dividends.^ Situations such as this are rare because 
most warrants are protected against dilution from large stock dividends.
^See pages 119-122 for a discussion of the reasons that an esca­
lation of the exercise price may induce exercise of the warrants.
^The fact that there was an escalation of the exercise price 
early in the 1960 fiscal year may also have induced some warrantholders 
to exercise.
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Other factors are also influential in inducing the exercise of 
warrants, although these factors were not encountered in the 20 warrant 
issues under study. Some of these factors will be discussed briefly.
Occasionally the theoretical value of a warrant may exceed its
market price. This is most likely to occur when the market price of the 
warrant is high in relation to its exercise price. Under such conditions 
the market price of the underlying common stock is high in relation to 
the exercise price of the warrant. As a result, the premium on the war­
rant is likely to disappear because the warrant offers very little lev­
erage. If the theoretical value of the warrant does exceed its market
price, arbitrageurs may buy the warrants and sell the equivalent shares 
of common stock short. The warrants are then exercised to cover the 
short sale. The result is a small but almost certain profit to the 
arbitrageur. At the same time the price of the warrant will usually 
advance to its theoretical value.
Royer cites the perpetual warrants of Alleghany Corporation as an 
example of arbitrage. In 1961 approximately 45 percent of its 2,000,000 
warrants were exercised by arbitrageurs because the theoretical value of 
the warrants exceeded their market price.
An increase in the dividends on the underlying common stock may 
also induce the exercise of warrants. Theoretically exercise would 
occur when the cash dividend return on the exercise price of the common 
stock exceeded the cost of funds required for the exercise. Royer cites
^®P. Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments," (un­
published Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970), p. 
138.
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Glenn L. Martin Company warrants as an example. When these warrants were 
issued in 1952, Martin was not paying a dividend. In 1954, when the 
company began paying a cash dividend of $1 per share, approximately 95 
percent of the warrants were exercised. The $1 dividend represented a 
return of 10.5 percent on the exercise price of $9.50.^9
For completeness of discussion, two other factors which may in­
duce the exercise of warrants should be mentioned at this point, although 
these factors have been discussed previously in this chapter.-’® A 
temporary reduction in the exercise price may result in the exercise of 
some warrants. Or, if the warrants are callable, a call for redemption 
of the issue will result in exercise if the theoretical value of the war­
rant is above the call price.
In summary, the potential dilution of shares outstanding of the 
90 companies issuing warrants must be considered material. Further, 
although the median potential dilution of all companies over all time 
periods is 20.0 percent, it has increased from 19.4 percent during the 
1967-1968 period to 30.0 percent during the 1969-1971 time period. The 
implication is that the dilution of earnings per share of those companies 
issuing warrants is likely to increase in the future if these warrant 
issues with higher potential dilution are exercised.
In general, potential dilution is higher for warrant issues in 
which the exercise price is set high in relation to the underlying common 
stock price. The treasury stock method, however, does not recognize
49Ibid., p. 144.
■*®See pages 122-123 and pages 127-131.
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this higher potential dilution until the market price of the common stock 
exceeds the exercise price of the warrants. The result is that warrants 
with less potential dilution, many of which are issued at lower exercise 
prices in relation to their related common stock prices, are reflected 
in earnings per share earlier than issues with greater potential dilution.
Evidence presented in this section indicates that the relation­
ship between the exercise price of the warrant and the underlying common 
stock price has little or no bearing on the ultimate number of warrants 
which will be exercised and, hence, on the dilution of earnings per 
share except in the period immediately preceding the expiration date of 
the warrant or, in some cases, the period immediately preceding an 
escalation of the exercise price. During such periods, the relationship 
between the exercise price of the warrant and the market price of the 
common does assume importance in that a condition precedent to exercise 
is that the theoretical value of the warrant be positive. Many of the 
warrants will be exercised if the common price exceeds the exercise 
price; none will be exercised if the exercise price is greater than the 
common price. The conclusion is that determination of the common stock 
equivalence status of warrants on the basis of a relationship between 
the exercise price of the warrants and their underlying common stock 
price has no validity except in the period immediately before the expira­
tion date.
Many warrants expire without exercise. The median percentage 
of exercise-of the warrants in this study was only 59 percent. This 
median is highest when the exercise price is set in the range from 95 to 
114 percent of the common stock price on date of issue. However, even
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when the exercise price is high in relation to the common stock price, 
some warrant issues are exercised. Of the six warrant issues in this 
study with exercise prices higher than 135 percent of their respective 
common stock prices on date of issue, 80 percent or more of the warrants 
of two issues were exercised. This ratio of 33 1/3 percent compares 
favorably with a ratio of only 50 percent for the entire 20 issues in 
which there were 10 issues having 80 percent or more of their warrants 
exercised. In formulating guidelines for earnings-per-share computa­
tions, the fact that many warrant issues are not exercised must be con­
sidered.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Warrants have been used by companies in many industry groups. 
They were particularly popular with conglomerates during the period when 
APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect. While there were other reasons, such 
as the high level of merger activity, for using warrants during this 
period, part of their popularity must be attributed to the fact that war­
rants were not considered residual securities under the opinion.
Although warrant issues by conglomerates have declined since 
early 1969, usage by companies in other industries has increased to the 
extent that the number of issues continues to increase. Along with the 
greater number of issues there is also an increase in the potential 
dilution of each issue. Both the increased usage and the increased 
potential dilution of each issue can be attributed to the popularity of 
real estate investment trusts as tax shelters. Dividends per share of 
these trusts may exceed earnings per share as computed under APB Opinion
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No. 15 for extended periods of time because of tax regulations in regard 
to the distribution of earnings and because of assumptions made with 
respect to warrants by the opinion.
Warrants are usually attached to other securities issued for 
purposes of: (1) raising cash, (2) acquiring the securities of another
corporation, and (3) reorganization or recapitalization. The primary 
purpose of attaching warrants is to facilitate the sale or exchange of 
the securities to which the warrants are attached. Even when warrants 
are issued alone as distributions to stockholders, the fundamental pur­
pose of the issue does not appear to be that of raising future equity 
capital. Instead, the basic reason appears to be that of establishing 
a market for the warrants which will then be used as a merger currency 
in future acquisitions. Regardless of management's reasons for issuing 
warrants, the possible effect is the issuance of additional equity 
securities, perhaps at an exercise price well below the current market 
price if the warrants are exercised.
Management has much flexibility in setting the terms for its war­
rant issues. Unfortunately, all terms must be included in the agreement 
when the warrants are originally issued. Terms which appear to provide 
some degree of control over an issue may be valueless 5 or 10 years 
later when management desires to force the exercise of an issue or to 
terminate its life without exercise. Terms over which management has 
control initially include: (1) initial exercise price, (2) changes in
the exercise price, (3) means of payment of the exercise price, (4) 
warrant life, and (5) changes in warrant life.
In setting warrant terms management must strike a balance between
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its goals and those of warrant investors because of conflicting interests. 
For example, the call privilege allows management more certainty in 
financial planning through the ability to force the exercise or the re­
demption of an issue. Few warrant issues include the call privilege, 
however, because of its detrimental effect on warrant prices. Similarly, 
the temporary-reduction-of-exercise-price feature is not permitted for 
warrants listed on the American Exchange because it is not conducive to 
an orderly warrant market.
The exercise price tends to be higher with respect to the market 
price of the underlying common stock when warrants are issued to a cor­
poration's own security holders. This is true whether the warrants are 
distributed to the stockholders as a dividend, attached to common stock 
issued on a preemptive basis, or issued in a reorganization or recapi­
talization. On the other hand, when warrants are attached to debt 
instruments in a public offering or issued in a merger or acquisition, 
the exercise price tends to be lower with respect to the common stock 
price. Warrants with a low exercise price add more value per warrant to 
the total financial package than warrants with a higher exercise price.
At the same time, however, these warrants are more likely to result in 
dilution of current stockholders' equity because the likelihood of exer­
cise is greater.
The potential dilution of shares outstanding per warrant issue 
or series is increasing, suggesting that dilution in earnings per share 
will also increase. For the time period under study, the average poten­
tial dilution is 20 percent; however, it is 30 percent for the 1969-1971 
period. Potential dilution for warrants which expired between 1950 and
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1971, however, is considerably higher than actual dilution, 10.4 percent 
versus 2.1 percent. This difference is largely due to the fact that many 
warrant issues are not exercised. Of the 20 issues that expired during 
Lhe period under study, 10 had an exercise ratio of less than 40 percent
and 10 had a ratio greater than 79 percent. The median exercise ratio
was approximately 59 percent.
Warrants are generally not exercised until shortly before their 
expiration date. Exercise prior to the expiration date, however, will 
sometimes occur if any of the following factors is present: (1) an
escalation in the exercise price, (2) large stock dividend declared and 
warrants are not protected against dilution, (3) theoretical value of 
warrant exceeds its market price, (4) an increase in dividends on the 
underlying common stock, (5) a temporary reduction in the exercise price, 
or (6) a call for redemption when the theoretical value of the warrant 
is above the call price.
The data presented and analyzed in this chapter lead to the con­
clusion that a number of warrant characteristics need to be considered
in the formulation of earnings-per-share computational guidelines. A 
discussion of these characteristics follows.
1. Warrants are not a part of the legal common equity. Instead, 
they are merely a contractual right to purchase common stock. Warrant- 
holders have no voice in management, and they do not participate in divi­
dends except to the extent that their warrants are protected against 
dilution. This point is demonstrated by the experience of certain real 
estate investment trusts cited in this chapter. Due to the tax regu­
lations of these trusts in regard to income distribution and to the
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inclusion of warrants as common stock equivalents, dividends per share 
may exceed earnings per share. The fact that warrants are not legal 
common equity is, therefore, a characteristic which must be considered 
in formulating earnings-per-share computational guidelines.
2. Warrants are not issued for the primary purpose of raising 
common equity, although additional common equity will result if the war­
rants are exercised. Instead, management attaches warrants to other 
securities in order to facilitate their sale and lower interest or divi­
dend rates. Since the financial statements reflect these benefits from 
the date of issue of the warrants, consideration should be given to 
apprising stockholders of the potential cost of these benefits in terms 
of dilution of their equity. Earnings per share is perhaps the most 
feasible method for accomplishing this purpose.
3. Warrants are not purchased for the primary purpose of acquir­
ing common equity. The use of warrants for this purpose would be illogi­
cal because warrants almost invariably trade at a premium above their 
theoretical value. Rather, warrants are purchased for the leverage they 
offer investors. A given change in the price of the underlying common 
stock will usually produce a greater change in the warrant price. The 
result is a greater profit (or loss) per dollar invested. Warrant 
purchasers, therefore, favor the warrants of companies whose common stock 
has a history of high volatility.
4. Unless the warrant agreement contains special features or 
unusual circumstances occur, the majority of warrants which are ulti­
mately exercised are not exercised until the period immediately prior to 
their expiration date. This characteristic is a complement of the
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preceding characteristic; namely, warrants are purchased for the leverage 
they offer rather than for the purpose of acquiring common stock.
Special features which may induce exercise prior to the expiration date 
include exercise price escalations, temporary reduction of the exercise 
price, or a call provision. Warrants may also be exercised prior to their 
expiration due to an increase in the dividends paid on the underlying 
common stock. Stock dividends may also be a factor if the warrants are 
not protected by an anti-dilution provision.
5. Many warrants are never exercised. The basic reason for non­
exercise is the failure of the issue to meet one of the conditions prece­
dent to exercise which is that the theoretical value of the warrant must 
be positive in the period immediately preceding the expiration date of 
the warrant. Earnings-per-share computations should consider this factor.
6 . In general, the lower the exercise price of the warrant is 
in relation to the price of the underlying common stock on the date of 
issue, the greater the value that the warrants will add to the security 
package being offered. As a result, fewer warrants can be offered per 
unit of capital solicited.
7. Ceteris paribus, the lower the exercise price of the warrant 
in relation to the related common stock price on the date of issue, the 
greater is the likelihood that the warrant will be exercised. This is 
merely a reflection of the fact that the market price of the common stock 
must exceed the exercise price of the warrant in the period immediately 
preceding the expiration date of the warrant if exercise is to occur.
The lower the exercise price is in relation to the common price, the 
higher the probability that this condition will prevail.
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8. On the average, the higher the exercise price of the warrant 
in relation to the price of the underlying common stock on the date of 
issue, the greater potential dilution of shares outstanding is likely to 
be. This follows as a corollary to Characteristic No. 6. When the ex­
ercise price is high in relation to the common price, each warrant con­
tributes less value to the total package. Therefore more warrants per 
unit of capital are likely to be issued in a given transaction. How­
ever, actual dilution of shares outstanding may be less. As pointed out 
in Characteristic No. 7, the probability of exercise is less when the 
exercise price is high in relation to the common price.
9. Except in the period immediately preceding the expiration 
of the warrant, the relationship between the exercise price of the war­
rant and the market price of the underlying common stock has no bearing 
on the ultimate number of warrants which will be exercised. This is true 
unless unusual conditions such as a substantial increase in the dividend 
rate of the common stock cause exercise prior to the expiration of the 
warrant. The relationship between the exercise price and the common 
price does assume importance in the period in which the warrant expires. 
If the market price of the common stock exceeds the exercise price of 
the warrant, then practically all warrants will be exercised. If the 
market price of the common is lower than the exercise price during this 
period, then the warrants will expire without exercise.
Several of the preceding warrant characteristics could be used 
to support the argument that warrants are not common stock equivalents. 
For example, management does not issue warrants for the purpose of 
raising future common equity. Nor does the investor purchase warrants
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for the purpose of acquiring common equity. Legally, warrants are not 
common equity until they are exercised, and, in fact, many issues are not 
exercised.
The fact remains, however, that any value a warrant may have is 
derived, directly or indirectly, from the value of the underlying common 
stock. Further, issuance of warrants is a management decision which may 
result in dilution of a current stockholder's equity. Current stock­
holders should, therefore, be informed of the results of this decision in 
terms of its potential cost as well as its benefits.
These factors, as well as the attributes of earnings per share, 
will be considered in Chapter 5 in formulating guidelines for computing 
earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding. The common 
stock equivalency concept of APB Opinion No. 15 will be analyzed in 
Chapter 4 for this same purpose.
Chapter 4
THE CONCEPT OF COMMON STOCK EQUIVALENTS
The concept of common stock equivalents evolved from the residual 
security concept and is the end product of the Accounting Principles 
Board's efforts to make the residual security concept operational while 
retaining as much of the original theory as possible. The resolution 
of conflicts between theory and practice was no easy task. The Board 
spent over a year on the problem and prepared at least eight drafts of 
APB Opinion No. 15 in the process. A knowledge of the residual security 
concept and the problems of application presented by its theory is there­
fore essential to an understanding of the concept of common stock equiva­
lents. A review of both concepts, in terms of the problems presented by 
the residual concept and the solutions adopted by the concept of common 
stock equivalents, will be helpful in formulating guidelines for the 
earnings-per-share computations of companies with warrants outstanding.
BACKGROUND--THE RESIDUAL SECURITY CONCEPT
The term residual security was first used by the Committee on 
Accounting Procedure in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 49. This bulle­
tin, issued in April, 1958, made reference to the term as follows:
. . . Where used without qualification, the term earnings per 
share should be used to designate the amount applicable to each
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share of common stock or other residual security outstand- 1m g. . . .
Since the bulletin offered no. suggestions as to what types of 
securities might be included in the other residual security category, 
the purpose of this section is to determine the reasons for the develop­
ment of the residual concept in APB Opinion No. 9 and to investigate the 
theory of the residual concept. In addition, the criteria for deter­
mining residual status under APB Opinion No. 9 and the Accounting 
Principles Board's early efforts to codify guidelines for determining 
residual status in its revision of APB Opinion No. 9 are examined.
Reasons for Development
The earnings-per-share literature during the period following the 
issuance of Accounting Research Bulletin No. 49 ignores residual securi­
ties completely. Rappaport, in his SEC Accounting Practice and Procedure, 
does cite a situation in which two classes of common stock are combined 
to compute earnings per share for registration statement purposes. He 
does not, however, use the term "residual security."
Rappaport's illustration deals with privately owned companies 
which rearrange their capitalization before going public. Frequently 
these companies provide for two classes of common stock, Class A and 
Class B. Both classes are alike in all respects except that Class B is 
entitled to a small dividend and is convertible into Class A at any time. 
The owners offer Class A shares to the public and retain the Class B
^■Committee on Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Earnings per Share, Accounting Research 
Bulletin No. 49 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1958), p. 30.
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shares. Rappaport concludes that, because of the unrestricted converti­
bility, it is proper to combine the two classes to compute earnings per 
share p"
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 49 remained in effect until 
December, 1966 when it was replaced by APB Opinion No. 9. As discussed
3in Chapter 1, investor interest in common stocks and other securities 
had increased tremendously during this period. The number of mergers 
had increased almost threefold. With mergers came a variety of complex 
securities designed to meet the needs of the acquiring company's 
management and the acquired company's security holders.
The increasing use of convertible preferred stock for merger pur­
poses appeared to be a major concern of the Accounting Principles Board. 
This concern was indicated by Frank T. Weston in the following statement:
The genesis of the problem is the increasing vogue of con­
vertible preferred stock. While convertible debt issues have 
had a fairly lengthy period of renewed popularity beginning a 
number of years ago, convertible preferreds have only lately 
come into widespread use, particularly those types with unusual 
characteristics.4
Louis H. Rappaport, SEC Accounting Practice and Procedure (2d 
ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1966), pp. 8.33-8.34.
Rappaport concludes, however, that if the conversion and divident rights 
are limited--for example, until certain levels of earnings are 
achieved--two earnings per share figures, one assuming conversion, may 
be necessary for full disclosure of the situation. This latter point is 
in accordance with Accounting Research Bulletin No. 49. See Committee 
on Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Earnings per Share, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 49 
(New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1958),
p. 32.
See page 2.
^Frank T. Weston, "Increased Emphasis on Reporting Earnings per 
Share," Financial Analysts Journal. XXIII (July-August, 1967), 49.
Weston explained the reasons for the development of these con­
vertible preferred stocks as follows:
. . .  It appears that they were the response of ingenuous cor­
porate managers to a combination of various pressures, including 
such diverse and apparently unrelated ones as (a) the desire to 
achieve poolings of interests accounting for a proposed business 
combination, thus necessitating a type of equity or ownership 
security, (b) the desire to obtain immediate earnings leverage 
following the combination by limiting the dividend requirements 
applicable to the stock to be issued, so that the hoped-for 
increase in earnings of the acquired entity would improve the 
earnings applicable to the common shares, (c) the necessity, in 
many cases as a condition of the proposed combination, to pay 
cash dividends in amounts equivalent to those previously 
received by the stockholders of the company being acquired and (d) 
the requirement that some features be added to the stock for the 
above purposes which would permit the recipients to share in the 
long-range potential of the combined business.^
Convertible preferred stock and convertible debt posed a dif­
ficult problem of valuation for analysts and investors in general. To 
the extent that their valuation is based on fixed dividend or interest 
features--senior security characteristics--convertible securities could 
be considered equivalent to other preferred stock or debt. However, to 
the extent that their valuation is based on conversion rights--a residual 
or equity security characteristic--these complex securities are more in 
the nature of common stock. As such, they share in the earnings and in 
the growth potential of the company in essentially the same manner as a 
true equity security.^
Under these circumstances, the Accounting Principles Board con­
cluded that the conventional method of computing earnings per share might
•*Ibid. 6Ibid., 49-50.
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be inappropriate. This is explained by Weston as follows:
The marketplace realistically evaluated the various charac­
teristics, and it became clear, particularly in the more extreme 
cases, that, under certain conditions, these complex securities 
were basically equivalent to common shares. When such a deter­
mination could be made, it also became apparent that the classic 
method of computation of earnings per share applicable to the 
common shares was not appropriate; it would be improper to 
attribute all the earnings (above the preferred fixed dividend 
requirements) to the common shares when these complex preferred 
shares were, due to their forms, also entitled to share in the 
economic benefits of such earnings.
A method of overcoming this weakness in the classic method of 
computation when applied to these complex "residual-type" 
preferred stocks was therefore necessary.1
Theory of the Residual Concept
In order to solve the problem, the Accounting Principles Board 
developed the residual security concept that had been alluded to in 
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 49. Residual securities were defined 
in APB Opinion No. 9 as follows:
. . . When more than one class of common stock is outstanding, 
or when an outstanding security has participating dividend rights 
with the common stock, or when an outstanding security clearly 
derives a major portion of its value from its conversion rights 
or its common stock characteristics, such securities should be 
considered "residual securities" and not "senior securities" for 
purposes of computing earnings per share.®
The term earnings per share, therefore, included actual shares 
of common stock outstanding as well as shares potentially issuable under
^Ibid., 50. Although this reference refers specifically to con­
vertible preferred stock, Weston indicates on page 52 of the article that 
convertible debt issues may also qualify as residual securities.
QAccounting Pronciples Board of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, Reporting the Results of Operations, Opinions 
of the Accounting Principles Board, No. 9 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1967), p. 120.
168
the terms of those securities classified as residual. APB Opinion No. 9 
also required supplementary pro forma computations of earnings per share 
to disclose material potential dilution by other contingent issuances 
of common shares not included as residual securities in the earnings per 
share computation. Such contingent issuances included " . . .  (a) out­
standing senior stock or debt which is convertible into common shares,
(b) outstanding stock options, warrants or similar agreements and (c) 
agreements for the issuance of common shares for little or no considera-
Qtion upon the satisfaction of certain conditions . . . ." The Board 
strongly recommended that both earnings-per-share computations be dis­
closed in the statement of income.
As a theory, the residual security concept was conceptually 
sound. A security was residual if it derived a substantial portion of 
its value from its common stock characteristics rather than from its 
investment value as a senior security. Under these circumstances the 
value of the security is dependent, to some extent, upon the value of 
the related common stock. The value of the common stock, in turn, is 
dependent, in part at least, upon its earning power. This earning power, 
under the terns of the residual issue, may be shared with the residual 
security owners. The residual security concept, therefore, leads to 
the conclusion that residual securities should be treated as common stock 
for purposes of computing earnings per share.
The residual security concept is supported by a number of the 
basic accounting concepts which underlie generally accepted accounting
9Ibid., p. 123.
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principles. Comment on two of these concepts is appropriate because 
critics have used the logic on which these concepts are based as argu­
ments against the residual concept. These concepts are substance over 
form and approximation.^
Substance over form. Critics have argued that, legally, residual 
securities are not common stock since residual security holders do not 
generally have the usual rights associated with common stock. Such 
security holders do not vote or participate in dividends with common 
shareholders. These critics therefore argue that residual securities 
should not be included in the earnings-per-share computations. This 
line of reasoning ignores the well-established concept of substance over 
form. The concept is explained by the Accounting Principles Board as 
follows:
. . . Usually the economic substance of events to be accounted 
for agrees with the legal form. Sometimes, however, substance and 
form differ. Accountants emphasize the substance of events rather 
than their form so that the information provided reflects the 
economic activities represented.^
The fact that residual securities are not legally common stock is, there­
fore, not a valid reason for rejecting the residual security concept.
^These concepts are called features by the Accounting Principles 
Board. See Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles 
Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises, Statement of 
the Accounting Principles Board No. 4 (New York: American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1970), pp. 44-48.
1 ̂ Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Under­
lying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises, Statement of the 
Accounting Principles Board No. 4 (New York; American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1970), p. 48.
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If residual securities are in substance the equivalent of common stock, 
their inclusion in the computation of earnings per share may result in 
a better presentation of the economic realities of the situation.
Approximation. Another criticism raised by opponents of the re­
sidual security concept is the necessity of estimates in classifying 
securities as residual. Under APB Opinion No. 9 a security was residual 
if it derived a substantial portion of its value from its common stock 
characteristics. In practice this meant estimating the security's in­
vestment value from its senior security characteristics and comparing 
this estimate with its total value. The investment value estimate was 
usually determined by capitalizing the security's cash yield at a rate 
appropriate for the risk assumptions. The necessity of estimates in 
determining residual status does not invalidate the residual security 
concept since approximation is a basic concept of accounting. Estimates 
are necessary if accounting is to provide timely information.***
Criteria for Determining Residual 
Status under APB Opinion No. 9
Under the residual concept " . . .  neither conversion nor the
imminence of conversion is necessary to cause a security to be a common
13stock equivalent." The right to convert and the fact that the secur­
ity is deriving a substantial portion of its value from that right are
***Ibid., pp. 46-47.
13Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings 
per Share. November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 6. (Mimeographed.)
171
factors that make the security a residual one. An integral part of the
original residual security concept theory was the fact that the residual
equity of a corporation (hence its capital structure) may change as the
14result of fluctuations in the securities and money markets. The num­
ber of shares used in the earnings-per-share computation, therefore, 
could vary from period to period in accordance with market fluctuations 
even though the actual common shares outstanding remained constant. To 
be consistent, the theory did not permit retroactive adjustments of 
prior period earnings-per-share statistics when changes in residual 
status occurred. The reason for this conclusion was that financial 
statements are primarily historical in nature and should reflect the 
capitalization structure as it existed during each period presented.^ 
Potential dilution of earnings per share was not one of the 
criteria for establishing residual status under APB Opinion No. 9. 
Potential dilution could not be a criterion if the residual concept was 
to be internally consistent because, under certain conditions, a secur­
ity classified as residual could increase earnings per share. In 
contrast, the sole criterion for including convertible and option 
securities in supplementary pro forma earnings per share was the poten­
tial dilution of earnings per share. APB Opinion No. 9 strongly 
recommended disclosure of supplementary pro forma earnings per share if 
earnings per share might be subject to dilution through contingencies
1 f ipermitting the issuance of common shares in the future. The resulting
^^Ibid., pp. 6-7. 15Ibid., pp. 8-9.
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Reporting the Results of Operations. Opinions 
of the Accounting Principles Board, No. y (New York; American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1967), pp. 123-124.
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inconsistency between the two methods of computing earnings per share was 
resolved by the Board by excluding residual securities from the dilu­
tion requirements of pro forma earnings per share.
Early Efforts to Codify Guidelines 
for Residual Status
During the two years in which APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect,
the concept of residual securities became " . . .  established in the
financial community as a logical approach to the computation of earnings
per share when complex securities with common stock characteristics are 
18outstanding." However, the concept presented certain implimentation 
problems which were inherent in the theory. The Accounting Principles 
Board's first published effort aimed at resolving these conflicts be­
tween theory and practice was an exposure draft circulated to members of 
the Institute and the financial community in November, 1968. In this 
and earlier drafts, the Board chose to adhere almost literally to the 
residual concept. In fact, the exposure draft merely clarified the 
residual concept of APB Opinion No. 9 and furnished guidelines to provide 
consistency in its application. The Board's efforts to codify guidelines 
for determining the residual status of convertible securities and war­
rants are discussed in this section.
Convertible securities. APB Opinion No. 9 provided no specific
17Ibid., p. 123.
^•®Frank T. Weston and Sidney Davidson, "What Will Accounting 
Changes Do to Earnings?" Financial Analysts Journal. XXIV (September- 
October, 1968), 59.
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guidelines for determining the residual status of securities other than 
that contained in the definition of residual securities. Consequently 
the "major-portion-of-value" test in the definition of residual securi­
ties by APB Opinion No. 9 was used to determine the residual status of 
convertible securities. The Accounting Principles Board described the 
procedure as follows:
. . .  In practice this test has been applied by comparing a 
convertible security's market value with its investment value, 
and the security has been considered to be residual whenever 
more than half its market value was attributable to its common 
stock characteristics at time of issuance. Practice has varied 
in applying this test subsequent to issuance with a higher 
measure used in many cases. Thus, a convertible security's 
status as a residual security has been affected by equity and 
debt market conditions at and after the security's issuance.
Most of the Board's early efforts in revising APB Opinion No. 9 
were directed towards establishing guidelines to determine the residual 
status of convertible securities. The objective was to provide for a 
consistency of application in practice within the framework of the re­
sidual concept. The basic criterion for determining the residual status
of convertible securities, the relationship between the convertible
20security's market price and its investment value, was retained. A
19Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the Accounting 
Principles Board, No. 15 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 220.
20uAn alternate method of determining residual status, called the 
market parity test, was also considered by the Board. It was first 
presented in the Lytle-Schuetze Draft dated October 3, 1968 and retained 
as a possible option in the exposure draft of November 6, 1968. The mar­
ket parity test compares the convertible security's market value to the 
market value of the security into which it is convertible. If the market 
prices of the two securities are substantially equivalent, the conver­
tible security is considered to be residual. The advantage of this test,
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convertible security, however, was classified as residual if its market 
price was 150 percent or more of its investment value on the date of 
issue whereas 200 percent had been used under APB Opinion No. 9. Guide­
lines were also established for determining the residual status after 
issuance and for determining reversion to nonresidual status. In an 
effort to prevent frequent changes in status caused by temporary fluctua­
tions in market prices, the Board established a minimum period for which 
a given status would remain in effect. Various guidelines for deter­
mining the residual status of convertible securities under the invest­
ment value test were considered by the Board. Those considered through 
the date of the exposure draft of November 6, 1968 are shown in Table 23.
Warrants. The November 6, 1968 exposure draft also clarified
the status of warrants as residual securities. Practitioners had not
21considered warrants residual under APB Opinion No. 9. The rationale 
for treating warrants as nonresidual is not clear. Certainly warrants 
derive a major portion of their value from their common stock
as compared with the investment value test described above, is the use 
of more readily available market prices. Thus the problem of estimating 
the investment value of a convertible security is eliminated. A 
majority of the Board preferred the investment value test because it more 
directly supported the tenets of the residual concept as presented in APB 
Opinion No. 9. See Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, Lytle-Schuetze Draft, Proposed APB 
Opinion: Earnings per Share, October 3, 1968 (New York: American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), pp. 20-21 and 
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings per 
Share, November 6, 1968 (New York; American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), pp. 8 and 27.
^Samuel L. Hayes, III and Henry B. Reiling, "Sophisticated 
Financing Tool: The Warrant," Harvard Business Review, XLVII (January-
February, 1969), 144.
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Table 23. Various Guidelines Considered by the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants for 




Total Value of Convertible Security as a 





To Classify as Residual
To Revert to 
Nonresidua 1 




























Source: Compiled from drafts of the proposed earnings per share
opinion prepared by the Accounting Principles Board of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
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characteristics. In fact, warrants have no senior security character­
istics nor do they have an investment value because they do not pay 
interest or dividends.
Hayes and Reiling, although opposed to the idea that warrants 
were nonresidual, offered the following reasons why warrants might have 
been considered nonresidual:
Furthermore, since warrants, unlike common stock, do not 
represent ownership in a company, they carry no voting rights, no 
rights to dividends, and no claim on assets in liquidation. In 
addition, a fixed price must be paid the issuer on their exercise; 
they are merely contract rights like options and are therefore 
not within the traditional debt or equity balance sheet classifi­
cation; and, finally, they are arguably not even "securities."
These are grounds for the claim that a warrant does not have enough 
common stock characteristics to conform to the second part of the 
APB's definition of residuals.22
Perhaps the Board did not specifically include warrants in its 
definition of residual securities because the use of warrants had
declined drastically in the middle 1960's when APB Opinion No. 9 was
23written. However, by 1968 when the exposure draft for APB Opinion No. 
15 was being written, there was some evidence that warrants were being 
used as a substitute for convertible securities in order to avoid the 
adverse effect of residual securities on earnings per share. For ex­
ample, only five warrant issues listed on the American Stock Exchange 
during the period from 1960 through 1966 originated in conjunction with 
mergers and acquisitions. There were, however, 11 such issues during
22Ibid.
23See page 77 on this point.
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1967 and 1968.^ In late 1968 and early 1969 corporations began using
warrants in lieu of cash or stock dividends.^ And in October, 1968
LTV, Inc. made liberal use of warrants as part of a unit of securities
2 6offered in exchange for its common stock. ° This employment of warrants 
in new areas, as well as the increased usage of warrants generally, prob­
ably influenced the Board to include warrants as a residual security in 
the November 6, 1968 exposure draft.
In the formulation of guidelines for the classification of war­
rants as residual securities, the Board in early drafts appeared to 
equate the relationship between the exercise price of warrants and the 
market price of the underlying common stock with the relationship be­
tween the market price of a convertible security and its investment 
value. A comparison of Tables 23 and 24 indicates that the respective 
relationships, expressed as percentages, were the same in the August and 
September, 1968 drafts. In subsequent drafts, the residual status of 
warrants was made more inclusive by reducing the percentages.
The classification of warrants as residual securities presented 
the Board with an additional problem not encountered in convertible se­
curities. The exercise of warrants usually results in a receipt of funds 
ly the issuing corporation. Therefore some assumption must be made as to 
the use of these funds and the return thereon. As indicated in Table 24, 
the Board considered several methods of imputing a return on the funds
^See Table 2, page 89. For further discussion of the use of 
warrants for mergers and acquisitions related specifically to con­
glomerates, see pages 82 and 84.
25See pages 101-103. 26See pages 104-105.
Table 24. Various Guidelines Considered by the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants for Determining the Residual Status of Warrants and the Assumed Use 
of Funds from Exercise
Date of 
Draft
Market Price of Underlying Common Stock 
as a Percentage of 
Exercise Price of Warrant Period in Status 
before Change of 
Status Permitted
Assumed Use of 
Funds from 
Exercise3
To Classify as Residual
To Revert to 
Nonresidual 
Status










1, 2, 3, 4






1, 2, 3, 4






1, 2, 3, 4






1, 5, 2, 3
Source: Compiled from drafts of the proposed earnings per share opinion prepared by the Accounting
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
aKey to the assumed use of funds: (1) Consistent with the company's financial policies; (2)
The rate of interest being paid on outstanding debt, less tax-effect; (3) An assumed investment in government or similar obligations, less tax-erfect; (41 The assumed use of funds to purchase stock of the issuing company at current price; (5) The current borrowing rate of the company, less tax-effect.
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assumed to be received from exercise. This problem will be considered 
in the following section of this chapter.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF 
COMMON STOCK EQUIVALENTS
The exposure draft of November 6, 1968 was circulated to the 
full membership of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants and to other interested members of the financial community. As 
previously discussed, this draft adhered almost literally to the original 
residual concept. As a result, the emphasis of the draft was on the 
codification of guidelines for determining the status of residual securi­
ties .
The magnitude of the opposition to the residual concept was per­
haps surprising in view of Weston and Davidson's statement of its accep­
tance by the financial community.27 As indicated in Table 25, many 
influential accounting and finance organizations disapproved of the 
concept as it was presented in the exposure draft. The Accounting 
Principles Board also received many letters from corporate executives 
expressing dissatisfaction with the concept. The Financial Executives 
Institute, in a poll of its members, found that 74 percent of those 
responding disapproved of the concept as interpreted by the exposure 
draft.28
As a result of the broad opposition to the residual concept as
27See page 172.
28"propOSed APB Opinions on 'Earnings per Share' and 'Accounting 
for Convertible Debt and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants,"' 
Financial Executive, XXXVIII (March, 1969), 12.
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Table 25. Summary of Selected Comments of Certain Accounting and Finance 
Organizations on the November 6, 1968 Exposure Draft of the Proposed 
Opinion on Earnings per Share by the Accounting Principles Board of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Organizationsa
Comments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Residual Concept in General








Guidelines for Determining Residual Status 
of Convertible Securities
Prefer investment values test 
Prefer market parity test 
Prefer test based on dilutive effect of 
other securities on earnings per share 
of common stock X
X
X X X
Assumptions as to Use of Warrant Proceeds
Prefer those recommended in exposure 
draft
Prefer other assumptions X
X
Objections to Proposed Opinion
General
Too complex and confusing 
Determination of earnings per share not 
an accounting issue, but one of 
security valuation 
The method of calculating a particular 
earnings-per-share figure is a func­







Change of status between residual and 
nonresidua 1 
Prohibition of restatement of earnings 
per share to reflect changes in re­
sidual status 
Increase in primary earnings per share 
caused by residual securities 
Changes in earnings per share caused 


















Comments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Specific (continued)
Arbitrary selection of residual guidelines 
Fully diluted earnings per share should 
include securities which increase earn­
ings per share 
Earnings-per-share figures which are pro 
forma should be labelled as such. Both 
earnings-per-share figures in exposure 
draft are pro forma






Two earnings per share, one based on 
actual common shares outstanding and 
the other assuming full dilution X X X X X X X
Source; Compiled from comment letters received by the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board in response to their Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; 
Earnings per Share, November 6, 1968.
aKey to organizations responding: (1) Securities and Exchange
Commission; (2) Corporate Reporting Committee of the Financial Execu­
tives Institute; (3) Financial Accounting Policy Committee of the 
Financial Analysts Federation; (4) Accounting and Auditing Research 
Committee and Research Staff of the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants; (5) Airline Finance and Accounting Conference; (6) Retail 
Committee on Accounting Principles of the Controllers Congress of the 
National Retail Merchants Association; (7) Task Force Committee of 
American Accounting Association on Exposure Drafts of Proposed APB 
Opinions on Accounting for Convertible Debt and Debt Issued with Stock 
Purchase Warrants and Earnings per Share dated November 6, 1968;
(8) Corporation Finance Committee of the Investment Bankers Associa­
tion of America.
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presented in the exposure draft, the Accounting Principles Board made 
extensive changes in the concept. Consequently, the term residual was 
abandoned in favor of the term common stock equivalents in all drafts 
prepared subsequent to the exposure draft of November 6, 1968. Footnote 
1 of the February 24, 1969 draft explained the change as follows:
. . . APB Opinion No. 9 refers to certain securities as residual 
securities and the determination of residual status is based upon 
the market value of the security as it relates to investment value.
In this Opinion, the Board establishes the term common stock equiva­
lents as being more descriptive of the classes of securities other 
than common stock which should be considered in the determination 
of primary earnings per share. Underlying concepts which is [sic.] 
somewhat similar to the residual concept and the criteria for de­
termining common stock equivalent status are set forth in this
Opinion. 9
The concept of common stock equivalents, therefore, evolved as 
a result of the Board's modification of the residual concept. This 
modification was necessary in order to provide guidelines for computing 
earnings per share which could be implemented in practice on a consis­
tent basis. Most of the objections to the residual concept were a 
result of the basic theory that securities could move in and out of 
residual status through changes in market prices or investment values.
This problem of changes in residual status, which destroyed the inter- 
period and intercompany comparability of earnings per share, was height­
ened by virtue of the impossibility of devising guidelines for determining 
residual status which were not arbitrary.
Major problem areas created by the residual concept were the
2 Q̂Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi 
fied Public Accountants, Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earnings per 
Share. February 24, 1969 (New York; American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 2. (Mimeographed.)
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retroactive adjustment of earnings per share for changes in residual 
status, the enhancement of earnings per share by residual securities, 
and the use of funds from the assumed exercise of warrants. The Account­
ing Principles Board had considered these problems in formulating the 
guidelines set forth in the exposure draft but the solution of some of 
these problems would have required abandonment or extensive modification 
of the residual concept. Since the Board had chosen to retain the re­
sidual concept of APB Opinion No. 9, the guidelines provided by the 
exposure draft did little to resolve these problems. Having failed in 
its attempt to adapt the theory of the residual concept to practice, the 
Board in effect reversed its mode of operation. It resolved the prob­
lems created by the residual concept on a practical basis in terms of 
the desired end results and then created the concept of common stock 
equivalents to support those results.
A discussion of the major problem areas which the Board encoun­
tered in its attempt to make the residual concept operational follows.
In general, the organization of the discussion of each problem area is 
as follows: (1) a description of the problem, (2) the solution adopted
by the exposure draft of November 6, 1968, (3) the reaction of the 
financial community as expressed in comment letters to the Board, and 
(4) the resolution of the problem under the concept of common stock equi­
valents in APB Opinion No. 15.
Retroactive Adjustment for 
Changes in Residual Status
The question of whether or not the change in status of a security 
from nonresidual to residual or vice versa should affect the
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earnings-per-share computations only on a prospective basis or also 
retroactively presented the Accounting Principles Board with a dilemma. 
A discussion of this problem, the proposed solution under the residual 
concept, the reaction of the financial community to that solution, and 
the solution adopted under the concept of common stock equivalents 
follows.
The problem. Traditionally earnings per share had always been 
computed on the basis of the capital structure which existed in each 
period. Retroactive adjustment for changes in capital structure were 
prohibited. This policy was reaffirmed by APB Opinion No. 9 as follows:
. . . Accordingly, the computations of earnings per share in 
annual reports to stockholders, whether related to the formal 
statements in comparative form for two years or to the historical 
summaries covering a period of years, should usually be based on 
the capitalization structure existing during each period. . . .
The principal exception . . . occurs when a pooling of interests 
has occurred. . . . Other exceptions to this treatment are the 
result of (a) stock splits or reverse splits, and (b) stock 
dividends . . .
In other words, earnings-per-share data as well as the related financial 
statements are primarily of an historical nature and should not be 
affected by subsequent events.
On the other hand, a basic premise of the residual concept was 
that the capital structure of a corporation actually changed as the rela­
tive values of its convertible securities changed. The Lytle-Schuetze
T  AJUAccounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Reporting the Results of Operations, 
Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board, No. 9 (New York: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1967), pp. 124-125.
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Draft of October 3, 1968 explains this aspect of the residual concept 
as follows:
. . . Holders of this view believe that if a corporation has 
securities outstanding which may become coiranon stock the real 
capital structure of the corporation shifts depending upon the 
relative values of the outstanding securities. They believe that 
if a security which is not yet a common stock merely because a 
holder has not exercised his privileges derives a substantial 
portion of its value from its right to become common stock or 
from its other common stock characteristics, then that security 
should be considered the equivalent of common stock for the 
purposes of calculating primary earnings per share.33
Under this point of view, changes in residual status did not 
affect the comparability of earnings per share. The logic supporting 
this statement is as follows:
. . . Those who subscribe to this view are cognizant of the 
fact that securities may acquire and lose residual status 
depending upon factors beyond the control of the issuer or holder 
of the security. Although such movements may cause periodic 
earnings per share to lack comparability on their face, those 
who uphold this view believe that these movements and their con­
comitant effect on earnings per share truly portray the real 
shifts in a corporation's capital structure.32
Philip L. Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Convertible 
and Participating Securities, in a letter to the Accounting Principles 
Board members, pointed out the consequences of not permitting retroactive 
adjustment of earnings per share under the residual concept. He stated:
. . . prospective treatment, in a sense, detracts from the com­
parability of EPS data--there is little question but that a company 
would have some cause to be disturbed if its total earnings in­
creased and, as a result, the market price of stock went up, but 
then its primary earnings per share declined because of a change in
33Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Lytle-Schuetze Draft. Proposed APB Opinion: 
Earnings per Share, October 3, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12. (Mimeographed.)
3^Ibid., p p .  11-12.
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status of a convertible security to that of a residual (of course, 
there could be equal cause for concern if earnings and stock 
prices declined but EPS increased).33
Defliese presented the argument against retroactive adjustment 
of earnings per share for changes in residual status as follows:
. . . Retroactive treatment of the change weakens the view of
a residual security as a somewhat basic concept and consequently 
the need for its use in primary earnings per share data as long 
as pro forma earnings per share data are given. It also opens 
the question of retroactive treatment for actual conversions in 
order to be consistent.^
In the November 6, 1968 and all prior drafts, the Board chose
not to weaken the residual security concept by allowing retroactive
adjustment of earnings-per-share data for changes in residual status or
for actual conversions of convertible securities or the exercise of
options and warrants. Disclosure of supplementary earnings per share
35data giving effect to such events was permitted, however.
Comments of the financial community. As Table 25 on pages 180
and 181 indicates, most accounting and finance organizations were opposed 
to the guidelines which permitted changes in status between residual and 
nonresidual without allowing the retroactive restatement of earnings per 
share to reflect those changes. Although not indicated in Table 25,
3 3 Letter from Philip L. Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Convertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to 
members of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants dated June 18, 1968.
34Ibid.
35Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earn­
ings per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 10. (Mimeographed.)
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the Securities and Exchange Commission had earlier expressed a prefer­
ence for retroactive application. The views of members of the Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission on the proposed opinion had been obtained 
in a meeting with members of the Subcommittee on Convertible and 
Participating Securities on August 1, 1968. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, however, did not take exception to the disallowance of 
retroactive application in their comment letter on the exposure draft 
of November 6, 1968. Indications are that the Commission accepted as 
a compromise the recommendation of the exposure draft that disclosure 
of the effect of changes in residual status be made in a note to the 
financial statements.^6
Many of the comment letters received from financial executives 
of major corporations took exception to the prohibition of retroactive 
adjustment of earnings per share for changes in residual status. The 
concensus of opinion was that failure to restate earnings per share for 
prior periods destroyed the usefulness of the data for comparative pur­
poses. The following comments are typical;
. . . the rule forbidding the restatement of prior years 
figures disregards the basic use that is made of historical 
earnings per share--the establishment of trends for use in making 
investment decisions. Paragraph 10 of the exposure draft indi­
cates this quite explicitly, pointing out that one purpose of 
earnings per share data is to provide assistance to the investor 
in respect to changes in the business entity’s net income from 
period to period in relation to the shares the investor owns.
This paragraph also says that earnings per share are used in
Memorandum prepared by Robert N. Sempier, Assistant Administra­
tive Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, for the convertible securities 
file of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants dated August 5, 1968.
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evaluating past earnings performances of a business and in forming 
an opinion as to its future potential, etc. It seems obvious that 
erratic changes in earnings per share figures arising from changes 
in the residual status of convertible securities would destroy all 
usefulness to the investor for this purpose.^7
. . . The fundamental error contained in the Exposure Draft is 
the omission of a provision for the retroactive adjustment of the 
statements of prior years. The only justification for dealing with 
an imputed recapitalization for the current year lies in the assump­
tion that the true nature of the original security had become dis­
closed by events occurring subsequent to issuance. If such an 
event occurs several years after the date of issuance, it would 
seem completely proper to adjust not only the most recent year but 
rather each year in which that security was outstanding. To assert 
that the same security is residual in one column of a statement 
while handling it as common in the second column of that same 
statement would negate all sense of logic.
Because we feel that the prior year's statements are presented 
to provide a reference point or "bench mark" for judging current 
year's performance, we advocate restatement of the prior year when­
ever a conversion in the current year results in significant dilu­
tion of earnings per share. Restatement would especially be 
necessary if the proposed definitions of "residual" securities 
are sustained. At least, restatement for consistency would require 
only one arbitrary decision and the result would stand for the 
entire period being reported on. It follows that we would also 
treat a security as residual for the entire year in which it 
becomes residual.39
Solution under the concept of common stock equivalents. Despite 
the objections of the financial community, the Accounting Principles
07Letter from J. P. McFarland, President and Chief Executive 
Officer of General Mills, Inc. to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative 
Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 10, 1969.
38Letter from H. C. Knortz, Senior Vice-President and Comptroller 
of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation to the Accounting 
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants dated December 23, 1968.
■^Letter from Eugene H. Irmingh and R. W. Halliday, Comptroller 
and Executive Vice-President--Finance, respectively, of Boise Cascade 
to the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants dated December 7, 1968.
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Board adhered to the principle that " . . .  information in financial 
statements is of an historical nature and should not be affected by sub­
sequent events."^® Consequently, all of the drafts prepared after the 
November 6, 1968 exposure draft, as well as APB Opinion No. 15, con­
tained the requirement that changes in outstanding securities from the 
exercise of options, conversions, or changes in residual status should 
be reflected in the computation of earnings per share only from the time 
the change occurred. Other changes in the final opinion, however, 
alleviated the problem of retroactive adjustment to some extent.
Under the concept of common stock equivalents, the status of 
convertible securities is determined at date of issue only. Conse­
quently the problem of retroactive adjustment was avoided because securi­
ties do not change status after the original classification.^ In 
theory, warrants are always common stock equivalents. The problem of 
retroactive adjustment remains, however, because of the method chosen
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earn­
ings per Share. November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 8. (Mimeographed.)
^Convertible securities classified as common stock equivalents, 
however, would be excluded from the earnings-per-share computation if the 
effect was to increase primary earnings per share or decrease the loss 
per share as otherwise computed. The basis ultimately adopted by the 
Board in APB Opinion No. 15 for classifying convertible securities as 
common stock equivalents was a yield test. A convertible security was 
classified as a common stock equivalent if, based on the security's 
market price at the time of issuance, it had a cash yield of less than 
66 2/3 percent of the then current bank prime interest rate. See 
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the Accounting 
Principles Board, No. 15 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 229.
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by the Board for calculating the number of common stock equivalents.
As indicated in Table 24 on page 178, various assumptions about 
the use of funds from the exercise of warrants had been considered by 
the Board through the date of the release of the November 6, 1968 ex­
posure draft. Drafts after this date as well as the final opinion used 
the treasury stock method in various forms for determining the common 
stock equivalency of warrants. Under the treasury stock method the 
common stock equivalents attributable to warrants vary inversely with 
the market price of the underlying common stock. Consequently the prob­
lem of retroactive adjustment of earnings per share remains because the 
number of common stock equivalents attributable to a given warrant issue 
is not constant from period to period. Consideration must be given to 
this attribute of the treasury stock method in drafting guidelines for 
the computation of earnings per share of companies with warrants out­
standing .
Anti-dilution
Another predicament resulting from the residual security 
concept--the enhancement of primary earnings per share by residual 
securities--caused the Accounting Principles Board some concern. The 
following discussion deals with this problem under the residual concept, 
the opposition to the residual concept solution, and the final resolu­
tion under the concept of common stock equivalents.
The problem. The theory underlying the residual concept was 
based on market relationships rather than on potential dilution. A 
security was residual if it derived a major portion of its value from
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its common stock characteristics. If the residual theory was to be 
internally consistent, residual securities which enhanced primary earn­
ings per share also had to be included. The Subcommittee on Conver­
tible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles Board, 
charged with the revision of APB Opinion No. 9. accepted this conclusion 
from the beginning of its deliberations. This is indicated by the dis­
cussion memorandum of an April 2, 1968 meeting as follows:
. . . The subcommittee has concluded (with P. L. Defliese dis­
senting) that a security should be classified as a residual if the 
appropriate market relationships prevail regardless of a resultant 
increase in reported common earnings per share. This decision was 
largely based on the view that the residual classification 
represents a basic concept.4-2
The Subcommittee also reaffirmed the provisions of APB Opinion 
No. 9 with respect to pro forma earnings per share. The criterion for 
the inclusion of convertible securities was potential dilution to earn­
ings per share rather than the market relationships criterion of primary 
earnings per share. This is shown by the following excerpt from the 
discussion memorandum of the April 2 meeting:
. . . The subcommittee concluded that the intent of paragraph 
43 as expressed in its first sentence--that "earnings per share may 
be subject to dilution in the future if any existing contingencies 
permitting issuance of common shares eventuate"--leads to a con­
clusion that pro forma per share earnings should include only those 
convertible securities whose conversion would result in dilution 
of common earnings per share and should exclude others.43
^Discussion memorandum enclosed in a letter from Philip L. 
Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Convertible and Participating 
Securities of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, to members of the Subcommittee on Con­
vertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants dated 
April 10, 1968, p. 4.
^Ibid., p. 8.
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As a result, the dilution criterion of pro forma earnings per 
share was inconsistent with the market relationships criterion of primary 
earnings per share when a security classified as residual increased 
earnings per share. In early drafts and in the exposure draft of 
November 6, 1968 this conflict was resolved by excluding residual securi­
ties from the provisions of the dilution criterion in computing pro forma 
earnings per share.44 in APB Opinion No. 15 the problem was resolved by 
excluding from the primary earnings-per-share computation " . . .  common 
stock equivalents or other contingent issuance for any period in which 
their inclusion would have the effect of increasing the earnings per 
share amount or decreasing the loss per share amount otherwise com­
puted .
Opposition within the Subcommittee. The eventual exclusion of 
common stock equivalents having the effect of reverse dilution from the 
computation of primary earnings per share can probably be attributed to 
the influence of Philip Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Con­
vertible and Participating Securities, and to the opposition of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to anti-dilution. Defliese was 
opposed to including reverse dilution issues " . . .  because (a) we are
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: 
Earnings per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 13. (Mimeographed.)
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the 
Accounting Principles Board, No. 15 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 228.
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in a peculiar position if we disregard the inherent rights of security 
issues and the result is an increase in EPS over what that amount would 
be if such rights had been taken into consideration . . . and (b) we
L.C\seem to be inconsistent with the position we adopted on pro forma EPS.'
Theoretically the purpose of the residual concept was to reflect 
in earnings per share the capital structure which existed in each period. 
Under this concept, residual equity included senior securities which 
derived a major portion of their value from their conversion rights or 
their common stock characteristics in addition to the common shares out­
standing. Securities classified as residual, therefore, could cause 
earnings per share to increase or decrease. The exclusion from the earn- 
ings-per-share computation of residual securities which increased earn­
ings per share clearly weakened the basic concept unless the purpose of 
the concept was modified.
In a statement defending his position, Defliese made a subtle 
but important change in the purpose of the residual concept. The purpose 
of the residual concept was no longer that of allocating earnings to all 
residual equities. Instead, the objective of the concept was to prevent 
the employment of residual securities as a substitute for common stock 
for the purpose of increasing earnings per share. Defliese interpreted 
the residual concept as follows:
HDLetter from Philip L. Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Convertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to 
members of the Subcommittee on Convertible and Participating Securities 
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants dated April 10, 1968.
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. . . The residual concept, in my opinion, is an attempt to 
prevent a senior form of a security which can obtain a substantial 
part of its investment attractiveness only because of its common 
stock characteristics being employed to give the appearance of 
greater per share earnings than if common stock had actually been 
issued. Pro forma calculations serve a somewhat related purpose 
and deal with somewhat similar securities. In fact, the only dif­
ference between residual securities and those for which pro forma/ *7calculations are called for is one of degree. '
The other four members of the Subcommittee continued to prefer 
the basic residual concept. Accordingly, all of the early drafts of the 
opinion, including the November 6, 1968 exposure draft, retained the 
residual classification for securities which increased primary earnings 
per share. In fact, a provision to prevent reverse dilution of primary 
earnings per share was not included until the concept of common stock
A Oequivalents was introduced in the February 24, 1969 draft. °
Opposition by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The opposi­
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission to a residual security 
concept which could result in the enhancement of primary earnings per 
share was not surprising. The Commission had just released Securities 
Act of 1933 Release No. 4910 when the Subcommittee met to discuss the 
proposed opinion with Commission members on August 1, 1968. One of the 
conclusions of that release had the effect of modifying the market
^Statement of P. L. Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Convertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to mem­
bers of the Subcommittee on Convertible and Participating Securities of 
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants dated April 23, 1968.
A O^“Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings per
Share, February 24, 1969 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 12. (Mimeographed.)
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relationships criterion for determining residual status under APB 
Opinion No. 9 to include a dilution test. The following statement from 
the release makes this point clear:
. . .  In general, if at the time of issuance of a convertible 
security in an acquisition, the terras are such as to result in 
immediate material dilution to pro forma earnings per share, assum­
ing conversion, then that security should be considered a residual 
security whether or not a majority of its value may be derived 
from its conversion right. ^
In the August 1, 1968 meeting between members of the Subcommittee 
and members of the Commission, the preference of the Commission for the 
dilution criterion was reaffirmed. In fact, the Commission really 
preferred only one earnings-per-share figure which would reflect all 
potential dilution. This is indicated by the following statement:
The view was expressed by L. Millard of the SEC, that dilution 
of earnings per share should be the basis for determining whether 
a convertible security is a residual. It was also indicated that 
the most meaningful earnings per share figure would be that which 
gave effect to all convertibles as though they were in fact con­
verted (i.e. pro forma earnings per share).
The Commission's attitude did not change with the release of 
the November 6, 1968 exposure draft which permitted reverse dilution of 
primary earnings per share. In commenting on the exposure draft Andrew 
Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
stated:
^Securities and Exchange Commission, "Securities Act of 1933 
Release No. 4910," Financial Analysts Journal, XXIV (September-October, 
1968), 68.
^^Memorandum prepared by Robert N. Sempier, Assistant Administra­
tive Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, for the convertible securities file 
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants dated August 5, 1968.
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In our discussion with members of the subcommittee, and as 
reflected in Securities Act Release No. 4910, we have made it 
clear that the Commission's primary concern with the calcula­
tions of earnings per share is the dilutive effect of other 
securities on the earnings per share of the common stock. That 
is, the proper determination of the earnings per share attri­
butable to the common stock gives effect to participations of 
other security holders. Securities which do not have a dilu­
tive effect or which would enhance earnings per share, assuming 
conversion, would not enter into the calculations.51
The Accounting Principles Board had hoped that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission would suspend enforcement of the provisions of 
Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4910 in favor of the guidelines set 
forth in the exposure draft. Barr made it clear that the Commission 
would not do so in the following statement:
We also believe that guidelines based on the investment value 
concept, and even the market parity concept, are not adequate to 
cope with all situations in which dilution is so great as to 
cause us trouble. While we will not oppose adoption of the 
proposal, we do not abandon the criterion specified in Securities 
Act Release 4910 but will apply it only when failure to do so 
would materially distort the effect of the securities to be 
issued.52
Practically none of the comment letters on the November 6, 1968 
exposure draft took exception to the enhancement of primary earnings 
per share by residual securities. This would be expected since most of 
the responses came from the top level of management of firms which were 
likely to be affected adversely by the opinion. Some concern was ex­
pressed that the draft conflicted with the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission ruling, as shown by the following excerpt:
■^Letter from Andrew Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director 
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, dated January 7, 1969.
52Ibid.
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Our second specific difference concerns the possibility of 
differing rules issued by the American Institute and by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Paragraph 57 of the opinion 
implies that a security not be regarded as residual merely because 
of the effect the classification has on primary earnings per 
share. The SEC has issued a ruling stating that securities 
should be considered residual if they have a material effect of 
dilution on earnings per share when issued. Before any opinion 
is issued by the Institute, we feel that this apparent differ­
ence between the AICPA and the SEC rule should be resolved.^3
A few letters also pointed out the previously discussed incon­
sistency between primary and fully diluted earnings per share. These 
respondents usually urged that fully diluted earnings per share should 
also include securities the conversion or exercise of which would result 
in an enhancement of the figure. The logic for their inclusion in the 
computation is expressed in the following quotation:
As we view paragraphs 70 and 72, it appears that inconsis­
tent assumptions are required to be made in the calculation of 
fully diluted EPS where a company has several classes/types of 
outstanding convertible securities which are not classed as 
residuals, only these which will adversely affect EPS are to be 
included in the calculation. In most instances the fully diluted 
concept rests upon an assumption that the market price of common 
stock will increase to the point where conversion is advantageous 
from the viewpoint of the security holder. Since this is the 
assumption necessary to give meaning to the fully diluted EPS 
presentation, it must be assumed consistently, i.e., as to all 
outstanding convertible issues, if it is not to mislead the 
investing public altogether. It is not a question of infringing 
upon the time-honored principle of conservatism--it is simply the 
logical consequence of adopting the fully diluted concept.54
-^Letter from J. P. McFarland, President of General Mills, Inc., 
to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
dated January 10, 1969.
-^Letter from J. Kenneth Kilcarr, President of the Airline 
Finance and Accounting Conference, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative 
Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 13, 1969.
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Solution under the concept of common stock equivalents. The 
adoption of the concept of common stock equivalents eliminated the in­
consistency in criteria between primary and fully diluted earnings per 
share. Primary earnings per share excluded those common stock equiva­
lents which would increase earnings per share or decrease loss per 
share as otherwise computed. The concept also resolved much of the 
conflict with the Securities and Exchange Commission. There remained, 
however, the possibility that a security which could result in material 
potential dilution would not be classified as a common stock equivalent 
under the guidelines of APB Opinion No. 15. Although such securities 
would enter into the computation of fully diluted earnings per share, 
Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4910 would also require their inclu­
sion in the computation of primary earnings per share. Andrew Barr, 
Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission, did not 
mention this discrepancy in his comment letter on the pre-ballot draft 
of March 14, 1969.^  Perhaps the Commission felt that the guidelines 
were sufficiently restrictive to prevent this situation from occurring.
Use of Funds from the
Assumed Exercise of Warrants
Another problem which confronted the Accounting Principles Board 
under the residual concept was the formulation of guidelines for deter­
mining the use of funds derived from the assumed exercise of warrants. 
The following discussion is concerned primarily with the treasury stock
-^Letter from Andrew Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of 
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, dated March 27, 1969.
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method and modifications of the treasury stock method which the Board 
eventually adopted in APB Opinion No. 15. The treasury stock method 
and other assumptions as to the use of warrant funds are treated more 
extensively in Chapter 5.
The problem. Warrants had not been considered residual securi­
ties under APB Opinion No. 9. They were, however, included in the com­
putation of pro forma earnings per share if their exercise would result 
in material dilution of future earnings per share. No guidelines for 
the use of the funds received from the assumed exercise of the warrants 
were provided in the Opinion. Consequently several different assumptions 
developed in practice, as indicated by Frank Weston and Sidney Davidson:
. . .  In computing supplementary pro forma earnings per share 
data to determine potential dilution from outstanding options 
and warrants, it is customary to attribute some increase in pro 
forma net income as a result of the pro forma use of proceeds-- 
either by an assumed reduction in interest expense (through pro 
forma payment of debt) or by an increase in investment income, 
both net of income tax effect. A third approach is to assume 
that common shares are purchased for the corporate treasury with 
the proceeds at current market prices, considering only the 
excess of shares issuable under such instruments over the pro 
forma shares so acquired as an increase in the pro forma out­
standing shares for the dilution computation.^^
At least two members of the Accounting Principles Board, Weston 
and Davidson, had reservations about methods of attributing earnings to 
the proceeds of warrants assumed to have been exercised which resulted 
in pro forma adjustments of historical net income for the purpose of
Frank T. Weston and Sidney Davidson, "What Will Accounting 
Changes Do to Earnings?" Financial Analysts Journal. XXIV (September- 
October, 1968), 62.
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computing primary earnings per share. They expressed these reservations 
as follows:
. . . However, when options or warrants qualify as residual 
securities, there exists a major question as to whether the his­
torical net income of the period should be revised in any way, 
since the residual security computation is the basic, historical 
computation for the period and should therefore be based on 
actual net income. Accordingly, any increase in net income 
resulting from an attribution of earnings to proceeds which have 
not in fact been received would appear to be improper. On the 
other hand, it would appear illogical to adjust upward the 
outstanding common shares by the entire number of. shares 
issuable under options and warrants without some recognition of 
the fact that these instruments, upon exercise, do result in 
additional funds being made available to the corporation.-^
Weston and Davidson concluded that the treasury stock method 
might be most appropriate because the computation did not require a pro
C Oforma adjustment to net income. Although net income is not adjusted 
in the actual computation of earnings per share under the treasury 
stock method, the effect on earnings per share is the same as if a 
perhaps inappropriate earnings rate on warrant proceeds had been assumed
C Qfor the computation. 3 Proof that the treasury stock method assumes a 
rate of return on warrant proceeds that varies inversely with the price 
of the related common stock and that the rate assumed is always less 
than the earnings-price ratio of the underlying common stock is shown 
in Chapter 5.
57 ... 58Ibid. Ibid.
-^After further research of the treasury stock method, Weston 
also reached this conclusion. See a letter from Frank T. Weston, mem­
ber of the Subcommittee on Convertible and Participating Securities of 
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, to J. S. Seidman, member of the Accounting 
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants, dated March 28, 1969.
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As Table 24 on page 178 indicates, early drafts of the opinion, 
including the November 6, 1968 exposure draft, allowed management con­
siderable latitude in selecting a return on the funds obtained from an 
assumed exercise of warrants. The August, September, and October, 1968 
drafts permitted the following assumptions:
1. Consistent with the company's financial policies or, in the 
absence of a discernible relevant policy,
2. The rate of interest being paid on outstanding debt, net of 
tax effect,
3. An assumed investment in government or similar obligations, 
net of tax effect,
4. The assumed use of funds to purchase stock of the issuing 
company at current prices.^
Assumptions prohibited by the November 6, 1968 exposure draft. 
The November 6, 1968 exposure draft eliminated the purchase of treasury 
stock option, substituting in its place the option that funds received 
from the exercise of warrants would earn at the current borrowing rate 
of the company, net of tax effect.^ Furthermore, the treasury stock
^®See Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings
per Share, August 26, 1968 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), pp. 25-26; Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Draft, 
Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings per Share, September 16, 1968 (New
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), 
p. 29; and Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Lytle-Schuetze Draft, Proposed APB Opin­
ion: Earnings per Share, October 3, 1968 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), pp. 49-50.
61Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earn­
ings per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12.
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method was not allowed even if it were consistent with the company's
financial policies. The Board prohibited its use in the following
statement: "An assumed use of funds to purchase stock of the issuing
company is not appropriate because of the number of estimates, restric-
62tions, and other factors involved."0
Apparently the Accounting Principles Board had become concerned 
with the legality of a company's purchase of its own stock. In the 
interest of protecting creditors, some state statutes limit the amount 
of treasury stock which may be purchased. Bond indentures may also 
limit the purchase of treasury stock in order to protect the bondholders. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission also regulates the purchase of 
treasury stock. For example, Rule 10b-6 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 contains restrictions against trading by persons interested in 
a distribution.^
By specifically prohibiting the treasury stock method in the 
November 6, 1968 exposure draft, the Board appeared to be rejecting the 
concept of substance over form. Such a position was clearly untenable 
because the entire concept of residual securities placed substance over 
form. David N. Judelson and Norman R. Forson, President and Treasurer, 
respectively, of Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. pointed this out in 
the following comments:
. . . Also the assumed use of funds to purchase treasury stock
62Ibid.
^Securities and Exchange Commission, General Rules and Regula­
tions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as in Effect October 16, 
1968 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 
14-15.
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is more realistic than the approved methods. The objections to 
the use of this method set out in the opinion are without sub­
stance. The "number of estimates" involved are no greater than 
under the acceptable uses. The limitations are presumably under 
loan agreements. We believe that most loan agreements would 
allow a company to retire stock in a dollar amount equal to the 
amount of stock sold. The "other factors" might include the 
problem of purchasing a large block of treasury stock at a fixed 
market price. This assumption is no harder to accept than the 
assumption that all warrants and options are exercised at the 
same time.
The November 6, 1968 exposure draft and all preceding drafts 
also rejected an assumed rate of return on the use of additional capital 
for operating purposes. The Accounting Principles Board gave the fol­
lowing reasons:
a. A historical rate of return on book equity (which under 
accounting conventions frequently does not reflect the 
present replacement cost of tangible resources or sub­
stantial intangible resources) is not a reliable indica­
tion of a return to be expected on additional funds, and
b. in any event, assumptions as to future returns on the 
employment of capital in business operations would be 
conjectural.65
Several letters received by the Board in response to the ex­
posure draft contained comments on the fallacy of these arguments. 
Judelson and Forson pointed out that the argument against a historical 
rate of return on book equity is an argument against basic principles of 
accounting. They also felt that " . . .  since the entire computation
^Letter from David N. Judelson and Norman R. Forson, President 
and Treasurer, respectively, of Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. to 
Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated 
January 14, 1969.
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earn­
ings per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12. (Mimeographed.)
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based on assumed exercise of warrants and options is conjectural, an 
assumed use of funds might as well be conjectural also."
Corporate executives expressed dissatisfaction with the provision 
disallowing the assumed investment of warrant proceeds in operating 
assets. Many felt that the proceeds would be invested in operating 
assets rather than being used to retire debt or invested in government 
securities. The following comments are typical:
The assumed uses set out in the proposed opinion . . . are 
probably the last thing a company which believes in leverage 
would do. They would probably invest the proceeds in operating 
assets with an expectation of a higher return on investment
The most serious defect in the dilution rules is the require­
ment that proceeds from the exercise of warrants and options must 
be dealt with as if used to retire debt, or invested in govern­
ment securities if no debt exists. It is more likely that in nine 
cases out of ten the proceeds will be reinvested in the business 
and earn a higher return than the savings in interest on debt. 
Obviously no rule can recognize all the possible uses of the funds
and the earnings they will produce but this does not justify a
rule that presumes debt repayment to the exclusion of all other 
uses. By what authority is the most likely assumption replaced 
by the least likely?®®
The proposals for assumed use of funds receivable by the
corporations upon the exercise of options or warrants by the
holders thereof, strike us as being particularly unrealistic.
It holders of such options suspected that the capital they were
®®Letter from David N. Judelson and Norman R. Forson, President 
and Treasurer, respectively, of Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. to 
Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated 
January 14, 1969.
67Ibid.
fLQ°°Letter from Clyde Skeen, President of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 
to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Princi­
ples Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
dated January 10, 1969.
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supplying would be limited to such returns, they would be less 
than enthusiastic about exercising their options. The unwill­
ingness of the authors to assume future returns on capital on 
the ground that to do so would be "conjectural," struck us as 
being inconsistent with other portions of the proposed Opinion 
in which the authors displayed no reluctance to venture into 
the world of conjecture. ^
In its response to the exposure draft, the Securities and Ex­
change Commission took exception to the assumption that warrant proceeds 
might be invested in accordance with the company's financial policies. 
The Commission, in the interest of greater uniformity, preferred the 
following bases which are listed in the Commission's suggested order of 
priority:
1. The rate of interest being paid on outstanding debt,
2. An assumed use of funds to purchase stock of the issuing 
company, or
3. The current borrowing rate of the company but not in excess 
of one point above the prime rate.7®
The Commission also stated that " . . .  the assumed use of funds to pur­
chase stock is an appropriate basis and that it will produce the most 
realistic results in many instances."7^
Adoption of the treasury stock method. Most of the Accounting 
Principles Board's research with respect to warrants appears to have 
been conducted after the release of the November 6, 1968 exposure draft.
^Letter from F. Edward Rugemer, Vice-President of Baltimore Gas 
and Electric Company, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of 
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, dated January 2, 1969.
7®Letter from Andrew Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director 
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, dated January 7, 1969.
71Ibid.
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One of the reasons for the increased emphasis on warrants was an article 
entitled "The New Warrant Game" published in The Value Line Warrant 
Service. A copy of this article was circulated to members of the Sub­
committee on Convertible and Participating S e c u r i t i e s T h e  tenor of 
the article was that warrants were no longer being used just to facili­
tate the sale of the securities to which they were attached. They were 
also playing a major role in mergers, acquisitions and corporate distri­
butions.^
With the adoption of the concept of common stock equivalents 
after the November 6, 1968 exposure draft, the Board placed more empha­
sis on dilution as a criterion for the inclusion of warrants in the 
primary earnings-per-share computation. This is indicated by the elimi­
nation of the requirements that the market price of the related common 
stock be 125 percent or more of the exercise price of the warrant on 
the date of issue or 150 percent or more subsequent to date of issue 
for the warrant to be classified as residual. All options previously 
allowed management with respect to the assumed use of warrant proceeds 
were eliminated in favor of the treasury stock method. The elimination 
of these options assured uniformity in the computation of earnings per 
share. It did not, however assure interperiod or intercompany compara­
bility of earnings per share, as will be shown in Chapter 5. In
72Letter from Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the 
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, to the members of the APB Subcommittee on Convertible 
Securities of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, dated December 16, 1968.
73"The New Warrant Game," The Value Line Warrant Service (New 
York: Arnold Bernhard and Co., Iric., l968)} p _ J7
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addition, adoption of the treasury stock method did not assure the recog­
nition, under certain circumstances, of the potential dilution of earnings 
per share that might be caused by the exercise of warrants. The Board 
corrected this aspect of the treasury stock method, to a certain extent, 
in a subsequent draft which is discussed later in this chapter.
The Board's adoption of the treasury stock method under the con­
cept of common stock equivalents after having prohibited its use under 
the residual concept " . . .  because of the number of estimates, restric­
tions, and other factors involved"^ required justification. Whereas 
previously the method had been thought of as a bona-fide repurchase 
assumption, it was now considered simply as a practical means of com­
puting the dilution caused by warrants. The February 24, 1969 draft 
explains its use as follows:
. . . The Board recognizes that any assumption of use of 
funds is hypothetical and that varying results would be obtained 
depending upon the assumptions made. It has concluded, however, 
that use of the foregoing method is the most practical means of 
giving effect to the dilution of earnings per share which results 
from the issuance of common stock at a price below the current 
market price.75
The principal advantage of the treasury stock method in its 
initial form as adopted in the February 24, 1969 draft were its simpli­
city of application and the ready availability of the required data.
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft. Proposed APB Opinion; Earn­
ings per share. November 6. 1968 (New York: American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12. (Mimeographed.)
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Draft. Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings per 
Share. February 24. 1969 (New York: American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 1969), p. 20. (Mimeographed.)
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The number of common stock equivalents was determined by dividing the 
total warrant proceeds by the current market price of the common stock 
and deducting the results from the number of shares under option. The 
only information not provided by the warrant agreement was the market 
price of the common stock. With the possible exception of closely held 
corporations, common stock prices are readily available. On the other 
hand, some other methods require the computation of rates of return or 
warrant prices which in some cases may not be available.
Modifications of the treasury stock method. Unfortunately, the 
simplicity and ease of calculation provided by the treasury stock 
method were short-lived. Each subsequent draft contained modifications 
of the method as the result of additional research and study of prob­
lems inherent in the method. The February 24, 1969 draft had specified 
use of current common stock market prices for both primary and fully 
diluted earnings per s h a r e . T h i s  meant that both earnings-per-share 
figures were always the same insofar as the effect of warrants. In the 
Subcommittee pre-ballot draft of March 14, 1969 and in the final opinion, 
the average market price of the common stock was required for the primary 
earnings-per-share computation. The higher of the average or current 
market price was specified for the fully diluted computation.77 This 
was in line with the Board's concept that primary earnings per share was
76Ibid., pp. 20 and 22.
77Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Subcommittee Pre-Ballot Draft, Proposed 
Opinion: Earnings per Share, March 14. 1969 (New York; American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), pp. 19 and 22. 
(Mimeographed.)
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historical in nature whereas fully diluted earnings per share was pro­
spective and designed to show the maximum potential dilution of current 
earnings per share.
Another problem overlooked in the formulation of the treasury 
stock method was that some warrant agreements permit the tendering of 
debt or preferred stock, usually at face or par value, in lieu of cash 
as satisfaction of the exercise price. Some warrant agreements also re­
quire warrant proceeds to be applied toward the retirement of debt. The 
Subcommittee ballot draft of April 2, 1969 included exceptions to the 
treasury stock method for these situations. If the market value of debt 
which might be tendered at its face value was less than its face value, 
warrant proceeds were assumed to be applied to the retirement of the 
debt. If the market value of the debt exceeded its face value, the 
treasury stock method was required. These same assumptions also applied 
to preferred stock which might be tendered in lieu of cash. The treasury 
stock method was also inapplicable if the warrant agreement required that 
proceeds be applied to the retirement of debt. In such cases, the earn­
ings-per-share computations were required to reflect the assumption that
78debt was retired with the proceeds.
Another problem inherent in the treasury stock method was the 
fact that it would not indicate potential dilution when the exercise 
price of the warrants was above the market price of the underlying common
78Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Subcommittee Ballot Draft. Proposed Opinion: 
Earnings per Share, April 2, 1969 (New York: American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Inc., 1969(, pp. 21-22. (Mimeographed.)
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stock. The analysis of warrant characteristics in Chapter 3, however, 
indicates that, except in the time span immediately prior to the ex­
piration date of the warrants, the relationship between the exercise 
price of the warrants and the market price of the common stock has 
little or no bearing on the number of warrants that will ultimately be 
exercised. The exercise price must be below the market price of the 
common stock during only a brief period prior to expiration for the 
warrants to be exercised.
Frank Weston and Emmett S. Harrington recognized the limitations 
of the treasury stock method in reflecting potential dilution under cer­
tain conditions. Weston concluded that, when a large number of warrants 
was outstanding in relation to the common shares outstanding, the assump­
tion that the company could purchase those shares at current market 
prices when most of the shareholders had just acquired the shares through 
warrants exercised at less than market was unrealistic.^ Harrington 
agreed with Weston that the treasury stock method did not always properly 
reflect the dilutive effect of warrants. This is indicated by the fol­
lowing comments on the pre-ballot draft of March 14, 1969:
The present draft does not deal with warrants in a manner 
which properly indicates the dilutive effect. Frank Weston's 
analysis . . . clearly indicates that the treasury stock method 
is not effective for this purpose, particularly at the time of 
issuance. The deficiencies in this method are glaring when the
79Letter from Frank T. Weston, member of the Subcommittee on 
Convertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to 
J. S. Seidman, member of the Accounting Principles Board of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated March 28, 
1969.
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number of warrants is very high in relation to the shares of 
common stocks outstanding.88
Harrington offered three alternatives to overcome the limita­
tions of the treasury stock method. The first of these is as follows:
One alternative would be to call for the earnings per share 
to reflect the greater dilution which would result from the use 
of funds (a) for the purchase of common stock (the treasury 
stock method), or (b) to produce a yield at either a specific 
rate of interest or a flexible rate based on the current bank
Q -1prime interest rate. i
A second alternative offered by Harrington was the Graham-Dodd 
method. Under this method the number of common stock equivalents is 
determined by multiplying the ratio of the market value of the warrant 
to the market value of the common stock by the number of shares ob-
GOtainable from exercise. This method produces dilution equal to or 
greater than the treasury stock method in all possible cases. An 
advantage is that it will produce dilution when the exercise price of 
the warrant is above the market price of the common stock. A disad­
vantage is that the market price of the warrant is required for the 
computation. This method is more fully analyzed in Chapter 5.
Harrington's third alternative was ", . .to retain the treasury 
stock method, but to require supplemental disclosure indicating the 
dilution which would occur at various levels of market prices for common
Q  Ostock.' Harrington did not favor this method because it conflicted
88Letter from Emmett S. Harrington, member of the Accounting 
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants, to Philip L. Defliese, member of the Accounting Principles Board 





with the dual equal prominence presentation of primary and fully diluted 
earnings per share.
The Board adopted a modification of Harrington's first alterna­
tive as a solution to the inadequacy of the treasury stock method to re­
flect dilution under certain circumstances. This last-minute change 
first appeared in the ballot draft of April 21, 1969 and became known 
as the 20 percent limitation. When the number of shares of common stock 
obtainable from the exercise of warrants exceeded 20 percent of the 
current common shares outstanding, the use of proceeds was computed in 
two steps as follows:
a. As if the funds obtained were applied to the repurchase of 
20% of the current outstanding common shares at the average 
market price during the period (treasury stock method); and 
then
b. As if the balance of funds were applied first to reduce any 
short-term or long-term borrowings and any remaining funds 
were invested in long-term government securities or commer­
cial paper, with appropriate recognition of any income tax 
effect.
The results of steps (a) and (b) of the computation (whether dilu­
tive or anti-dilutive) should be aggregated and, if the net effect 
is dilutive, should enter into the earnings per share computa­
tion.84
The 20 percent limitation also applied to the fully diluted 
earnings-per-share computation with the modification that treasury stock 
was assumed to be purchased at the higher of the average price or the 
current price.88 The same provisions were retained in the final opinion.88
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, Ballot Draft, Proposed Opinion: Earnings per 
Share, April 21, 1969 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 23. (Mimeographed.)
85Ibid., p. 25.
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the Accounting 
Principles Board, No. 15 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), pp. 232-235.
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The 20 percent limitation had the desired effect 




Net income for period $1,000,000
Common shares outstanding 1,000,000
Number of shares subject to purchase
through exercise of warrants 500,000
20% limitation on assumed purchase 200,000
Exercise price per share $10
Average and end-of-period market
value per common share $8
Computations:
Application of assumed proceeds 
($5,000,000) towards purchase of
treasury stock $1,600,000
Reduction of 6% debt 3.400.000
$5,000,000
Adjustment of net income:
Actual net income $1,000,000
Interest reduction net of tax
effect (3%) 102.000
Adjusted net income $1,102,000
Adjustment of shares outstanding:
Actual 1,000,000
Additional shares issuable
Case 1 (500,000 - 200,000) 300,000
Case 2 (500,000 - $5,000,000 =
$30
500,000 - 166,667)






















The assumptions in both cases are the same, except that in Case 1 
the exercise price of the warrants is below the market price of the
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common stock. In Case 2 the market price of the common stock is high 
in relation to the exercise price of the warrants. In both cases the 
ratio of the shares under option to the shares outstanding is high so 
that the 20 percent limitation applies.
In Case 1 application of the treasury stock method without the 
20 percent limitation would have resulted in no dilution because the 
exercise price of the warrants was above the market price of the common 
stock. Case 2 demonstrates a situation in which the 20 percent test is 
met but the number of shares purchased under the treasury stock method 
is less than the 20 percent limitation. Such results will occur when 
the market price of the common stock is high relative to the exercise 
price of the warrant.
Case 2 also illustrates the sensitivity of earnings per share to 
the market price of the common stock. For example, if the market price 
of the common had been $50 per share rather than $30, earnings per share 
would have been approximately 71 cents. Proof is presented in Chapter 5 
that under these conditions the effect of the treasury stock method on 
earnings per share is the same as if the assumption were made that the 
proceeds from warrants earned less than 2 percent, the earnings-price 
ratio based on actual common shares outstanding. In other words, the 
company's rate of return on assets is less than its cost of debt, a 
highly unlikely possibility for a company with a price-earnings ratio 
of 50. These characteristics of the treasury stock method are factors 
which must be evaluated in formulating guidelines for the earnings-per- 
share computations of companies with warrants outstanding.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
During the 1960's the use of convertible securities and warrants 
increased substantially. The conversion feature facilitated the issuing 
of debt and equity securities by allowing investors to participate in 
the growth of the issuer through the option for the issuer's common 
stock. The issuer benefited through lower interest and dividends. The 
Accounting Principles Board was particularly concerned with the increase 
in the use of convertible preferred stock in mergers and acquisitions. 
Convertible preferred stock was used to permit the stockholders of 
the acquired company to participate in the long-range potential of the 
acquiring company. This potential of the convertible preferred stock­
holders, however, was not reflected in earnings per share. Many 
companies, therefore, were able to reflect a temporary improvement in 
earnings per share through such acquisitions.
The Accounting Principles Board concluded that under these cir­
cumstances the traditional earnings per share computation was inappro­
priate. As a result, in December, 1966, the Board released APB Opinion 
No. 9 which contained a development of the concept of residual securi­
ties. A residual security was one which clearly derived a major portion 
of its value from its conversion rights or its common stock characteris­
tics. Such securities were to be treated as common stock for purposes 
of the earnings-per-share computation. The criterion for determining 
residual status was one of relative values--the investment value of a 
convertible security compared to its total value. Consequently, under 
the appropriate circumstances, residual securities could increase earn­
ings per share. APB Opinion No. 9 also required a pro forma
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earnings-per-share computation if existing contingencies permitting the 
issuance of common shares in the future would materially dilute earnings 
per share. The use of different criteria, relative values and dilution, 
resulted in a potential conflict between the two earnings-per-share com­
putations which was eventually resolved under the concept of common 
stock equivalents by eliminating common stock equivalents which enhanced 
earnings per share.
APB Opinion No. 9 contained no specific guidelines for determin­
ing the residual status of securities. The result was a lack of 
uniformity in computing earnings per share. In addition, warrants were 
generally not considered to be residual securities by practitioners. 
Consequently, by 1968 warrants were being used in mergers and acquisi­
tions as a means of avoiding the detrimental effect on earnings per share 
caused by convertible securities which were classified as residual. For 
these reasons, the Accounting Principles Board undertook a revision of 
APB Opinion No, 9.
In its early efforts the Board retained the residual concept.
The emphasis was, therefore, on formulating guidelines for determining 
residual status in conformity with the residual concept as expressed in 
APB Opinion No. 9. These guidelines, circulated in the exposure draft of 
November 6, 1968, produced an unprecedented negative response from the 
financial community. As a result, the Board made such extensive changes 
in the guidelines that they no longer conformed to the basic tenets of 
the residual concept. The term residual was subsequently dropped in 
favor of the term common stock equivalents and the modified residual 
concept became the concept of common stock equivalents.
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The basic difficulty the Board encountered in making the theory 
of the residual concept operational was the fact that a security could 
change residual status between periods as a result of market relation­
ships. Under the residual theory the changes in equity capital caused 
by securities moving in and out of residual status were real and earn­
ings per share should reflect these changes in equity capital without 
retroactive adjustment to earnings per share. Most of the financial 
community felt that reflecting these changes,which were the result of 
investment and market values over which management had no direct control, 
destroyed the interperiod and intercompany comparability of earnings per 
share. The Board resolved this difficulty to some extent with the 
adoption of the concept of common stock equivalents. Under this con­
cept convertible securities were classified as common stock equivalents 
only if they met the yield test on the date of issue.
Warrants were always classified as common stock equivalents; how­
ever, they did not enter into the earnings per share computations under 
the treasury stock method unless: (1) the market price of the related
common stock was greater than the exercise price of the warrants or (2) 
the 20 percent test was met and the aggregate results were dilutive. 
Earnings per share computations of companies with warrants outstanding 
remained a partial function of market values. Further, the relationship 
was inverse: the higher the market price of the common stock, the lower 
the earnings per share. The Board continued to prohibit retroactive 
adjustment of earnings per share although the number of common stock 
equivalents could be expected to change from period to period because of 
changes in market prices. Despite these conclusions, the fact is that
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the number of shares under option and the funds that would be received 
from exercise remain constant. Clearly the results produced by the 
treasury stock method in any given period would agree with the results 
when warrants are actually exercised only if the company actually pur­
chased treasury stock with warrant proceeds and the price of the common 
stock did not change. This aspect of the treasury stock method needs to 
be considered in formulating earnings-per-share guidelines.
Under the residual concept, the purpose of including residual 
securities in earnings-per-share computations was to reflect changes in 
the residual capital of a company in the per-share figures. Securities 
meeting the relative value test were residual and therefore a part of the 
common equity. Under the appropriate circumstances, a residual security 
could cause an increase in traditionally computed earnings per share.
The relative value criterion for classifying securities as residual, 
therefore, placed the Accounting Principles Board in direct conflict 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which favored potential dilu­
tion as the criterion. In fact, the Commission had issued a release that 
required securities which would result in material potential dilution of 
earnings per share at issue to be classified as residual even if the 
relative value test of APB Opinion No. 9 was not met. The Commission 
declined to suspend the dilution test and, under the concept of common 
stock equivalents, the Board excluded from the computation securities 
classified as common stock equivalents which would have the effect of in­
creasing earnings per share as otherwise computed. Abandonment of the 
residual concept permitted a more realistic definition of the purpose of 
including securities other than common stock in the earnings-per-share
219
computations. Under the concept of common stock equivalents the pur­
pose was to prevent a senior form of security which obtained a substan­
tial part of its investment attractiveness because of its common stock 
characteristics from being employed to give the appearance of greater 
per share earnings than if common stock had actually been issued.
The inclusion of warrants as common stock equivalents presented 
the Board with a unique problem. Unlike convertible securities, which 
generally do not require the payment of additional cash upon conversion, 
the exercise of warrants usually requires payment in cash. Unlike debt, 
the proceeds of which are frequently committed to specific purposes by 
the indenture, warrant agreements rarely require warrant proceeds to be 
used for specific purposes. Management is therefore free to use these 
funds for any legitimate corporate purpose.
The manner in which these funds are used clearly affects earn­
ings per share. Under the residual concept, the Board appeared to 
accept this conclusion by permitting the assumption that the funds were 
invested consistent with the company's financial policies. The scope of 
this provision was severely limited, however, by prohibition of the 
assumption that the proceeds would be invested in operating assets.
The Board also disallowed the assumption that proceeds would be invested 
in treasury stock, after having approved this method in early drafts.
The Securities and Exchange Commission was opposed to the assump­
tion that funds could be invested in accordance with the company's 
financial policies. Perhaps as a result of this opposition and in the 
interests of greater uniformity, the Board did a complete about face and 
adopted the treasury stock method under the concept of common stock
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equivalents. The method, however was not to be construed as a literal 
repurchase assumption, but merely as a practical means of computing the 
dilution of earnings per share caused by warrants. The principal advan­
tage of the method was its simplicity. There is ample evidence, however, 
that the Accounting Principles Board adopted the treasury stock method 
without having fully considered its effect on earnings per share under 
various operating conditions. After adoption of the treasury stock 
method under the concept of common stock equivalents in the draft of 
February 24, 1969, each subsequent draft of the proposed opinion con­
tained modifications of the method. These modifications included:
1. Use of the average market price of common stock rather than 
the current market price for primary earnings per share and 
the use of the higher of average or current market prices 
for fully diluted earnings per share.
2. Exclusion of warrants which permitted the tendering of debt 
or preferred stock in lieu of cash and warrants which re­
quired that proceeds be applied to debt retirement.
3. The 20 percent limitation designed to produce greater dilu­
tion of earnings per share when large numbers of warrants 
are outstanding and the ratio of the market price of the 
common stock to the exercise price of the warrants is low.
The introduction of these modifications destroyed the treasury 
stock method's principal advantage of simplicity and did little to 
correct its shortcomings. Earnings per share continued to be a partial 
function of the market price of the company's common stock with an in­
evitable adverse effect on the comparability of interperiod and
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intercompany earnings per share. The earnings rate attributed to war­
rant proceeds by this method decreases as the price of the company's 
common stock increases. Companies with high price-earnings ratios are 
assumed to be unable to invest funds as advantageously as companies with 
low price-earnings ratios. In formulating guidelines for the earnings- 
per-share computations of companies with warrants outstanding, considera­
tion must be given to the question of whether the assumptions of the 
treasury stock method result in an appropriate rate of return on war­
rant proceeds.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the formulation of guidelines for 
computing earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding.
These guidelines will be derived from: (1) the attributes of earnings
per share which investors appear to use as developed in Chapter 2, (2) 
the characteristics of warrants which need to be considered in earnings- 
per-share computations as analyzed in Chapter 3, and (3) the analysis in 
this chapter of the difficulties encountered by the Accounting Principles 
Board in the development of the concept of common stock equivalents. 
Various assumptions about the use of warrant proceeds will be analyzed 
in terms of these guidelines to determine the most suitable method of 
computing earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding.
Chapter 5
THE FORMULATION OF GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING 
EARNINGS PER SHARE OF COMPANIES WITH 
WARRANTS OUTSTANDING
In the preceding chapters of this study, a number of observations 
about earnings per share, warrants, and the concept of common stock 
equivalents has been made. The purpose of these observations was to 
provide information relevant to the formulation of guidelines for com­
puting earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding. A 
summary of these observations is presented in the first section of this 
chapter in order to provide a convenient reference for use in the devel­
opment of guidelines for computing earnings per share of companies with 
outstanding warrants.
In formulating guidelines for computing earnings per share of 
companies with warrants outstanding, two basic questions need to be 
answered:
1. Should the effect of warrants enter into both primary and 
fully diluted earnings per share?^
2. In reflecting the dilutive effect of warrants in earnings per 
share, what rate of return should be assumed on the proceeds 
from exercised warrants?
The question of whether the effect of warrants should be included 
in all earnings-per-share computations is considered in the second




section of this chapter. The rate of return on warrant proceeds is 
investigated within the context of the development of guidelines for 
computing fully diluted earnings per share in the next section. At this 
point, the various methods of computing fully diluted earnings per share 
are tested against the guidelines. Finally, the recommended method of 
computing fully diluted earnings per share, based on the guidelines 
developed within this study, is presented.
SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS IN REGARD TO EARNINGS 
PER SHARE, WARRANTS, AND THE CONCEPT OF 
COMMON STOCK EQUIVALENTS
Several important points were developed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
with regard to earnings per share, warrants, and the concept of common 
stock equivalents. These observations are used in the remaining sections 
of this chapter to formulate guidelines for the computation of earnings 
per share of companies with warrants outstanding.
1. The purpose of earnings per share is to attribute the earn­
ings of a corporate entity to the capitalization structure of the entity 
existing during that period. By relating earnings per share to price 
per share, comparisons among corporations with different capital struc­
tures, as well as interperiod comparisons of the same company, can be 
made. Additionally, the relationship of earnings per share to dividends 
per share provides information about the entity's dividend policy.
2. Many common stock valuation models employ earnings per share 
historically and/or prospectively, explicitly or implicitly, as a basic 
variable. Historical earnings-per-share data are sometimes used as the 
basis for predicting future earnings per share and/or, by application
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of a dividend payout ratio, future dividends per share. The trend and 
variability of the trend of past earnings per share are qualitative 
factors which influence the earnings multiple or capitalization rate 
which is applied to historical or prospective earnings per share in 
arriving at stock values. Therefore the timing of the recognition of 
the dilution, if any, to earnings per share caused by warrants will 
affect the absolute amount, the trend, and the variability of earnings 
per share.
3. Dividends are paid on the basis of legal common shares out­
standing on the date of declaration of the dividend. Earnings per
average common share is therefore a useful statistic for evaluating
dividend policy.
4. Most warrants are issued: (1) as a unit with other securi­
ties for cash or (2) as a unit with other securities as part considera­
tion for the securities of another corporation. The primary reason for
issuing warrants, therefore, is not to raise equity capital but to make 
the issue of securities to which the warrants are attached more attrac­
tive to potential investors by adding value to the security package.
This added value is reflected in lower interest or dividend rates and 
in the higher value received from the sale of the security package.
Since these benefits are reflected in the financial statements from the 
date of issue of the security package, management should also be held 
accountable for the detriments of attaching warrants to other securities; 
namely, the potential dilution of a current stockholder's equity if the 
warrants are exercised. The fact remains that warrants, although 
attached to other securities for the purpose of making the issue more
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attractive, will result in additional equity capital if the warrants are 
exercised. Furthermore, management has very little control over the 
timing of these cash inflows resulting from the exercise of warrants.
5. Warrants are not purchased by investors for the purpose of 
acquiring common equity. Purchasing warrants for this purpose would be 
irrational because warrants normally sell at a premium above their in­
trinsic value and are purchased for the leverage they offer an investor. 
Successful leverage depends upon the high volatility of underlying common 
stock prices. The volatility of the common stock prices of most com­
panies with warrants outstanding is greater than that of the average 
listed company.
6. Many warrant issues expire without a substantial number of 
warrants having been exercised. The conversion of most warrants that 
are exercised generally occurs in the period immediately preceding the 
expiration date of the issue. Practically all warrants will be exer­
cised if the market price of the underlying common stock exceeds the 
exercise price of the warrants during this period. If the exercise price 
exceeds the common stock price during this period, the issue will expire 
with very few warrants having been exercised. As a consequence, partial 
exercise of warrant issues occurs infrequently.
7. Additional equity capital equal to the exercise price of each 
warrant converted is received when warrants are exercised. Warrant 
agreements, unlike long-term debt indentures, rarely require that war­
rant proceeds be used for specific purposes. Management, therefore,
has the discretion to use these funds for any legitimate corporate pur­
pose. The effect of the exercise of warrants on earnings per share is
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a function of the relationship between: (1) the number of shares of
common stock outstanding and the earnings attributable to assets 
existing prior to the exercise of warrants and (2) the number of common 
shares issued through the exercise of warrants and the earnings attri­
butable to the warrant proceeds. Dilution to earnings per share will 
occur when the percentage of increase in earnings attributable to war­
rant proceeds is less than the percentage of increase in shares out­
standing attributable to the exercise of warrants.
8. The time horizon of the average investor appear to be within 
the range of from one to three years. The median life span of the war­
rant issues included in this study is 10 years.
9. The concept of substance over form and approximation are 
accepted by accountants in order to provide timely information which 
reflects the economic realities of an event. Earnings-per-share compu­
tations, therefore, may include: (1) potentially issuable common
shares as well as the legally outstanding common shares and (2) esti­
mates of the earnings from the proceeds of warrants assumed to be 
exercised.
MODIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF COMMON STOCK 
EQUIVALENTS UNDER APB OPINION NO. 15 TO 
EXCLUDE THE EFFECT OF WARRANTS FROM 
PRIMARY EARNINGS PER SHARE2
Under APB Opinion No. 15 warrants are always common stock
^The elimination of warrants as common stock equivalents reduces 
primary earnings per share to earnings per average common share assuming 
no other common stock equivalents, such as convertible securities, are 
present. The validity of including these other common stock equivalents 
in primary earnings per share is a question beyond the scope of this 
study. Primary earnings per share which excludes warrants from common 
stock equivalents will be referred to as earnings per average common 
share in this chapter in order to simplify the terminology.
227
equivalents which enter into the computation of both primary and fully 
diluted earnings per share if the effect is dilutive. The inclusion of 
warrants in primary earnings per share is questionable since the result 
reflects neither the imminence nor likelihood of exercise of the war­
rants. In addition, the inclusion of essentially the same number of 
common stock equivalents resulting from warrants in both earnings-per- 
share figures is questionable because it denies the user an estimate of 
the total potential dilution which might result from the exercise of 
warrants. These questions are examined in this section. First, the 
provisions of APB Opinion No. 15 with respect to warrants are analyzed. 
Second, a modification to overcome the weaknesses of APB Opinion No. 15 
is proposed. Finally factors supporting the proposed modification are 
discussed.
Requirements of APB Opinion No. 15 
with Respect to Warrants
Under the concept of common stock equivalents, two types of
earnings-per-share data for corporations with complex capital structures
are required:
1. Primary earnings per share which is based on: (1) the average
common shares outstanding and (2) the average common stock 
equivalents outstanding which have a dilutive effect.
2. Fully filuted earnings per share which is based on: (1) 
average common shares outstanding and (2) the average shares 
which would have resulted from all contingent issues that 
would individually have reduced earnings per share had such 
shares been issued at the beginning of the period or at the 
date of issue of the security giving rise to the contingency.^
JAn exception to this statement occurs under the 20 percent 
limitation. If the number of shares potentially issuable through the 
exercise of warrants is greater than 20 percent of the outstanding
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The purpose of requiring the inclusion of common stock equivalents in 
primary earnings per share is to prevent the senior form of a security 
which appeals to an investor primarily because of its potential share in 
common stock appreciation being employed to give the appearance of 
greater earnings per share than if common stock had actually been issued. 
The same purpose is served by requiring that all securities which contain 
a provision for the contingent issuance of common shares and have a 
dilutive effect be included in fully diluted earnings per share.
The difference between the two per-share figures is merely one of 
degree. In the case of convertible securities this difference between 
primary and fully diluted earnings per share can be material because the 
criterion for determining common stock equivalents excludes those con­
vertible securities for which the cash yield is two-thirds or more of 
the prime rate on the date of issue. Companies that wish to avoid 
having convertible securities classified as common stock equivalents can 
do so through the terms of the issue by using appropriate interest or 
dividend rates and conversion ratios.
The potential for difference between primary and fully diluted 
earnings per share is much less in the case of warrants. Since warrants 
are always common stock equivalents, the same issues will usually be in­
cluded in both primary and fully diluted earnings per share. The number 
of common stock equivalents entering into the fully diluted computation 
may be slightly more, however, due to differences in the computational
common shares, warrant issues which would not currently be dilutive to 
earnings per share under the treasury stock method may be included in the 
computation.
229
guidelines for the two per-share figures. In computing the number of 
common stock equivalents to be included in primary earnings per share, 
the average price of common stock for the period is used. For purposes 
of computing fully diluted earnings per share, the higher of the average 
price or the current price is required. These same common stock price 
guidelines also apply to the treasury stock assumed to be purchased 
under the 20 percent limitation.
In the case of convertible securities, management can avoid the 
common stock equivalent classification by the terms of the issue, but 
common stock equivalents cannot be avoided in a warrant agreement. At 
best, management can only postpone showing the dilutive effect of war­
rants in earnings per share. Postponement of the dilutive effect can be 
accomplished by setting the exercise price of the warrants at a level 
which is high in relation to the market price of the common stock on the 
date of issue. Even this strategy may fail, however, if the number of 
warrants issued is greater than 20 percent of the common shares out­
standing. Under the 20 percent limitation, funds assumed to be derived 
from the exercise of warrants are first applied to the purchase of 
treasury shares to the extent of 20 percent of the common shares out­
standing. Any remaining funds are then assumed to be used for the 
reduction of debt and/or investment in government or commercial securi­
ties. If the aggregate effect is dilutive to earnings per share as 
otherwise computed, then the results enter into the earnings-per-share 
computation. As shown in Chapter 4,^ the 20 percent limitation can cause
^See page 213.
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dilution of earnings per share even if the exercise price is higher than 
the market price of the common stock.
Deficiencies of APB Opinion No. 15 
and Proposed Modification
In formulating guidelines for the earnings-per-share computations 
of companies with warrants outstanding, consideration must be given to 
the question of whether the best interests of investors are being served 
by presenting them with two earnings-per-share figures that are some­
times identical and frequently similar. As the preceding discussion has 
indicated, the effect of warrants on primary and fully diluted earnings 
per share is identical unless the end-of-the-period price of the related 
common stock is higher than the average price for the period. If this 
situation exists, then fully diluted earnings per share will be lower 
than primary earnings per share and the magnitude of the difference in 
earnings per share will be directly related to the magnitude of the 
difference between the average price and ending price of the common 
stock.
Does this difference, when it occurs, provide any significant new 
information to the investor? The knowledge that warrants are outstand­
ing which might be dilutive is imparted to the investor by either of the 
figures; therefore two figures are not necessary for this purpose.•* As 
a matter of fact, by including essentially the same dilutive effect of
-’The only exception to this statement occurs when the average 
price of the underlying common stock is lower than the exercise price of 
the warrants and the end-of-period price of the common stock is higher 
than the exercise price of the warrants. Under these circumstances war­
rants would enter into the fully diluted earnings-per-share computation 
but not the primary earnings-per-share computation.
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warrants in both primary and fully diluted earnings per share, important 
information is being withheld from the user of earnings-per-share data. 
The impact of the dilutive effect of warrants is lost because the user 
is provided no basis for comparison. This situation is compounded if 
the reporting company has dilutive convertible securities outstanding 
which are not classified as common stock equivalents. The inclusion of 
the dilutive effect of these securities in fully diluted earnings per 
share is likely to completely obscure any additional dilution attribu­
table to warrants.
Ideally, the potentially dilutive effect of warrants on earnings 
per share can best be shown by presenting two earnings-per-share 
figures--one assuming no dilution and the other assuming full dilution. 
These two contrasting figures provide the user of earnings-per-share 
information with the best and worst possible outcomes which might result 
from the outstanding warrants. Further, potential dilution from war­
rants is forcefully brought to the attention of the reader of the finan­
cial statements through a comparison of the two earnings-per-share 
figures.
Factors Supporting the Exclusion 
of Warrants from Primary 
Earnings per Share
A number of factors enters into the decision to exclude the poten­
tial dilution of warrants from primary earnings per share. The timing of 
the exercise of warrants, the fact that many warrant issues expire without 
exercise, and the fact that few warrant issues are partially exercised 
are warrant characteristics which influence the decision. The dividend
payout ratio is also more meaningful if it is based on earnings per com­
mon share. Each of these factors, as well as selected comments of 
corporate executives and committees of various financial and accounting 
organizations, is discussed in this section. Elimination of the dilu­
tive effect of warrants from primary earnings per share depends upon the 
accounting and financial community's acceptance of the dual, equal 
prominence concept of APB Opinion No. 15. This acceptance, particularly 
in relation to managements' emphasis on price-earnings ratios, is also 
discussed in this section.
Warrant characteristics. The analysis of warrant characteristics 
in Chapter 3, as summarized by Observation No. 6 on page 225 of this 
chapter, supports the argument that two earnings-per-share figures, one 
assuming no dilution and the other assuming full dilution, are desirable 
for companies with warrants outstanding. The evidence, as presented in 
Table 22 on page 150 of Chapter 3 is two-fold;
1. Warrants are not exercised until shortly before their expira­
tion date unless other factors contained in the warrant agreement induce 
early exercise. Table 22 indicates that the median cumulative percen­
tage of warrants exercised from the 20 issues was only 1.8 percent by 
the end of the period immediately preceding the period of expiration. 
Although the median life span of the warrants included in this study is 
10 years,7 the average investor's time horizon appears to be from one to
°For a discussion of these factors, see pages 151-153. 
^See Table 10, page 126.
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three years (Observation No. 8, page 226). Under these circumstances 
the average investor would not be concerned with the effect on earnings 
per share of the dilution caused by the exercise of warrants unless his
Qtime horizon included the expiration date of the warrants. During 
other periods the earnings per average common share which is computed 
under the assumption that there is no dilution would appear to be as 
appropriate for investment analysis purposes as the earnings per share 
which is computed under the assumption that there is full dilution.
2. Many warrants expire without being exercised. As indicated 
by Table 22, the median percentage of warrants exercised from the 20 
issues was approximately 59 percent. The percentage of warrants exer­
cised for six issues was less than 1 percent. On the other hand, the 
percentage of warrants exercised for seven issues was 95 percent or 
more. Only one issue had a percentage of exercise which fell in the 
range from 20 percent to 80 percent. These statistics emphasize the 
importance of providing an investor with earnings-per-share figures
8See page 52.
^This statement implies that potential dilution in the market 
price of the common stock being evaluated is not reflected until the ex­
piration date of the warrants approaches. Alternatively, it implies 
that the investor adjusts the earnings multiple or discount factor used 
in his evaluation of the stock to reflect the market's discount of the 
potential dilution. Lerner and Auster have concluded that the market 
does discount potential dilution. Their conclusion, however, applies 
primarily to the potential dilution resulting from convertible securi­
ties. In addition, their study is not addressed to the question of the 
timing of the recognition of the potential dilution. See Eugene M. 
Lerner and Rolf Auster, "Does the Market Discount Potential Dilution?" 
Financial Analysts Journal. XXV (July-August, 1969), 118-121.
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which assume no dilution as well as those which assume full dilution.
The investor is then in a position to make his own assessment as to the 
probability that the outstanding warrants will be exercised and the 
effect that the exercise or non-exercise of these warrants will have on 
earnings per share and the common stock price. Such information is denied 
the investor under the provisions of APB Opinion No. 15.
Dividend policy. The analysis of common stock valuation tech­
niques in Chapter 2 (summarized in Observation Nos. 2 and 3 on pages 223- 
224) disclosed several methods which employ estimates of dividends per 
share. A common practice is to base such estimates on estimated earnings 
per share and dividend payout ratios.^-® In such situations earnings per 
common share assuming no dilution would be a useful tool to the investor 
because: (1) dividends are paid on the basis of actual shares out­
standing and (2) warrants are rarely exercised (and therefore do not 
become outstanding shares) until the period of their expiration.
The importance of providing investors with earnings per common 
share assuming no dilution is demonstrated by the seemingly illogical 
earnings-per-share statistics resulting from the application of APB 
Opinion No. 15 to certain real estate investment trusts. A number of 
these trusts, in their initial offering to the public, attached a war­
rant to purchase one share of beneficial interest to each share sold.
In order to qualify for favorable tax treatment, these trusts must dis­
tribute at least 90 percent of their ordinary income to their
■^See pages 61-64.
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shareholders. As a result of these circumstances, annual dividend pay­
ments per share are likely to be higher than earnings per share when the 
warrants become common stock equivalents as provided by APB Opinion No.
Two examples from the many examples available should be suffi­
cient to illustrate this aspect of APB Opinion No. 15. American 
Fletcher Mortgage Investors is a Massachusetts business trust which 
qualifies as a real estate investment trust for tax purposes. On 
January 27, 1970 the trust offered for sale at $25 per unit 540,000 units 
consisting of one share of common stock and a five-year warrant to pur­
chase one share of common stock at $25 per share. In its first year of 
operation the trust's primary earnings per share was $2.40 and fully 
diluted earnings per share was $2.17. However, dividends of $2.51 per 
share were paid in order for the trust to retain its favorable tax 
status.
C. I. Mortgage Group is another Massachusetts business trust 
which qualifies as a real estate investment trust for tax purposes. For 
the fiscal year ending October 31, 1972 it had primary earnings per 
share of $2.29 and fully diluted earnings per share of $1.80. Dividends 
during the same period were $2.63 per share.
The prohibition of the presentation of earnings per average com­
mon share outstanding by APB Opinion No. 15 does a disservice to investors 
of these trusts who desire to evaluate the trusts' dividend policies or
^See pages 85-86 for a discussion of the characteristics of real 
estate investment trusts.
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to estimate future dividends based on earnings per share. Neither pri­
mary nor fully diluted earnings per share bears any relation to present 
dividends or those that will be payable in the immediate future because 
such dividends will be paid on the basis of actual shares outstanding in 
each period. Although these examples are extreme due to the unusual tax 
status of real estate investment trusts, the principle remains the same 
for companies in other industries. This deficiency in the methods 
promulgated in APB Opinion No. 15 was recognized by Robert L. Forsberg, 
Vice President--Finance and Treasurer of Arizona Public Service Company 
in a comment letter to the Institute. In opposing the substitution of 
primary earnings per share for earnings per average common share, he 
stated:
One of the criteria used in an investment decision is the divi­
dend pay-out ratio. This is different with different industries.
By introducing a primary earnings per share statistic, the dividend 
pay-out ratio would change and could possible [sic.] create a wrong 
interpretation when the ratio of one company is compared with that 
of a different company. This could also be true in the pay-out 
ratio of one industry against another.^
Opinion of major accounting and financial organizations and 
corporate executives. As indicated in Table 25 on pages 180 and 181 of 
Chapter 4, most of the major accounting and finance organizations that 
responded to the November 6, 1968 exposure draft were opposed to the 
residual security concept and, by implication, to the common stock 
equivalency concept as they related to primary earnings per share. The
12Letter from Robert L. Fosberg, Vice President--Finance and 
Treasurer of Arizona Public Service Company, to Richard C. Lytle, 
Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 10, 
1969.
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comment letters of these organizations indicated a preference for two 
earnings-per-share figures--one assuming no dilution and one assuming 
full dilution. The opposition to an earnings-per-share statistic which 
included residual securities or common stock equivalents as well as 
common shares was directed toward the arbitrary nature of the criteria 
for determining which securities were residual or common stock equiva­
lents. The concern of this segment of the financial community was that 
the residual concept would ". . .in the eyes of investors, infuse such 
artificiality, complexity and confusion into earnings per share figures
1 Oas to undermine their value."
The Corporate Reporting Committee of the Financial Executives 
Institute recognized that the earnings-per-share figures of a few com­
panies were misleading because of the use of unusual or "gimmick" securi­
ties. They objected, however, to the Accounting Principles Board's 
solution which denied the investor earnings per average common share.
This objection is indicated in the following statement:
Let us first state that our committee agrees with the objectives 
of the SEC and the APB in attempting to arrive at a reasonable 
"earnings per share" computation. The recent proliferation of 
various unusual types of securities, "chinese securities," used 
primarily in the case of acquisitions to confuse and, in some cases, 
bury the true dilutive effect of the acquisitions, has resulted in 
misleading "earnings per share" data for a relatively few companies 
and this has created a question regarding the validity of the 
reports of all companies.
However, in spite of our agreement with the objectives, we be­
lieve that the solution proposed in the exposure drafts would
■'■Memorandum from the Corporation Finance Committee of the In­
vestment Bankers Association of America to the APB Subcommittee on 
Convertible Securities of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants dated January 7, 1969.
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result in more confusion and misunderstandings regarding the true 
results of the large number of companies that have confined the 
issuance of securities to the standard issues which do not in 
essence distort the "earnings per share."^
Edward F. Gee, Chairman of the Commercial Lending Committee of 
the American Bankers Association, expressed his concern as follows:
As proposed, any statement of common earnings per share would 
partially involve arbitrary assumptions based on arbitrary criteria. 
This, I submit, is not desirable and can lead only to misunderstand­
ing and confusion. It denies the reader a solid base of existing 
legal reality from which to start his assessment of the signifi­
cance of the fully diluted potential. ̂
A task force committed of the American Accounting Association 
recommended, pending further research, that earnings per average common 
share and earnings per share on a fully diluted basis be reported. The 
conclusions of this committee were based on the relevancy of the various 
statistics as shown in the following statement:
We can identify potential value for a calculation of earnings 
per share based on currently outstanding shares; for instance, as 
one basis for evaluating dividend policy. We can also identify 
potential value for a calculation of earnings per share based on 
full conversion of all securities. However, the selection of an 
equivalent number of shares somewhere between these two extremes 
and a related earnings figure implies that some other purpose is 
being served.^
^Letter from J. J. Hangen, Chairman, Subcommittee on Convertible 
Securities of the Corporate Reporting Committee of the Financial Execu­
tives Institute, to the Accounting Principles Board of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants dated December 30, 1968.
15Letter from Edward F. Gee, Chairman of the Commercial Lending 
Committee of the American Bankers Association, to Joseph Caramanica of 
the American Bankers Association dated March 31, 1969.
■^Task Force Committee of the American Accounting Association, 
"Statement of Task Force Committee of American Accounting Association on 
Exposure Drafts of Proposed APB Opinions on Accounting for Convertible 
Debt and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants and Earnings per 
Share dated November 6, 1968," no date, p. 8.
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The Task Force Committee rejected the residual security concept 
on the grounds that it could find no valid purpose being served by pri­
mary earnings per share. The committee stated:
We are disturbed that a particular intermediate earnings per 
share figure has been selected and designated as "primary"
(namely, of singular importance) when this figure has in no way 
been established as being relevant to any user or use. For 
example, neither the investment value test nor the parity test 
for determining inclusion in the denominator of the earnings per 
share calculation has any necessary relationship to the potential 
dilution of share equity. Further, neither of these tests reveals 
either the imminence or likelihood of ultimate conversion of con­
vertibles or exercise of warrants or options. One can argue 
normatively that imminence and/or likelihood of the ultimate dilu­
tion is relevant to certain types of decisions. We could not 
develop any rational basis for determining that the "primary" 
earnings per share as computed was relevant.^
Clyde Skeen, President of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., also ques­
tioned the relevance of an earnings figure which included some but not 
all potentially dilutive securities. He stated:
The residual concept is no more than an intermediate calculation 
somewhere between a factual one based on actual shares outstanding 
and the ultimate in theory represented by the fully diluted concept. 
If any calculation is justified to show what might be, it should 
deal with all possibilities rather than certain prescribed effects.
We conclude that there is no need for the residual concept under 
any circumstances and recommend that it be completely discarded.
Other respondents to the November 6, 1968 exposure draft favored 
earnings per average common share as the primary earnings-per-share 
figure because of its conformity to the legal realities of capital struc­
tures, its ease of calculation, and its understandability by the average
■*-̂ Ibid. , pp. 8-9.
1 QAOLetter from Clyde Skeen, President of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 
to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles 
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated 
January 10, 1969.
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investor. The following comments are typical of those received by the 
Institute in support of this position:
. . . there should be a full recognition of the nominal facts 
and of the legal realities as they actually existed during and as 
of the end of the earnings period. This is tangible, determinable, 
definite, legally factual, and capable of computation and inter­
pretation without dependence on assumptions or suppositions or 
market evaluations or other arbitrary criteria. It is, of course, 
the orthodox view of common stock earnings, and dividends, and net 
book value, per share. It assumes nothing--it relates only to the 
nominal legal and accounting realities that existed at the time.
Although there was some disagreement as to whether fully diluted 
earnings per share should be given equal prominence with earnings per 
average common share by placing it on the face of the income statement 
instead of relegating it to the notes to the financial statements, most 
comment letters favored the fully diluted concept. The following 
comments of Edward F. Gee summarize the points made by most respondents 
to the November 6, 1968 exposure draft;
It is highly desirable, of course, that the Board require a 
computation and prominent presentation of earnings per share 
based on the maximum number of common shares or common share 
equivalents that can, under all existing issues, contracts, and 
agreements, be outstanding at some point in the future, after 
giving full effect to all debt-conversions, preferred stock 
conversions, stock options, warrants, stock purchase contracts, 
participating securities, two-class commons, contingent shares, 
or other capital structure devices. . . . This results in 
showing clearly the maximum existing potential dilution in 
common-share earnings, based on the most adverse suppositions.
It thus presents the bleakest possible picture for a corporation's 
current per share common earnings. Certainly, no analyst or 
investor can ever be mislead when the presentation of such an ex­
treme re-statement of current earnings is an essential accounting
requirement.20
•^Letter from Edward F. Gee, Chairman of the Commercial Lending 
Committee of the American Bankers Association, to Joseph Caramanica of 
the American Bankers Association dated March 31, 1969.
20Ibid.
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Dual, equal prominence concept. The Accounting Principles Board's 
insistence that primary earnings per share include common stock equiva­
lents even though fully diluted earnings per share would also be required 
suggests a lack of confidence in the dual, equal prominence concept of 
APB Opinion No. 15. The Board had introduced the concept in APB Opinion 
No. 9 by strongly recommending that earnings per share and pro forma 
earnings per share be included in the statement of income. The Board 
concluded that this reporting format would " . . .  help to eliminate the 
tendency of many users to place undue emphasis on one amount reported as 
earnings per share.
Many respondents to the November 6, 1968 exposure draft supported 
the dual, equal prominence concept although they were opposed to the 
residual security concept and use of the word "primary" to describe one 
of the figures. In their opinion the practice of labeling one figure 
primary defeated the purpose of the dual, equal prominence concept. This 
was the view of a task force committee of the American Accounting Asso­
ciation, as reflected in the following comments.
We committee members believe that the provision of only one 
earnings per share carries the implication that it is generally 
relevant for many users making different decisions. Similarly, 
any earnings per share figure labelled as "primary" will carry 
the implication. We do not believe that any earnings per share 
figure can well serve the wide variety of uses to which it may be 
put. The majority of our committee believes that reporting only 
one earnings per share figure in the income statement will only 
serve to perpetuate and add support to an overly simple view of 
earnings per share. We therefore recommend that, as a minimum,
21Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Reporting the Results of Operations, Opinions 
of the Accounting Principles Board, No. 9 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1967), p. 119.
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earnings per common share outstanding (weighted average for the 
year) and fully diluted earnings per share be required by the
present opinion.22
The Board's refusal to allow earnings per average common share
outstanding as one of the earnings-per-share figures may have reflected
a fear that earnings per average common share would be emphasized and
fully diluted earnings would be ignored by management in its press re-
2 ̂leases and by the financial press and statistical services. J William 
H. Harrison, Vice President and Controller of General Telephone and 
Electronics Corporation, pointed out this danger to the Accounting 
Principles Board in the following comments:
As a general comment pertinent to this and other bulletins, we 
feel that the accounting profession should recognize and be sen­
sitive to the widespread use of investment information sources 
other than the fully detailed certified financial statements con­
tained in annual reports and prospectuses. . . . The practical 
fact is that many investors inform themselves solely by reference 
to newspaper reports, stock guide summaries and other cryptic 
sources. ^
22Task Force Committee of the American Accounting Association, 
"Statement of Task Force Committee of American Accounting Association on 
Exposure Drafts of Proposed APB Opinions on Accounting for Convertible 
Debt and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants and Earnings per 
Share dated November 6, 1968," no date, p. 6.
2%any investors rely on information sources other than annual 
reports and Security and Exchange Commission filings. For example, Baker 
and Haslem, in a survey of common-stock investors in metropolitan 
Washington, D. C., found that 46.8 percent of the 775 respondents rated 
stockbrokers as the most important source of information. The most im­
portant source of investment information for 15.6 percent of the respon­
dents was advisory services, followed by newspapers for 11.3 percent.
Only 7.9 percent rated financial statements as the most important source. 
See H. Kent Baker and John A. Haslem, "Information Needs of Individual 
Investors," Journal of Accountancy. CXXXVI (November, 1973), 64-69.
2^Letter from William H. Harrison, Vice President and Controller 
of General Telephone and Electronics Corporation, to Richard C. Lytle, 
Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the Ameri­
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 16, 1969.
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The Board had considered the space problems created by two earn- 
ings-per-share figures early in its deliberations. For example, the Sub­
committee on Convertible and Participating Securities met with 
representatives of Standard & Poor's Corporation on August 27, 1968. 
Standard & Poor's indicated that " . . .  there would be space problems
if they tried to give equal prominence to both figures, but they would
25do all they could to comply."
Experience subsequent to the release of APB Opinion No. 15 indi­
cates that the major investor services and financial newspapers do pub­
lish both earnings-per-share figures.^6 The argument that such 
publications would emphasize earnings per average common share outstanding
2 SMemorandum prepared for the convertible securities file of the 
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants dated August 27, 1968.
26The stated policies of two major publishers of investor ser­
vices are offered as proof of this statement. See Moody's Investors 
Services, Inc., Moody's Industrial Manual; 1974, I (New York: Moody's 
Investors Services, Inc., 1974), x for the following statement of Moody's 
policy:
Earned per common share is generally shown as reported by the 
company in its annual report. Where shares outstanding have in­
creased during the year earnings per common share is usually based 
on the average number of shares outstanding during the year (in 
some cases including common equivalent shares). Earned per share 
based on common on a fully diluted basis, is shown when reported 
by the company.
See also Standard & Poor's Corporation, Security Owner's Stock Guide. 
XXVIII (June, 1974), 1 for the following statement of Standard & Poor's 
policy:
Earnings per share are in general on a "Primary" basis as 
reported by company, excluding extraordinary items. If common 
equivalents are dilutive, the primary earnings are prefixed by 
symbol S; if potential dilution is significant, the extent is 
indicated for the latest year by reporting the "Fully Diluted" 
in the footnotes.
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through the omission of fully diluted earnings per share appears, in 
retrospect, to be without merit. There is, however, at least one excep­
tion to this statement.
As discussed in Chapter 2, price-earnings ratios have been added
to the price, volume, and dividend information contained in the daily
stock quotations published by many newspapers.^7 Space is a critical
constraint in publishing these quotations. As a result, primary earnings
per share is the earnings figure selected for computing the daily price- 
28earnings ratio.
Management's emphasis on price-earnings ratio. The presumption 
that management would emphasize earnings per average common share while 
ignoring fully diluted earnings per share is based on the assumption
that investors would place a higher value on the shares because of the
higher earnings per share. Some managements, however, place great 
emphasis on the price-earnings ratio. High price-earnings ratios were 
the key to some of the acquisitions by conglomerates during the middle 
1960's. Childs and others have shown that earnings per share of the 
acquiring company will increase in the year of the acquisition of a 
company provided: (1) the price paid per share for the acquired company
divided by the acquired company's earnings per share is lower than the
27see page 60.
28For example, on November 7, 1972 Daylin, Inc. announced primary 
earnings per share of $1.60 and fully diluted earnings per share of $1.43 
for the period ended September 3, 1972. Daylin's stock closed at 17 7/8
on November 8, 1972, resulting in a reported price-earnings ratio of 11
based on primary earnings per share. Had fully diluted earnings of $1.43 
per share been used in the computation, the price-earnings ratio would 
have been 13 (rounded to the nearest integer).
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acquiring company's price-earnings ratio and (2) the acquisition is 
accounted for on a poolings of interest basis.^9 This increase in earn­
ings per share of the acquiring company occurs only in the year of the 
acquisition. Further increases related to the acquisition depend upon;
(1) increasing the rate of return on the assets acquired (synergism) and
(2) the return on the earnings of the acquired company which are retained 
and reinvested. This tendency of some managements to judge their success 
in terms of the price-earnings ratio of their stock is shown by Childs
in the following statement from an unidentified executive;
Everything has changed, the name of the game today is get the 
current earnings up, boost the price-earnings ratio in every way 
possible and use the inflated paper to boost current earnings 
again and again by more acquisitions.
Look at the millions of dollars of stock value that such 
tactics create.30
A current example of management's emphasis on fully diluted earn­
ings per share for purposes of computing price-earnings ratios is 
provided by Mesulam Riklis, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of 
Rapid-American Corporation. As of January 31, 1974 Rapid-American had 
4,053,333 shares of common stock reserved for the exercise of warrants. 
This amounted to 60.3 percent of its 6,726,679 outstanding common 
shares. Riklis stated:
We have made a basic decision in our company that we are going 
to emphasize fully-diluted earnings. We did that last year. It's
2 Q̂See John F. Childs, Earnings per Share and Management Decisions 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 33-36. See
also Marvin M. May, "The Earnings per Share Traps," Financial Analysts 
Journal. XXIV (May-June, 1968), 113-117.
John F. Childs, Earnings per Share and Management Decisions 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 125.
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the only way you can really make a comparison. So this year we 
will only show fully-diluted. We will not even show the others, 
because we don't like to be shown at a six-time multiple when ^  
on the fully-diluted basis we are a 10 or 11-time multiple. . . .
If the price of Rapid-American's common fully reflects the 
anticipated dilution, an investor would perhaps be justified in using 
the higher multiple based on fully diluted earnings per share for cer­
tain of his investment decisions such as long-term price estimates. 
However, when the expiration date of the warrants is several years in 
the future the possibility exists that the market has not fully dis­
counted the dilutive effect of the warrants. In addition, certain 
decisions are affected by the actual number of shares outstanding. In­
vestment decisions of this type, such as short-term price estimates and 
dividend payout, might be more appropriately based on earnings per 
average common share.
The conclusion is that there is no one earnings-per-share figure 
appropriate for all purposes. Earnings per common share, which reflects 
the current legal rights of common shareholders, and fully diluted earn­
ings per share, which reflects all potential dilution, are more appro­
priate, ipso facto, than primary earnings per share for the investment 
decisions discussed above. The common stock equivalents used in comput­
ing primary earnings reflect neither the imminence nor likelihood of the 
ultimate exercise of warrants. As a result, primary earnings per share 
does not appear to be a relevant tool for investment decisions.
Based on these conclusions, this study will proceed under the
O  1 "People and Profits--Rapid-American Corporation," Wall Street 
Reports, VII (April, 1973), 58.
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assumption that, as a minimum, two earnings-per-share figures are rele­
vant to an investor who chooses to use earnings per share in evaluating 
the common stock of companies with warrants outstanding. The first, 
earnings per average common share outstanding,^ assumes no dilution of 
earnings through the exercise of warrants. The second, fully diluted 
earnings per share, indicates what earnings per share might have been 
had all warrants been exercised during the period. By comparing the two 
figures, an investor can determine the magnitude of the dilution which 
could occur if the warrants are exercised. This comparison is not pos­
sible under the guidelines of APB Opinion No. 15 because primary earnings 
per share includes essentially the same number of common stock equiva­
lents resulting from warrants as does fully diluted earnings per share.
The conclusion that the potentially dilutive effect of warrants 
should be reflected only in fully diluted earnings-per-share computations 
leaves unresolved the question of what assumptions should be made re­
garding the use of the proceeds which would be received if the warrants
o nJ The use of average common shares in computing earnings per com­
mon share is based on the Institute's position. Others would use the 
number of shares outstanding at the end of the period. For example,
Eric L. Kohler, in a comment letter to Richard C. Lytle on the November 
6, 1968 exposure draft, stated:
. . . Averaging outstanding shares during a reporting 
period . . . can be justified only where earnings have actually 
been modified by changes in such shares (as from a takeover).
Aside from this exception, I have never seen a situation where 
other types of changes in outstanding shares have had any notice­
able effect on net income. "Earnings per share" is a ratio of the 
moment, not one that has been effective throughout a reporting 
period. . . . Where additional shares have been sold or issued, 
say, as a bonus shortly before the end of the period, the APBO-9 
formula may have the effect of seriously overstating the ratio.
Consideration of this question is beyond the scope of this study.
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were exercised. APB Opinion No. 15 makes the general assumption, for 
computational purposes, that the funds would be used to purchase common 
stock at current market prices. The result of this assumption is that 
earnings per share varies inversely with the price of the underlying 
common stock. This and other assumptions regarding the use of warrant 
proceeds are considered in the following sections of this chapter.
DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING 
FULLY DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE
In Chapter 2 of this study the attributes of earnings per share 
were examined. In Chapter 3 the characteristics of warrants were 
analyzed. The purpose of this section is to formulate guidelines for 
reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of warrants in fully diluted 
earnings per share. In formulating these guidelines the characteristics 
of warrants will be related to the attributes of earnings per share used 
by investors in order to determine the most appropriate method of re­
flecting the dilutive effects of warrants. During the course of this 
analysis, reference will be made to the summary of observations about 
earnings per share and warrants detailed in the first section of this 
chapter.
Earnings per share relates the absolute amount of earnings 
theoretically available to common stockholders to the capital structure 
which existed during the period (Observation No. 1). Reducing earnings 
to a share basis is necessary in order to establish valid relationships 
with other variables which influence common stock investment decisions. 
These other variables are usually expressed on a per-share basis. For
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example, common stock prices are always quoted on a per-share basis and 
dividends are usually expressed in terms of one share.
Investors who use earnings per share to evaluate common stocks 
are interested in comparisons. They compare current period earnings per 
share with those of preceding periods for the same company or they com­
pare earnings per share of one company with those of another company in 
the same time frames. Similar comparisons are made by relating earnings 
per share to price per share and to dividends per share. Chapter 2 con­
cluded that the important attributes of earnings per share were the 
absolute amounts, the trend, and the variability of the trend (Observa­
tion No. 2).
In reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of warrants in 
earnings per share, the characteristics of warrants and the effect of 
these characteristics on the attributes of earnings per share must be 
considered. These characteristics of warrants and their effect on the 
attributes of earnings per share are discussed within the following 
framework: (1) the period over which dilution should be reflected, (2) 
the amount of dilution which should be reflected, (3) the rate of 
return on warrant proceeds, and (4) the variability of the rate of 
return.
Period over Which Dilution 
Should be Reflected
Recognition of potential dilution in fully diluted earnings per 
share reduces the absolute amount of earnings per share. Consequently 
the trend and variability of the trend of earnings per share are also 
affected (Observation No. 2). Since these are important attributes of
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earnings per share, the question of the timing of the recognition of 
potential dilution becomes important.
Chapter 3 of this study concluded that the issuance of warrants 
is a management decision. Warrants are usually attached to other securi­
ties as an inducement which facilitates the sale of the securities and/or 
reduces the interest or dividends. These benefits are reflected in the 
financial statements from the date of issue of the warrants (Observation 
No.4). Certeris paribus, earnings per share during the period over 
which the warrants are outstanding is higher than it otherwise would have 
been.
This improved performance for which management receives credit 
is not without potential cost to common stockholders. The cost to a 
current stockholder of management's decision to issue warrants is the 
dilution of his equity in the corporation if the warrants are exercised.
A proper matching of the sacrifices resulting from the issuance of 
warrants with the benefits derived therefrom requires, therefore, that 
the potentially dilutive effect of warrants be reflected in fully diluted 
earnings per share from the date warrants are issued to the date of 
exercise or expiration. Reflecting the potential dilution in fully 
diluted earnings per share during the period warrants are outstanding 
accomplishes the following: (1) management is made accountable for the
sacrifices as well as benefits of issuing warrants and (2) the common 
stockholder is made aware of the possible dilution to his equity. The 
conclusion is, therefore, that the dilutive effect of warrants should be 
recognized in fully diluted earnings per share during all periods in 
which warrants are outstanding.
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Amount of Dilution Which 
Should Be Reflected
The term dilution is used in several different but interrelated 
contexts by financial analysts and investors. Dilution may refer to a 
loss of voting power, a decline in asset values (book value) per share,
33a decline in earnings per share, or a decline in market value per share.
In each context the cause of the dilution is related to the issuance of 
additional shares of common stock. Since this study is concerned with 
the potential dilution in earnings per share which might be attributed to 
warrants, an understanding of dilution in its various contexts and of how 
dilution is reflected in earnings per share when warrants are exercised 
is important.
Dilution of voting power. Dilution of voting power occurs when 
additional common stock is issued to new stockholders. The amount of 
the dilution for the current stockholders as a group is the number of 
new shares issued to non-current stockholders expressed as a percentage 
of the total number of shares owned by current stockholders. Since 
warrants are frequently attached to debt, preferred stock, and non- 
preemptive common stock issues, a loss of voting power usually occurs 
when warrants are exercised. If an individual stockholder wishes to 
avoid dilution of voting power, he must purchase shares of the new issue 
proportional to his current holdings.
■^Philip M. Hubbard, Jr., classifies dilution into these four 
categories in an article entitled "The Many Aspects of Dilution." The 
discussion of dilution which follows is based, in part, on the ideas 
presented in that article. See Philip M. Hubbard, Jr., "The Many 
Aspects of Dilution," Financial Analysts Journal. XIX (May-June, 1963), 
33-40.
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Dilution of asset values. Asset values are diluted when an 
issue of common stock is sold at a price per share (or exchanged for 
other assets valued at fair market expressed on a per-share basis) which 
is lower than the current book value per share. Theoretically, book 
value should be based on the current replacement cost of assets rather 
than original cost in order to provide for the comparability of assets 
presently employed with those being acquired by the new issue of common 
stock.
Since assets are reported at original cost rather than replace­
ment value, dilution of asset values will not be reflected in the finan­
cial statements unless the assets acquired through the issuance of 
additional common stock, expressed on a per-share basis, are less than 
the book value per share of existing assets valued at original cost.
This dilution of book value has important implications for earnings per 
share. If the funds acquired through the issuance of additional common 
stock which dilutes book value earn at the same rate as existing net 
assets, dilution of earnings per share will occur. Management should 
not, therefore, issue common stock at prices which dilute asset values 
unless the new assets can be employed in a more productive manner than 
existing assets. If the new assets are more productive, then the cur­
rent dilution of assets values will be offset in the long run through 
increased earnings retained in the business.
Dilution of earnings per share. Dilution of earnings per share 
occurs when the percentage of increase in earnings produced by the assets 
acquired through the issuance of additional common stock is less than
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the percentage of increase in common shares outstanding as a result of
the issue. Dilution of earnings per share, therefore, is a function of:
(1) the earnings produced by existing assets, (2) the earnings produced 
by the assets acquired through the issuance of additional common stock,
(3) the number of common shares outstanding prior to the new issue, and
(4) the number of shares issued to acquire the new assets (Observation
No. 7).
An analysis of the relationships among these functions will pro­
vide an understanding of the dilution which will be reflected in earn­
ings per share when dilutive warrants are exercised. Functions (1) and
(3), for the purposes of this analysis, are constant. Dividing Func­
tion (1) (the earnings produced by existing assets) by Function (3)
(the number of common shares outstanding prior to the new issue) pro­
duces the earnings per share which would have existed had warrants not 
been exercised. Dividing Function (2) (the earnings produced by the 
assets acquired through the exercise of warrants) by Function (4) (the 
number of shares issued through the exercise of warrants) gives the 
earnings per share produced by the additional capital. Dilution of 
earnings per share will result if the earnings per share produced by the 
additional capital received from the exercise of warrants is less than 
the earnings per share of the existing capital.
Given the rate of return of existing net assets and the book 
value per share of those assets, the dilution which will be reflected 
in earnings per share through the exercise of warrants is determined by 
two variables: (1) the exercise price of the warrants and (2) the rate 
of return earned on the exercise price. The effect of each of the nine
254
possible combinations of these variables on earnings 
follows:
Status of Variables 
Affecting Earnings per Share
If Book Value 
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Earnings per share, therefore,will always be diluted through the 
exercise of warrants if the exercise price is equal to or less than the 
book value per share of existing assets and the rate of return on the 
exercise price is less than the rate of return on existing net assets.
If the rate of return on the exercise price and the rate of return on 
existing net assets are equal, dilution will occur if the exercise price 
is less than the book value per share of existing assets.
Dilution of earnings per share through the exercise of warrants 
may also occur when the exercise price is higher than the book value per 
share if the rate of return on the exercise price is sufficiently lower 
than the rate of return on existing net assets. On the other hand, dilu­
tion will not occur when the exercise price per share is lower than the 
book value per share of existing assets if the rate of return on the
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exercise price is sufficiently higher than the rate of return on existing 
net assets. In each of these two cases, the approximate rate of return 
on the exercise price necessary to prevent dilution is the quotient 
obtained by dividing the earnings per share of existing net assets by 
the exercise price per share. This rate is referred to as the cost of 
the capital obtained by the exercise of warrants. Dilution, therefore, 
will be reflected in earnings per share whenever the rate of return on 
warrant proceeds is less than the cost of the capital obtained from the 
warrants exercised.
Dilution of market price on common stock. Although this study 
deals primarily with the dilution of earnings per share caused by the 
issuance and exercise of warrants, many investors are perhaps more con­
cerned with the dilution of market price of the underlying common shares 
which may result from the exercise of warrants. The investor's interest 
in the dilution of earnings per share may be limited to the extent that 
he believes dilution of earnings per share will be reflected in a dilu­
tion of the common stock price.
Dilution of earnings per share through the exercise of warrants 
is only one of many factors which might be related to a dilution of mar­
ket price. In fact, an immediate dilution in earnings per share caused 
by the exercise of warrants might not result in a dilution of price. If, 
for example, investors feel that the funds provided by the exercise of 
warrants will be invested profitably and thereby result in a future in­
crease in the growth rate of earnings per share, the price of the shares 
may increase rather than decrease. On the other hand, a failure to
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maintain the dividend rate because the exercise of warrants has increased 
divident requirements would result in the dilution of market price to 
the extent that price is determined by dividends rather than earnings. 
Unless offset by other factors, dilution of market price will also re­
sult from an increase in the supply of shares made available for trading 
through the exercise of warrants. Regardless of the causes for dilution 
of market price, the importance of warning investors of this potential 
dilution is apparent. Earnings per share is perhaps the most effective 
device for providing this warning. By reflecting the potential dilution 
of warrants in fully diluted earnings per share for the entire period 
that warrants are outstanding, the investor is alerted to the potential 
dilution of the market price of his shares.
Rate of Return on Warrant Proceeds
In the preceding discussion of dilution, the conclusion was 
reached that dilution of earnings per share through the exercise of war­
rants will occur when the rate of return earned on warrant proceeds is 
less than the cost of the capital derived from the exercise of warrants 
where the cost of capital provided by warrants is defined as the rate 
obtained by dividing the earnings per share of existing assets by the 
exercise price per share. In theory, therefore, the dilution which is 
reflected in earnings per share when dilutive warrants are exercised is 
easily calculated, given the rate of return earned on warrant proceeds 
and the cost of the capital provided by those proceeds.
The application of this theory in practice, however, presents 
some problems. In order to determine the rate of return on warrant
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proceeds or the cost of the capital provided by the exercise of warrants, 
the absolute amount of earnings must be separated into two component 
parts: (1) the earnings applicable to existing capital and (2) the earn­
ings applicable to warrant proceeds. The earnings applicable to warrant 
proceeds, of course, is a function of how the funds are employed by man­
agement. Warrant agreements, unlike bond indentures, generally do not 
require warrant proceeds to be used for specific purposes. Thus the 
funds become a part of the pool of corporate assets and lose their sepa­
rate identify. As part of the pool of assets the funds may be used:
(1) to provide additional working capital, (2) to purchase plant and 
equipment, (3) to purchase long-term investments, (4) to retire debts,
(5) to acquire treasury stock, (6) to pay dividends, or (7) for any 
other legitimate corporate purpose as well as any combination of these 
purposes.
Barring a specific provision in the warrant agreement, any projec­
tion on the date of issue as to how warrant proceeds will be utilized if 
and when the warrants are exercised five, ten, or fifteen years in the 
future is pure speculation. In the first place, there may be no warrant 
proceeds because many issues are not exercised (Observation No. 6). 
Secondly, if the warrants are exercised, the proceeds become a part of 
the pool of assets and their specific identity is lost.
Under these circumstances, determination of the exact amount of 
dilution in earnings per share which is caused by the exercise of warrants 
is impossible. The closest approximation to the appropriate rate of 
return on warrant proceeds would appear to be the rate of return on aver­
age assets before interest and taxes for the period in which the warrants
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are exercised. In applying this rate to warrant proceeds, adjustment 
for income taxes must be made. The rate of return on average assets 
before interest and taxes is preferable to a rate of return on average 
owner's equity because the latter rate includes the leverage effect of 
debt.
Although the rate of return on warrant proceeds can be approxi­
mated by the rate of return on average assets before interest and taxes, 
thus excluding the leverage effect of debt, the cost of the additional 
capital provided by warrants is affected by leverage because the earn­
ings per share of existing capital reflects the effects of any debt 
securities outstanding. As previously explained, the cost of the war­
rant capital is the earnings per share of existing capital divided by 
the exercise price per share. Given the rate of return on warrant 
proceeds, the cost of warrant capital is readily determinable because 
the values of all other variables are already known or can be calculated. 
These variables and the sources of their values are; (1) earnings per 
share of existing capital determined by subtracting from total earnings 
the earnings applicable to warrants and dividing the result by the aver­
age number of shares of common outstanding exclusive of those issued 
through the exercise of warrants and (2) exercise price per share as 
provided by the warrant agreement.
The key variable, therefore, for determining the dilution to earn­
ings per share caused by the exercise of warrants is the rate of return 
earned on warrant proceeds. Unless the warrant agreement provides 
specifically for the utilization of proceeds, the funds received from 
the exercise of warrants are commingled with existing funds and become
260
a part of the pool of assets of the business. Thus the determination of 
a specific rate of return for the warrant proceeds becomes impossible. 
Under these circumstances, the rate of return on average assets before 
interest and taxes appears to be the appropriate approximation of the 
actual rate of return.
Variability of Rate of Return 
on Warrant Proceeds
In the preceding section, the conclusion was reached that the 
basic variable determining the amount of dilution which is reflected in 
earnings per share in the period in which warrants are exercised is the 
rate of return earned on the warrant proceeds. The difficulty of deter­
mining this rate has been explained. Dilution, however, will automati­
cally be reflected as a reduction of earnings per share when the warrants 
are exercised regardless of whether the amount can be accurately deter­
mined or not.
The problem with which this study is concerned is that of reflect­
ing the actual dilution of earnings per share encountered when warrants 
are exercised in fully diluted earnings per share for every period in 
which the warrants are outstanding. Clearly this is impossible. Even 
if the rate of return on warrant proceeds were known in advance, as would 
be the case if the warrant agreement provided that warrant proceeds were 
to be used to retire a specific debt issue, the amount of the dilution 
could not be determined in advance of the warrant exercise. This is 
true for two reasons. First, the warrants might not be exercised and thus 
no dilution would result. Secondly, the amount of actual dilution is 
dependent not only on the rate of return on warrant proceeds but also on
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the cost of warrant capital in the year of exercise. As previously 
explained, the cost of the capital provided by the warrants is a func­
tion of the earnings per share of the existing capital in the period of 
exercise and of the exercise price of the warrants. The cost of the 
warrant capital, therefore, cannot be determined until the period of 
exercise.
Given these conditions, the potential dilution to earnings per 
share which will be reflected in fully diluted earnings per share must 
be estimated from information available when the periodic financial 
statements are prepared. Ideally, the rate of return on warrant proceeds 
selected will be the one which produces a dilution estimate that most 
closely approximates the actual dilution which will be reflected in 
earnings per common share when the warrants are exercised. As pointed 
out in Chapter 2, investors consider variations in the trend of earn­
ings per share a significant attribute of earnings per share for common 
stock evaluation purposes (Observation No. 2). They place a lower multi­
ple on earnings with higher variability and vice versa. Therefore, the 
rate of return on warrant proceeds selected should, in each period, 
produce a consistent estimate of the actual dilution without causing 
variations in fully diluted earnings per share from period to period 
because of variations in the rate which are attributable to factors not 
related to dilution as it will ultimately be reflected in earnings per 
common share.
Any method of computing fully diluted earnings per share designed 
to reflect the potential dilution of warrants which employs the market 
price of the underlying common stock and/or the market price, premium,
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or theoretical value of the warrants is inappropriate. The reasons for 
the unsuitability of such methods are discussed in the following two 
paragraphs.
The market price of the underlying common stock and/or the market 
price, premium, or theoretical value of the warrants are not variables 
which enter directly into the determination of the dilution which is re­
flected in earnings per share when warrants are exercised. These vari­
ables do have an indirect effect on dilution in that their status in the 
period immediately preceding the expiration date of the warrants deter­
mines whether the warrants will be exercised (Observation No. 6). The 
conditions precedent necessary to induce exercise are that the theoreti­
cal value of the warrants be positive and that their market price be 
close to their theoretical value. As previously explained, the relevant 
variables for determining the dilution of earnings per share are the 
earnings per share which would have existed had the warrants not been 
exercised, the exercise price of the warrants, and the rate of return on 
the warrant proceeds.
Even if the pricing variables described above were relevant to 
the dilution actually reflected in earnings per share upon the exercise 
of warrants, as would be the case if warrant proceeds were actually used 
to purchase treasury stock, the use of the pricing variables to estimate 
dilution in other periods would be inappropriate.-^ For example, the
"^Barring a specific need for treasury stock, the purchase of 
treasury stock with warrant proceeds is unlikely because it is an admis­
sion by management that it cannot invest the warrant proceeds at a rate 
sufficiently high to return the cost of capital. The Accounting 
Principles Board adopted the treasury stock method not on the grounds 
that warrant funds are likely to be used to purchase treasury stock but
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treasury stock method of computing fully diluted earnings per share, as 
well as any other method utilizing common stock or warrant prices, intro­
duces variability into the trend of earnings per share. This variability 
is unrelated to the actual dilution which may result from the exercise 
of warrants and is therefore undesirable. These methods assume that the 
price relationships which exist between common stock and warrants in 
each period will be the same as those existing when the warrants are 
exercised. Such an assumption is unwarranted because it ignores the 
volatility of common stock prices. As documented in Chapter 3,̂ "* the 
common stock prices of companies with warrants outstanding are likely to 
be more volatile than those of the average listed company because the 
leverage which appeals to warrant investors is derived from fluctuations 
in the underlying common stock price.
The conclusion is that methods of computing fully diluted earn­
ings per share designed to reflect an estimate of the actual dilution of 
earnings per share which may result from the exercise of warrants should 
utilize only those variables which actually affect dilution. Price re­
lated variables that have no direct affect on the actual dilution which 
may be reflected in earnings per share when warrants are exercised merely 
introduce variability into fully diluted earnings per share and destroy 
interperiod and intercompany comparability.
merely as a convenient means of reflecting dilution in earnings per share 
during the periods warrants are outstanding. The treasury stock method, 
however, is not a reliable estimator of the actual dilution which may 




Summary of Guidelines for Computing 
Fully Diluted Earnings per Share
In summary, the preceding analysis of the attributes of earnings 
per share in relation to the characteristics of warrants leads to the 
conclusion that any method of computing fully diluted earnings per share 
which is designed to reflect an estimate of the actual dilution which 
may occur when warrants are exercised should meet the following guide­
lines :
1. The dilutive effect of warrants should be reflected in fully 
diluted earnings per share from the date of issuance to the date of exer­
cise or expiration of the warrants. Management is thus held responsible 
for the sacrificies as well as the benefits of issuing warrants and the 
potential dilution of control, net asset values, earnings per share and 
market price is forcefully brought to the attention of investors.
2. The amount of dilution which should be reflected in fully 
diluted earnings per share during each period warrants are outstanding 
is the current best estimate, based on the latest relevant data avail­
able, of the actual dilution which will result if and when the warrants 
are exercised. The amount of dilution which would have resulted had 
warrants been exercised in the current period being reported is relevant 
only to the extent that it is a good estimate of the actual dilution 
which will result if and when the warrants are exercised.
3. The actual dilution which will be reflected in earnings per 
share when warrants are exercised is a function of the number of common 
shares issued through the exercise of warrants, the number of common 
shares outstanding when the warrants are exercised, the earnings on the
265
warrant proceeds, and the earnings of assets existing prior to the 
exercise of warrants. Dilution of earnings per share will occur if the 
earnings from warrant proceeds per share of common issued through the 
exercise of warrants is less than the earnings per share of the capital 
existing prior to the exercise. In other words, dilution occurs if the 
rate of return on warrant proceeds is less than the cost of the warrant 
capital. The key variable in determining dilution, therefore, is the 
rate of return on warrant proceeds. The method chosen for computing 
fully diluted earnings per share should incorporate a realistic estimate 
of the rate of return that will be earned on warrant proceeds.
4. The method chosen for computing fully diluted earnings per 
share should not incorporate an estimated rate of return on warrant 
proceeds which injects variability into fully diluted earnings per 
share that is not a result of the operating conditions experienced by 
the firm during the period. In other words, the estimated rate of return 
chosen to approximate the actual rate of return on warrant proceeds 
should not vary from period to period as the result of factors external 
to the firm which have no direct bearing on the dilution of earnings per 
share. The introduction of variability not related to operations of 
the firm could result in incorrect decisions by those investors who are 
influenced by variability in the trend of earnings per share.
CONFORMITY OF VARIOUS METHODS OF COMPUTING FULLY 
DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE TO GUIDELINES
There are basically four different methods which might be used 
to compute fully diluted earnings per share when the purpose is to
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reflect in the computation an estimate of the actual dilution which may
result from the exercise of warrants. These are:
I - equivalent shares considered outstanding - no credit given 
for earnings on potential proceeds 
II - equivalent shares considered as outstanding - credit given for 
earnings on potential proceeds:
(a) - at some earnings rate determined from data independent
of the corporation's own rate of return
(b) - at a rate based on the earnings of the corporation in
relation to the current market price of its common stock 
III - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option
reduced to a portion based on the relationship of the exercise 
price of the warrant and the current market price of the common 
stock - also known as the purchase of treasury stock method 
IV - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option 
reduced to a portion based on the relationship of the market 
price of the warrant and the current market price of the common 
stock - the Graham-Dodd formula.36
In the following section each of these methods of computing fully 
diluted earnings per share is analyzed in terms of the guidelines devel­
oped in the preceding section. These methods and the relationships among 
them can perhaps best be explained by expressing them as equations. The 
following symbols are used:
EPS = earnings per share 
NI = net income applicable to common shares 
CS = common shares outstanding
WS = common shares issuable through the exercise of warrants 
MPC = market price per share of common stock
o/:
JOLetter from Frank T. Weston, member of the Subcommittee on Con­
vertible Debt of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, to Philip L. Defliese, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Convertible Debt of the Accounting Principles Board of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 20, 
1969. These four categories are not completely exhaustive of all possi­
bilities. Category II should perhaps be expanded to include internal 
rates of return such as the cost of debt and the return on assets.
267
MPW = market price of warrants necessary to acquire one share 
of common stock
EPW = exercise price of warrants per common share
R = designated earnings rate on warrant proceeds, net of tax 
effect.
Method I
No earnings are assumed on the proceeds from warrants under 
Method I and the equivalent shares under option are considered to be 
outstanding. Fully diluted earnings per share is simply the net income 
for the period divided by the sum of the ccmmon shares outstanding and 
the common shares issuable through the exercise of warrants. The equa­
tion is:
EPS = NI / (CS + WS) 
where NI > 0.
This method will reflect an estimate of dilution in every period 
in which there is net income available to common stockholders. However, 
this method fails to conform to the guidelines for computing earnings per 
share because the amount of estimated dilution is excessive. The assump­
tion of a 0 percent earnings rate on warrant proceeds is clearly 
unrealistic. Since warrant agreements generally do not restrict the use 
of warrant proceeds, the funds could always be invested in government 
securities until the firm developed a more profitable project. The use 
of a constant rate of return on warrant proceeds, although inappropriate 
in this case, does prevent variability which is not related to the 
operating conditions of the firm from influencing the trend of fully 
diluted earnings per share. Interperiod and intercompany comparisons
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are therefore valid as long as the method is consistently used in all 
periods and by all companies. The conclusion is that this method fails 
to meet the requirements of Guidelines Nos. 2 and 3 in that the dilution 
produced by this method is not a good estimate of the actual dilution 
which will be reflected in earnings per share if and when the warrants 
are exercised. This method does not produce a good estimate of actual 
dilution because it assumes an inappropriate rate of return on the 
warrant proceeds.
Method II-(a)
Method II-(a) assumes an earnings rate on warrant proceeds inde­
pendent of the corporation's own rate of return. The effect of this 
assumption is to assert that the corporation will invest warrant proceeds 
in private or governmental securities. The rate of return is therefore 
dependent on the type of security designated in the assumption. Thus 
the designated rate might be the bank prime rate, the U. S. treasury 
bill discount rate, the commercial paper rate, or any other rate of 
return on investment securities independent of the corporation. The 
equation for earnings per share under this method is;
EPS = NI / (CS + WS) + (R) (EPW) (WS) / (CS + WS) 
where (NI / CS) >  EPS >0.
This method will provide an estimate of dilution in every period 
warrants are outstanding except during periods when there is a net loss 
or the earnings rate selected for warrant proceeds exceeds the cost of 
the warrant capital. This method is always less dilutive than Method I. 
In fact, Method II realistically recognizes that the exercise of warrants 
may result in enhancement rather than dilution of earnings per share.
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Enhancement of earnings per share will occur if the rate of return on 
the assumed investment is greater than the cost of warrant capital.
The assumption that warrant proceeds are invested in the securi­
ties of other corporations or governmental units results in a realistic 
estimated rate of return on warrant proceeds. As a matter of fact, this 
course of action by management would not be unreasonable if the timing 
of exercise of warrants was such that the funds were not currently needed 
in operations. A temporary investment in securities would produce 
revenues until a more profitable use of the funds materialized.
Although investment in short term securities may be the course 
of action pursued by management when warrants are exercised, the use of 
the rate of return on such investments during interim periods as an 
estimator of the actual dilution may be inappropriate. The rate of re­
turn on investments would be undesirable as an estimator of actual dilu­
tion if it caused excessive variability in the periodic computations of 
fully diluted earnings per share. Inevitably some variability would re­
sult because interest rates do change over time. The change, however, 
has been gradual until recent years. For example,the U. S. bank prime 
rate remained unchanged at 4.5 percent from August 23, 1960 until
0 7December 6, 1965. Other interest rates, although more variable, tend 
to correlate with the prime rate. Unfortunately all interest rates 
have become more volatile in recent years. Despite this increase in 
volatility, interest rates remain much more stable than stock prices.
0 7J/J. T. Ball, Computing Earnings per Share: Unofficial Account­
ing Interpretations of APB Opinion No. 15 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1970), p. 108.
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Use of an interest rate as the estimator of the rate of return on war­
rant proceeds is, therefore, preferable to an estimator which is based 
on stock prices.
In summary, Method II-(a) meets most of the guidelines for com­
puting fully diluted earnings per share. Except for the variability 
introduced into the computation by changing interest rates, this method 
provides for interperiod comparability. Intercompany comparability is 
also good if the assumption is made that all companies are required to 
use the same rate of return.
Method II-(b)
Method II-(b) is based on the current earnings per share of the 
company, computed without regard to dilutive securities, in relation to 
the current market price of the common shares. The equation for comput­
ing fully diluted earnings per share under this method is:
EPS = NI / (CS + WS) + (((NI / CS) / MPC) (EPW) (WS))
/ (CS + WS)
where (NI / CS) >  EPS >  0.
This method of computing fully diluted earnings per share pro­
vides an estimate of actual dilution of earnings per share in periods 
when a net loss has not been incurred and the exercise price of the war­
rants is less than the market price of the common. A serious disadvantage 
of this method is that it will not produce an estimate of dilution in 
periods when the exercise price of the warrants exceeds the market price 
of the common. As shown in Chapter 3, the fact that the warrant exer­
cise price exceeds the common stock price during interim periods bears 
no relationship to the ultimate dilution which may be reflected in earn­
ings per share if warrants are exercised. The relationship between the
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warrant exercise price and the common stock price assumes importance only 
in a brief span of the time immediately preceding the expiration date of 
the warrants. During that period the market price of the common must 
exceed the exercise price of the warrants if conversion is to occur.
The term ((NI / CS) / MPC) in the equation for Method II-(b) is 
the rate of return on the current market price of common stock; i.e., it 
is the reciprocal of the price-earnings ratio, usually referred to as 
the earnings-price ratio. In capital budgeting this rate is considered 
to be the cost of common equity capital. Method II-(b) will, therefore, 
produce higher estimates of dilution than Method II-(a) when the earn- 
ings-price ratio is less than the rate of return assumed from data 
independent of the corporation. Thus high price-earnings ratio companies 
would show less fully diluted earnings per share under this method than 
under Method II-(a) while low price-earnings ratio companies would show 
higher fully diluted earnings per share.
Method II-(b) makes the assumption that warrant proceeds can 
never earn at a rate greater than the cost of common equity capital 
((NI / CS) / MPC). This is tantamount to saying that warrants will 
always be dilutive when exercised because the cost of common equity capi­
tal must be less than the cost of warrant capital ((NI / CS) / EPW) in 
order for warrants to be exercised. This is true because the market price 
of the common (MPC) must exceed the exercise price of the warrants (EPW) 
in order for a rational investor to exercise. It is the rate of return 
which can be earned on warrant proceeds, not the cost of common equity 
capital, in relation to the cost of the warrant capital which determines 
the actual amount of dilution, if any, to earnings per share.
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The impropriety of assuming that warrant proceeds earn at a rate 
equilavent to the company's earnings-price ratio is clearly demonstrated 








































The assumption that McDonald's and International Business Machines would 
earn only 2.6 percent and 5 percent respectively on warrant proceeds 
when they are currently earning 14.6 percent and 19.2 percent respec­
tively on invested capital is not reasonable. Equally unreasonable is 
the assumption that LTV and U. S. Steel, currently earning 8.3 percent 
and 8 percent respectively on invested capital, could achieve returns 
of 50 percent and 16.7 percent respectively on warrant proceeds.
Another serious disadvantage of Method II-(b) as an estimator 
of the dilution which will actually be reflected in earnings per share 
when warrants are exercised is the variability which this method causes 
to be reflected in fully diluted earnings per share. This variability 
is the result of using the market price of the common stock as one of 
the variables in the estimated rate of return on warrant proceeds. Use 
of the common stock price in the term for the estimated rate of return
®®Compiled from "Survey of Corporate Performance: First Quarter 
1974," Business Week. May 11, 1974, pp. 69-90.
273
((NI / CS) / MPC) can produce incongruous results in fully diluted 
earnings per share. Assume, for example, that the absolute amount of 
earnings increases and that as a result of increased earnings and ex­
pectations of future increases in earnings, the price of the common 
stock of a company with warrants outstanding increases. The result is 
a decrease in fully diluted earnings per share over what would have been 
reported had there been no increase in the common price. Yet the price 
of the common stock will have no effect on the amount of dilution in 
earnings per share when the warrants are exercised (except in the 
unlikely event that the proceeds are used to purchase treasury stock). 
Method II-(b), therefore, introduces variability into fully diluted 
earnings per share that is not a result of the operating conditions en­
countered by the company.
In summary, Method II-(b) fails to meet the guidelines for com­
puting fully diluted earnings per share. It fails to estimate dilution 
in periods when the warrant exercise price exceeds the common stock 
price. An unrealistically low rate of return on warrant proceeds is 
assumed for high price-earnings ratio companies and an excessively high 
rate of return is assumed for low price-earnings ratio companies. 
Further, the rate of return assumed in each period varies inversely 
with the price of the common stock. The result is that neither inter­
period nor intercompany comparisons of fully diluted earnings per share 
are valid.
Method III
Method III is known as the treasury stock method. It is the 
method, modified by the 20 percent limitation, adopted by APB Opinion
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No. 15. This method makes the assumption that warrant proceeds are used 
to purchase treasury stock at current market prices. Such an assumption 
is unrealistic for at least two r e a s o n s . I n  the first place, a 
corporation would not normally purchase its own stock unless management 
had reached the conclusion that the stock was undervalued in the market 
place. If the stock is undervalued, there is the likelihood that the 
stock is selling below the exercise price of the warrants. Thus no funds 
from the exercise of warrants would be available for the purchase of 
treasury stock. In the second place, sizable purchases of treasury stock 
could not be made without affecting the price of the stock.
The Accounting Principles Board recognized the limitations of the 
purchase of treasury stock as an actual application of warrant proceeds. 
The method was adopted because it offered ". . . a  practical approach to 
reflecting the dilutive effect that would result from the issuance of 
common stock under option and warrant agreements . . . ."^O
The equation for Method III is:
EPS - NI / (CS + (WS - ((EPW) (WS) / MPC))) 
where (NI / CS) >  EPS "> 0.
The term ((EPW) (WS) / MPC) is the number of treasury shares assumed to
be purchased and these shares are deducted from the number of shares
issuable through the exercise of warrants. Although the equation for
■^The two reasons cited are in addition to possible legal re­
strictions on the purchase of treasury stock. For a discussion, see 
page 202.
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the Accounting 
Principles Board, No. 15 (New York; American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 231.
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Method III does not specify a rate of return on warrant proceeds, the 
purchase of treasury stock is equivalent to a rate of return slightly 
less than the earnings-price ratio assumed by Method II-(b). Proof of
this statement is offered in the following paragraphs.
The terms of the equation for Method II-(b) can be rearranged as
follows:
EPS, Method II-(b) = (NI + ((NI / CS) (EPW) (WS) / MPC))
/ (CS + WS)
Noting that the term ((EPW) (WS / MPC) is the number of shares of common 
assumed to be purchased under the treasury stock method and substituting 
X for this term, Method II-(b) can be written
EPS, Method II-(b) = (NI + ((NI / CS) (X)) / (CS + WS).
Similarly, the equation for Method III can be written 
EPS, Method III = NI / (CS + WS - X).
Net income (NI) Is a common term in the numerator of both equa­
tions. In Method II-(b) the assumed proceeds from warrants ((NI / CS) 
(X)) is added to net income (NI). There is no adjustment for warrant 
proceeds in the numerator of Method III. Therefore the numerator in 
Method II-(b) reflects an increase over the numerator of Method III of 
((NI / CS) (X) (100) / NI) percent.
In the denominator the common term of both equations is the 
total number of shares outstanding after the assumed exercise of warrants 
(CS + WS). Under Method III the number of shares assumed purchased under 
the treasury stock method (X) is deducted from the total shares out­
standing if warrants have been exercised (CS + WS). Since there is no 
adjustment to the denominator of Method II-(b), the denominator of 
Method III reflects a decrease over the denominator of Method II-(b)
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of ((X) (100) / (CS + WS)) percent.
Method II-(b) will always produce greater earnings per share than 
Method III if the percentage of increase in the numerator ((NI / CS) (X) 
(100) / NI) is greater than the percentage of decrease in the denominator 
((100) (X) / (CS +WS)). In other words, the term ((NI / CS) (X) (100)
/ NI) must be greater than the term ((X) (100) / (CS + VJS)). By can­
celling and rearranging terns, the percentage of increase in the numera­
tor becomes ((100) (X) / CS, which will always be larger than the 
percentage of decrease in the denominator of ((100) (X) / (CS +WS)). 
Method III, therefore, is always more dilutive than Method II-(b). Since 
Method II-(b) assumes that warrants earn at the earnings-price ratio and 
Method III always produces a lower earnings per share than Method II-(b), 
the conclusion is that the treasury stock method of computing fully 
diluted earnings per share assumes a rate of return on warrant proceeds 
that is less than the cost of common equity capital.
Method III fails to meet the guidelines for computing fully di­
luted earnings per share for the same reason as Method II-(b) because 
this method also assumes a rate of return on warrant proceeds which is 
based on the current market price of the common stock. As a result, this 
method fails to provide a dilution estimate in periods when the exercise 
price exceeds the common stock price. The rate of return assumed on war­
rant proceeds is even less than the price-earnings ratio assumed under 
Method II-(b). Consequently, the rate of return which high price-earnings 
ratio companies are assumed to earn on warrant proceeds is absurdly low.
In addition, the rate of return varies inversely with the price of the 
common stock. Interperiod and intercompany comparisons are therefore
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invalid because of variations in fully diluted earnings per share not 
related to the operations of the firm.
Method IV
Method IV is the method recommended by Graham and Dodd. It 
assumes that the warrants " . . .  are equivalent to additional outstand­
ing common shares with the same aggregate market value as that of the 
warrant i s s u e . T h e  equation for computing fully diluted earnings 
per share under this method is:
EPS = NI / (CS + ((MPW / MPC) (WS))) 
where (NI / CS) >  EPS >  0.
This method is similar to Method III in that the equation for 
computing fully diluted earnings per share does not specify a rate of 
return for warrant proceeds. It relates the market value of the warrant 
to the market value of the common stock in order to determine the equi­
valent common shares considered to be outstanding. This relationship 
differs from that of the treasury stock method which relates the 
theoretical or intrinsic value of the warrant (i.e.. the difference 
between the market price of the common and the exercise price of the 
warrant) to the market value of the common.
Method IV results in an implied rate of return on warrant pro­
ceeds which is less than that assumed by Method II-(b) and less than or 
equal to the implied rate of Method III. Since the implied rate of 
return for Method III has already been demonstrated to be less than that
^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security 
Analysis: Principles and Technique (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1962), p. 227.
278
of Method II-(b), the preceding statement can be proved by showing that 
the implied rate of Method IV is equal to or less than the implied rate 
of Method III. Proof is offered in the following paragraphs that fully 
diluted earnings per share under Method IV is always less than or equal 
to fully diluted earnings per share under Method III.
The equation for computing fully diluted earnings per share under 
the treasury stock method is:
EPS, Method III - NI / (CS + (WS - ((EPW) (WS) / MPC))).
By factoring out the variable WS, the term (WS - ((EPW) (WS) / MPC)) 
becomes ((WS) (1 - EPW / MPC)). The term (1 - EPW / MPC) is equivalent 
to ((MPC - EPW) / MPC) so that the revised equation for Method III be­
comes
EPS, Method III, Revised = NI / (CS + (((MPC - EPW)
/ MPC) (WS))).
The revised equation for Method III is in a form that is com­
parable with Method IV. The terms in both equations are identical except 
that the fraction for determining the equivalent shares resulting from 
outstanding warrants is ((MPC - EPW) / MPC) for Method III and (MPW / MPC) 
for Method IV. The term (MPC - EPW), the difference between the market 
price of the common and the exercise price of the warrant, is the theo­
retical or intrinsic value of the warrant. The difference between the 
intrinsic value and the market value of the warrant, i.e.. the differ­
ence in the two equations, is the premium at which the warrant is selling. 
This premium reflects the leverage advantage which the warrant offers 
the underlying common stock. The value of the premium approaches zero 
as the intrinsic value of the warrant increases and as the expiration
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date of the warrant becomes imminent.
Since the market price of warrants will almost always be equal 
to or greater than their intrinsic value the numerator in the frac­
tion for determining equivalent shares under Method IV will always be 
greater than or equal to the numerator for determining equivalent shares 
under Method III. Consequently the number of equivalent shares added to 
the common shares outstanding under Method IV will be equal to or 
greater than the equivalent shares under Method III. As a result, fully 
diluted earnings per share calculated under Method IV will be less than 
or equal to fully diluted earnings per share calculated under Method III. 
Thus the implied rate of return on warrant proceeds under Method IV is 
less than or equal to the implied rate of return under Method III and 
less than the earnings-price ratio of Method II-(b).
Although Method IV is an improvement over Method II-(b) and 
Method III in some respects, it also fails to comply fully with the 
guidelines for computing fully diluted earnings per share. Unlike 
Methods II-(b) and III, Method IV will reflect an estimate of dilution 
in every period in which warrants are outstanding. Since the implied 
earnings rate on warrant proceeds is either equal to or less than that 
of Method III, the amount of the dilution estimate is excessive for high 
price-earnings ratio companies. As with Methods II-(b) and III, the 
implied rate of return varies inversely with the price of the underlying 
common stock.
^Arbitrageurs prevent warrants from selling below their intrin­
sic value for any appreciable length of time. For a discussion of 
arbitrageurs, see page 151.
280
Summary of Conformity of Various 
Methods to Guidelines
Table 26 presents a comparison of the conformity of the basic 
methods of computing fully diluted earnings per share to the guidelines 
formulated by this study for the computation of fully diluted earnings 
per share "when the purpose is to estimate the dilution which may result 
from the exercise of warrants. Methods I, III, and IV can be discarded 
immediately for failure to meet the guidelines. Method I offers an 
objective method for computing fully diluted earnings per share by 
simply avoiding the problems of estimating a rate of return on warrant 
proceeds. The assumption of a zero rate of return on warrant proceeds 
is unreasonable because warrant proceeds can be readily invested in 
short-term securities until a more profitable project materializes.
Method III also offers a practical method of computing fully 
diluted earnings per share by indirectly avoiding the problem of esti­
mating a rate of return on warrant proceeds. The purchase of treasury 
stock, however, is equivalent to some implied rate of return which will 
always be less than the current cost of common equity. As a conse­
quence, this method overstates the dilution which will be experienced 
by high price-earnings ratio companies and, to some extent, understates 
the dilution of low price-earnings ratio companies. This method would 
not be a good estimator of actual dilution even if the corporation 
actually purchased treasury stock with warrant proceeds. The volatility 
of common stock prices would cause variability in the periodic earnings- 
per-share computations completely unrelated to the operations of the 
firm.
Table 26. A Comparison of the Conformity of Various Methods of Computing Fully Diluted Earnings per 
Share to the Guidelines for Computing Fully Diluted Earnings per Share When Warrants Are Outstanding
Methods3
Guidelines I II-(a) II-(b) III IV
1. Method should provide an 
estimate of actual dilu­
tion, if any, in every 
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actual rate of return 









































Guidelines I II-(a) II-(b) III IV
4. Method should not in­
corporate a rate of 
return on warrant 
proceeds which intro­
duces variability into 
earnings per share not 
related to the opera­











































aThe basic assumptions of each method are:
Method I - equivalent shares considered as outstanding with no credit given for earnings on warrant 
proceeds
Method II-(a) - equivalent shares considered as outstanding with credit given for earnings on warrant 
proceeds at an earnings rate determined from data independent of the corporation's 
own rate of return
Method II-(b) - equivalent shares considered as outstanding with credit given for earnings on warrant 
proceeds at a rate based on earning's of the corporation in relation to the current 
market price 0f its common stock; i.e.. the earnings-price ratio
Method III - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option reduced to a portion based 
on the relationship of the exercise price of the warrant and the current market price of 
the common stock; i.e., the treasury stock method
Method IV - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option reduced to a portion based 
on the relationship of the market price of the warrant and the current market price of the common stock; i.e., the Graham and Dodd method.
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Method IV also indirectly avoids the problem of estimating a 
rate of return on warrant proceeds by assuming additional common shares 
are outstanding based on the relationship of the market price of the 
warrant to the market price of the common stock. This method, advocated 
by Graham and Dodd, is not as practical as the treasury stock method, 
however, because the computation requires warrant prices which may not 
always be available. The implied rate of return assumed by this method 
is less than the cost of common equity and also less than or equal to 
the implied rate of the treasury stock method. Consequently the estimate 
of dilution for high price-earnings ratio companies is even more seri­
ously overstated. As with the treasury stock method, fully diluted 
earnings per share varies inversely with the price of the common stock. 
Thus variability unrelated to the operations of the firm is introduced 
into fully diluted earnings per share.
Methods II-(a) and II-(b) both incorporate an estimated rate of 
return on warrant proceeds. Since the rate of return on warrant pro­
ceeds is the key variable1̂  in determining the actual dilution, if any, 
which will be reflected in earnings per share when warrants are exer­
cised, an analysis of these two methods may provide an appropriate rate 
of return for estimating dilution.
Method II-(a) employs a rate of return on warrant proceeds 
selected from data independent of the corporation's own rate of return.
^Dilution of earnings per share occurs if the cost of the war­
rant capital (earnings per share of existing capital divided by the 
warrant exercise price) exceeds the rate of return on the warrant pro­
ceeds. The rate of return on warrant proceeds is termed the key 
variable because management has little control over the cost of warrant 
capital once warrants have been issued.
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In other words, the assumption is that warrant proceeds are invested in 
securities of other corporations or governmental agencies. Investment 
of warrant proceeds in securities is one of several options available to 
management. Consequently Method II-(a) meets the guidelines better than 
any of the other methods considered. The principal fault with this 
method is that periodic changes in the interest or discount rate selected 
will cause variability in the estimated dilution which may not be re­
lated to the operations of the firm.
Whereas Method II-(a) employs a rate of return derived from 
sources external to the firm, Method II-(b) uses internal data of the 
firm as well as data from external sources. This rate, usually referred 
to as the cost of common equity, relates the firm's earnings per share 
to the current price of its common stock. This method therefore assumes 
that a firm can never invest warrant proceeds profitably because the 
cost of the warrant capital will always exceed the cost of common equity. 
This is true because the market price of the common must exceed the 
exercise price of the warrants for exercise to occur. Basing the rate 
of return on the current common stock price severely understates the 
rate of return which high price-earnings ratio companies may earn on 
warrant proceeds. Earnings per share is also subject to variability not 
related to the operations of the firm because of the volatility of com­
mon stock prices.
RECOMMENDED METHOD OF COMPUTING FULLY 
DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE
Both Methods II-(a) and II-(b) fail to meet the guidelines for 
computing fully diluted earnings per share because their rates of return
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on warrant proceeds employ, in part at least, data external to the firm. 
Such rates exclude the possibility that the funds derived from the exer­
cise of warrants will be employed internally in the operations of the 
firm. Under these circumstances warrant proceeds lose their separate 
identify because they are comingled with the other operating assets.
The rate of return earned on the proceeds, therefore, is the rate of re­
turn earned, before interest and taxes, on average assets employed 
(hereinafter referred to as the operating rate of return).
The operating rate of return produces results which comply favor­
ably with the guidelines for computing fully diluted earnings per share. 
This compliance with the guidelines is indicated by the following 
comparison:
1. An estimate of dilution is reflected in fully diluted earn­
ings per share in every period in which the operating rate of return is 
exceeded by the cost of warrant capital. This method properly reflects 
no dilution in periods in which the operating rate of return exceeds the 
cost of warrant capital. Failure to reflect dilution is appropriate 
because the best estimate, based on the latest relevant data, is that
no dilution of earnings per share will occur if warrants are exercised. 
This contrasts with Methods II-(b) and III which assume that no dilution 
will occur if the exercise price exceeds the market price of the common 
stock and with Methods I and IV which always assume that dilution will 
occur.
2. The amount of dilution which this method estimates is reason­
able because the process of estimation is based on the relevant variables 
which determine actual dilution when warrants are exercised. This
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contrasts with some of the other methods under consideration. Method I 
estimates excessive dilution because it assumes that warrant proceeds 
will produce no earnings. Method II-(b) overestimates dilution for high 
price-earnings ratio companies because it assumes that warrant proceeds 
cannot earn at a rate higher than the cost of equity capital. Method 
Ill's assumption that warrant proceeds will be used to purchase treasury 
stock produces results similar to Method II-(b), except that the dilution 
estimate is higher. Method IV produces dilution estimates similar to, 
but generally higher than, Methods II-(b) and III because it somehow 
assumes that dilution of earnings per share is a direct function of the 
market prices of the warrants and the related common stock.
3. Barring a requirement of the warrant agreement that warrant 
proceeds be utilized for a specific purpose, the operating rate of re­
turn is the most appropriate estimate of the rate of return which will
be earned on warrant proceeds. As previously explained, warrant proceeds 
are likely to become a part of the firm's pool of assets used in opera­
tions. Under these circumstances, a specific rate of return applicable 
only to the proceeds cannot be determined. The operating rate of return 
will, however, reflect the benefits or detriments derived from the use 
of the funds. The operating rate of return, adjusted for tax effect, is 
preferable to the return on owner's equity because it eliminates the 
effects of leverage.
4. The operating rate of return injects no variability into 
earnings per share that is not the result of the operations of the firm. 
This is a major advantage that this method offers over some of the other 
methods considered. Methods II-(b), III, and IV cause earnings per share
287
to vary inversely with the price of the common stock because they incor­
rectly employ the common stock price as a variable in the dilution com­
putation.
In addition to substantial conformity to the guidelines for 
computing fully diluted earnings per share, this method has the advantage 
of simplicity of calculation. All of the data necessary for the computa­
tion is readily available from the financial statements of the company 
and the warrant agreement.
The conclusion is that fully diluted earnings per share should 
be computed in accordance with the equations of Methods II-(a) or II-(b), 
except that the operating rate of return should be substituted for the 
rates specified in those equations. If, however, the warrant agreement 
specifies the use of proceeds, the appropriate rate of return is that 
which conforms to the terms of the agreement.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There is no one earnings-per-share figure appropriate for all 
investment decisions. As a minimum, two earnings-per-share figures 
should be reported for companies with warrants outstanding: (1) earn­
ings per average common share and (2) fully diluted earnings per share. 
Earnings per average common share has validity for decisions which are 
affected by actual shares outstanding, as, for example, dividend payout 
estimates. Earnings per average common share may also be a useful tool 
for evaluating stock prices in short-term investment decisions if the 
expiration date of outstanding warrants is not imminent. Earnings per 
average common share, when reported with fully diluted earnings per
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share, permits an investor to estimate the potential dilution in earnings 
per share that would occur if warrants were exercised. In addition, 
fully diluted earnings per share is appropriate for long-range stock 
evaluation purposes; i.e.. for periods which encompass the expiration 
date of the warrants.
The concept of a primary earnings per share which includes essen­
tially the same number of common stock equivalents for dilutive warrants 
as is included in fully diluted earnings per share is rejected. The in­
clusion of the dilutive effect of warrants in both earnings-per-share 
figures prevents the investor from estimating the amount of dilution. 
Further, the common stock equivalents used in computing primary earnings 
per share reflect neither the imminence nor likelihood of the ultimate 
exercise of warrants.
One reason for the Accounting Principles Board's adoption of 
primary earnings per share rather than earnings per average common share 
was the fear that the financial reporting services, because of space 
limitations, would publish only one earnings-per-share figure. Thus 
earnings per average common share, which reflects no potential dilution, 
would have been emphasized to the detriment of fully diluted earnings 
per share. Experience subsequent to the publication of APB Opinion No.
15 has shown this argument to be without merit. Most financial re­
porting services do publish both earnings-per-share-figures.
Once the decision is made that the dilutive effect of warrants 
should be reflected in fully diluted earnings per share, the problem of 
how to estimate the dilution arises. Various methods with differing 
assumptions and results complicate the problem. The purpose of this
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study is to formulate guidelines which can be used to select the appro­
priate method. These guidelines were formulated by relating the attri­
butes of earnings per share as used by investors to the characteristics 
of warrants. Briefly summarized, the guidelines are as follows:
1. The method selected should reflect the potential dilution
of warrants in fully diluted earnings per share from the date of issuance 
to the date of exercise or expiration of the warrants.
2. The method selected should reflect the best possible estimate 
of the actual dilution which will be incurred if the warrants are exer­
cised .
3. The method selected should incorporate a realistic estimate 
of the actual rate of return which will be earned on warrant proceeds. 
Dilution of earnings per share occurs only when the rate of return on 
warrant proceeds is exceeded by the cost of the warrant capital.
4. The method selected should not incorporate an estimated rate 
of return on warrant proceeds which causes variability in fully diluted 
earnings per share that is not the result of operating conditions ex­
perienced by the firm during each period.
None of the basic methods of computing fully diluted earnings 
per share of companies with warrants outstanding complies fully with 
these guidelines. Most of the methods fail to comply because they are 
based on variables external to the operations of the firm, such as com­
mon stock or warrant prices, which have no direct bearing on the actual 
amount of dilution which would be reflected in earnings per share if 
warrants were exercised. These variables, because of their high volatil­
ity, introduce an undesirable variability into fully diluted earnings
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per share that is unrelated to the operating conditions experienced by 
the firm in each period.
The method which most fully complies with the guidelines for com­
puting fully diluted earnings per share employs an operating rate of re­
turn which is derived from internal data of the firm. This method will 
reflect dilution in every period in which the cost of warrant capital 
exceeds the operating rate of return. The estimate of dilution which 
this method produces is reasonable because it utilizes the same vari­
ables that determine actual dilution when warrants are exercised. The 
actual rate of return earned on warrant proceeds may be impossible to 
determine because these proceeds usually become a part of the pool of 
assets used in the firm's operations. Under such circumstances, the 
operating rate of return must be considered a reliable estimator of the 
actual rate of return. An additional advantage of this method is that 
the operating rate of return will not introduce variability into fully 
diluted earnings per share that is unrelated to the operations of the 
firm.
The resulting fully diluted earnings-per-share figures provide 
interperiod and intercompany comparability. The conclusion is, there­




During the 1960's warrants to purchase common shares of the 
issuing corporation were frequently attached to debt and equity securi­
ties in order to facilitate the sale or exchange of these securities. 
These warrants presented a definite hazard to investors who purchased 
common shares of the issuing corporations because exercise of the war­
rants could result in a dilution of the corporations' book value, their 
earnings per share, and the market value of their shares as well as the 
voting power of the individual stockholders. In May, 1969 the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants adopted the treasury stock 
method of reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of warrants on 
earnings per share through the issuance of APB Opinion No. 15. The 
treasury stock method of computing the earnings per share of corporations 
with outstanding warrants makes the assumption that the corporation uses 
the funds obtained from the exercise of warrants to purchase treasury 
shares at the average price of the common shares during the period 
and/or at the current price of the shares at the end of the period. The 
Institute recognized that many corporations would not actually purchase 
treasury stock with warrant proceeds, but this method was adopted be­
cause it was a practical means of reflecting the potential dilution of 
warrants in earnings-per-share computations.
On a theoretical basis the treasury stock method has certain
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disadvantages. While the treasury stock method makes no specific assump­
tion about the rate of return earned on warrant proceeds, the use of 
this method results in an earnings rate on warrant proceeds which is 
less than the earnings-price ratio of the corporation. Such a rate is 
unrealistically low for corporations with high price-earnings ratios and 
perhaps overly optimistic for corporations with low price-earnings 
ratios. In addition, the treasury stock method causes the earnings per 
share of corporations with warrants outstanding to vary inversely with 
the price of the corporations' common stock.
The purpose of this study has been to evaluate, on a theoretical 
basis, several methods of reflecting the potential dilution of warrants 
in the earnings-per-share computations. The desirability of including 
the potentially dilutive effect of warrants in both primary and fully 
diluted earnings per share has also been considered. Guidelines for 
this evaluation of the earnings-per-share computations were developed 
through an analysis of: (1) the attributes of earnings per share that
investors perceive to be useful in the evaluation of common stocks, (2) 
the characteristics of warrants which might affect earnings per share, 
and (3) the problems encountered by the Accounting Principles Board in 
its promulgation of APB Opinion No. 15. The methodology for achieving 
these objectives included a survey of the accounting, finance, and in­
vestment literature related to warrants and earnings per share. The 
earnings-per-share files of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants were also examined. In addition, the characteristics of 
warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange between 1950 and 1972 were
analyzed. A summary of the results of these investigations and of the 
conclusions reached follows.
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ATTRIBUTES OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
Prior to World War I few common stocks were considered to be 
quality investments. Investment decisions with regard to common stocks 
were made on the basis of a balance sheet analysis. Very few corpora­
tions included complete income statements in their annual reports and 
the financial press did not report earnings per share.
The acceptance of common stocks as investments began in the 
1920's after the publication of E. L. Smith's study, Common Stocks as 
Long-Term Investments. Common stock valuation techniques shifted from 
an emphasis of the balance sheet to the income statement. More firms 
began publishing income statements, but generally these statements pro­
vided insufficient information for investment decision-making purposes. 
The financial services began publishing earnings-per-share statistics 
and investors, frustrated by inadequate accounting information, began 
to evaluate common stocks by estimating future earnings per share and 
applying an earnings multiple to the projected earnings.
The earnings-per-share statistics of the 1920's and 1930's were 
sometimes misleading because the method of calculation was not stan­
dardized. Accountants felt that common stock valuation techniques should 
not be based solely on earnings per share and refused to include earn­
ings per share in the financial statements. Accountants finally recom­
mended that earnings per share be included in the statement of income in 
December, 1966 with the publication of APB Opinion No. 9.
The earnings capitalization model developed in the 1920's con­
tinues to be the method most frequently used by practitioners today in 
the valuation of common stocks. The basic variable of this model is
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earnings per share. Future earnings per share is estimated and a price- 
earnings multiplier or capitalization rate is applied to the estimate. 
Earnings per share is also frequently used in present value models in 
that future dividends are often estimated by applying a dividend payout 
ratio to estimated earnings per share.
The attributes of earnings per share which are important to the 
earnings capitalization model are:
1. The absolute amount of earnings per share. Current or esti­
mated future earnings per share is one of the two inputs of the earnings 
capitalization model. The timing of the recognition of the potential 
dilution of warrants, as well as the estimate of the amount of potential 
dilution, affects this attribute.
2. The trend of earnings per share. The second variable in the 
earnings capitalization model, the earnings multiplier or capitalization 
rate, is influenced by the trend of earnings per share. Investors place 
a higher value on the earnings multiplier of companies which exhibit a 
high growth rate in earnings per share. The timing of the recognition 
of the potential dilution of warrants therefore affects the trend of 
earnings per share. The accuracy of the estimates of the potential di­
lution also affects the trend of earnings per share.
3. The variability of the trend of earnings per share. The earn­
ings multiplier or capitalization rate is also influenced by the vari­
ability of the trend of earnings per share. Investors place a higher 
multiple on earnings with a stable growth rate. Estimates of the 
potential earnings attributable to warrant proceeds should not, therefore, 
introduce variability into the trend of earnings per share.
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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WARRANTS
The characteristics of all warrants listed on the American Stock 
Exchange during the period from January 1, 1950 through December 31,
1971 were analyzed. The population selected consisted of 106 warrant 
issues (94 warrant series) by 90 companies. Fifty-six percent of the 
warrants were issued with other securities for the purpose of raising 
cash. Thirty percent were issued as part of the consideration for the 
securities of another corporation and 7 percent were issued in connection 
with reorganizations or recapitalizations. Four percent were issued as 
distributions to stockholders in addition to, or in lieu of, dividends.
Warrants do not appear to be used for the purpose of raising
future equity capital. Instead, warrants are attached to other securi­
ties for the purpose of facilitating the sale or exchange of the securi­
ties with which they are issued. Warrants increase the total value of 
the security package and reduce the cash flow for interest or dividends. 
When warrants are distributed to stockholders as dividends, the purpose 
appears to be that of establishing a market for the warrants in order to 
increase their value as a merger currency.
The following characteristics of the warrants that were analyzed 
in this study appear to be of importance in the formulation of earnings- 
per-share computational guidelines of companies with outstanding war­
rants :
1. Warrants do not constitute legal common equity. Consequently, 
warrantholders do not participate in corporate management or receive 
dividends. Earnings-per-share statistics used in the calculation of 
dividend payout ratios should, therefore, exclude the effect of warrants.
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2. Warrants are attached to other securities for the purpose of 
facilitating the sale or exchange of the securities rather than for the 
purpose of raising future equity capital. Management and current stock­
holders benefit through the sale or exchange of the securities on more 
favorable terms. These benefits are reflected in the financial state­
ments from the inception of the transaction. The potential cost of these 
benefits through the dilution of the stockholders' equity should also be 
reflected in the financial statements. The inclusion of an estimate of 
this potential dilution in earnings per share is a logical means of 
apprising stockholders of the potential detriment which might occur if 
the warrants are exercised.
3. Investors purchase warrants for the leverage they offer over 
the underlying common stock. As a consequence, warrants are generally 
exercised during a brief span of time immediately preceding their expira­
tion. Dilution of owner's equity and earnings per share, therefore, 
will usually not occur prior to the expiration date of the warrants.
4. Many warrant series expire with practically none of the war­
rants having been o«Kercised. In such situations, earnings-per-share 
calculations which include an estimate of the potential dilution caused 
by the exercise of warrants will result in the understatement of earn­
ings per share on a historical basis.
5. Warrants add more value to a security package when the ratio 
of the exercise price of the warrants to the market price of the under­
lying common stock on the date of issue is low. When this practice is 
followed, fewer warrants per unit of capital solicited can be offered.
On the other hand, the likelihood that the warrants will be exercised
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and cause dilution is increased because of the lower exercise price.
6. The potential dilution to earnings per share is increased 
when the ratio of the exercise price of the warrants to the price of the 
underlying stock on the date of issue is high because more warrants per 
unit of capital solicited must be offered. However, the probability of 
actual dilution is decreased because of the higher exercise price.
7. The relationship between the exercise price or the market 
price of the warrant and the market price of the underlying common stock 
has no effect on the number of warrants which will ultimately be exer­
cised except during a brief span of time immediately prior to the expira­
tion date of the warrants unless unusual circumstances intervene.
Methods of estimating the dilution to earnings per share based on these 
price relationships therefore have questionable validity.
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
The Accounting Principles Board developed the concept of residual 
securities in APB Opinion No. 9 in its first effort to resolve the prob­
lem of reporting the dilutive effect of convertible securities and options 
in earnings per share. A convertible security was residual if it derived 
a major portion of its value from its conversion rights. Securities 
which are classified as residual securities enter into the earnings-per- 
share computation. In addition, a supplementary pro forma earnings-per- 
share computation was recommended if outstanding convertible and option 
securities not classified as residual securities might result in the 
further dilution of earnings per share as computed under the residual 
concept. Practitioners, in their interpretation of the opinion, excluded
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warrants from the residual category. The result was a noticeable in­
crease in the use of warrants in order to avoid the detrimental effect 
on earnings per share.
The original intent of APB Opinion No. 15 was to provide more 
specific guidelines for the computation of earnings per share under the 
residual concept. However, a number of conflicts between practice and 
theory was encountered. The modifications necessary in order to make 
the residual concept operational resulted in a change of its name to the 
concept of common stock equivalents. The Accounting Principles Board 
encountered three principal areas of difficulty in its efforts to formu­
late guidelines for the computation of earnings per share when poten­
tially dilutive convertible and options securities were outstanding. 
These problem areas were: (1) the restatement of earnings per share for
changes in residual status, (2) anti-dilution, and (3) the use of funds 
from the assumed exercise of warrants.
The Board concluded that earnings per share should not be re­
stated for changes in residual status because of the basically histori­
cal nature of earnings-per-share statistics. The comparability of the 
statistics with respect to convertible securities was improved with the 
abandonment of the relative value test under the residual concept in 
favor of a yield test at date of issue under the concept of common stock 
equivalents. The problem of the comparability of earnings per share 
with respect to warrants remains, however, because of the adoption of 
the treasury stock method for computing the common stock equivalents 
attributable to warrants. Under the treasury stock method earnings per 
share varies inversely with the price of the underlying common stock.
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This problem was considered in the formulation of the guidelines for com­
puting earnings per share which were recommended by this study.
Under the residual concept securities classified as residual 
could result in an enhancement of earnings per share. This enhancement 
of earnings per share was opposed by the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion and by some members of the Accounting Principles Board so that under 
the concept of common stock equivalents, potentially dilutive securities 
were excluded from the computation if their inclusion would result in an 
increase in earnings per share or a decrease in net loss per share. The 
effect of this decision was to eliminate warrants, except under the 20 
percent limitation, from the earnings-per-share computation during 
periods when the exercise price of the warrants was above the related 
common stock price. This failure of the treasury stock method to provide 
an estimate of the potential dilution of earnings per share in every 
period during which warrants are outstanding was a factor which influ­
enced the recommendations of this study.
The Accounting Principles Board originally adopted the treasury 
stock method as a means of reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of 
warrants in earnings per share because of its simplicity of application. 
Subsequent modifications to the method complicated the calculations to 
the extent that simplicity of application is no longer an advantage.
More importantly, the treasury stock method indirectly attributes a rate 
of return to the proceeds assumed to have been received from the exer­
cise of the warrants that is always less than the earnings-price ratio of 
the company. Such a rate of return, in addition to introducing vari­
ability into earnings per share because of common stock price changes,
300
is unrealistic for companies with either very high or very low price- 
earnings ratios. This problem of an appropriate rate of return on 
warrant proceeds was also considered in the formulation of earnings-per- 
share computational guidelines.
CONCLUSIONS
The two basic conclusions of this study are:
1. A minimum of two earnings per share figures for those com­
panies having outstanding warrants should be provided to investors. 
Earnings per average common share should be based on the average shares 
outstanding during the period. Fully diluted earnings per share should 
include an estimate of the potential dilution of earnings per share 
which might occur if warrants were exercised.
2. The most appropriate method of reflecting the potentially 
dilutive effect of warrants in fully diluted earnings per share is the 
operating rate of return method, which assumes that warrant proceeds will 
earn at the current rate of return on assets. This conclusion was 
reached through an evaluation of various methods of computing the fully 
diluted earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding. The 
evaluation of these methods was based on the guidelines which were 
developed during the course of this study.
The reasons for these conclusions are discussed in the following 
sections.
Exclusion of the Dilutive 
Effect of Warrants from 
Earnings per Common Share
APB Opinion No. 15 requires that the potentially dilutive effect
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of warrants must be included in primary earnings per share as well as 
fully diluted earnings per share. This procedure should be rejected in 
favor of: (1) primary earnings per share based on legal common equity
and (2) fully diluted earnings per share which includes the potentially 
dilutive effect of warrants. This conclusion can be defended on the 
following basis:
1. By providing two earnings-per-share figures, one of which 
assumes no dilution, the other of which assumes full dilution, an in­
vestor is given a basis of comparison which permits him to determine 
the full extent of the dilution which might occur through the exercise 
of warrants. APB Opinion No. 15 denies an investor this information.
2. The life span of warrants is considerably longer than an 
investor's time horizon. Earnings-per-share computations that assume 
no dilution are an appropriate tool for investment decisions during 
periods prior to the expiration date of the warrants.
3. Many warrant issues do not result in the dilution of earn­
ings per share because they expire without exercise. Earnings per share 
computations that assume no dilution provide the investor with the 
appropriate information in such cases.
4. Dividend policy is best evaluated on the basis of earnings 
per share figures that assume no dilution because dividends are paid on 
the basis of legal capital.
5. The argument for including the dilutive effect of warrants 
in primary earnings per share because the financial reporting services, 
due to space limitations, would ignore fully diluted earnings per share 
has proved invalid. In fact, some corporate managements have emphasized
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the fully diluted figure because this figure results in a higher price- 
earnings ratio.
Recommended Method for
Including the Dilutive Effect 
of Warrants in Fully Diluted 
Earnings per Share
Guidelines for the evaluation of various methods of including an 
estimate of the dilutive effect of warrants in fully diluted earnings 
per share were formulated in this study. These guidelines were derived 
from: (1) the attributes of earnings per share which investors per­
ceive to be useful in making investment decisions about common stocks, 
(2) the characteristics of warrants which might have a bearing on the 
earnings-per-share computation, and (3) an analysis of the problems 
encountered by the Accounting Principles Board in the promulgation of 
APB Opinion No. 15.
The method selected for the computation of the fully diluted 
earnings per share of companies with outstanding warrants should:
1. reflect the potential dilution of warrants from the date of
issuance to the date of exercise or expiration,
2. provide the best possible estimate of the actual dilution
which will be incurred if the warrants are exercised,
3. incorporate a realistic estimate of the rate of return which 
will be earned on warrant proceeds,
4. and not introduce variability into fully diluted earnings
per share that is not the result of operating conditions experienced by 
the firm during each period.
These guidelines were used in the evaluation of various methods
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of reflecting an estimate of the dilutive effect of warrants in fully- 
diluted earnings per share. Three of these methods make the following 
assumptions with regard to earnings on warrant proceeds: (1) no
return on warrant proceeds, (2) a return selected from data independent 
of the corporation's rate of return, and (3) a return equivalent to the 
earnings-price ratio of the firm. Two other methods which were evalu­
ated make no direct assumptions about the rate of return earned on 
warrant proceeds. The treasury stock method provides an estimate of 
common stock equivalents based on the relationship of the exercise price 
of the warrants and the price of the underlying common stock. The 
Graham and Dodd method produces an estimate of common stock equivalents 
based on the relationship of the market price of the warrants and the
price of the underlying common stock.
Each of the above methods was rejected because of a lack of com­
pliance with one or more of the guidelines. The method which assumes no 
earnings on warrant proceeds produces excessive estimates of dilution 
because warrant proceeds could always be invested in income producing 
securities if more favorable company projects were not available. The 
method which most closely complies with the guidelines assumes an earn­
ings rate independent of the corporation's own rate of return. The 
effect of the assumption is that funds are invested in income producing 
securities. This method was rejected because it would result in vari­
ability which is unrelated to operations due to the volatility of the
external rate of return selected.
The earnings-price ratio, treasury stock, and Graham and Dodd 
methods failed to comply with the guidelines because these methods
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produce unrealistic estimates of the rates of returns on warrant proceeds 
and inject variability into fully diluted earnings per share which is 
unrelated to the operation of the firm. Each of these methods produces 
excessively high estimates of dilution for high price-earnings ratio 
companies. These methods cause variability of fully diluted earnings per 
share because of the volatility of the common stock prices on which they 
are based.
The basic cause of the lack of compliance of the above methods 
to the guidelines is the fact that most of the methods incorporate ex­
ternal data into the calculation of fully diluted earnings-per-share. 
Calculations based on this external data introduce variability into the 
earnings-per-share figures which is unrelated to the operating condi­
tions experienced by the firm during the period. This variability causes 
interperiod and intercompany comparisons of the earnings-per-share sta­
tistics to be misleading.
The preceding observations led to the conclusion that an internal 
rate of return should be applied to warrant proceeds in the calculation 
of fully diluted earnings per share. The dilution which will ultimately 
be reflected in earnings per share through the exercise of warrants is 
a function of the number of common shares outstanding prior to the exer­
cise of the warrants, the number of common shares issued through the 
exercise of the warrants, the rate of return on assets existing prior to 
the exercise of the warrants, and the rate of return earned on the war­
rant proceeds. Stated another way, dilution of earnings per share will 
result from the exercise of warrants if the cost of the capital provided 
by the exercise of the warrants (earnings per share of existing assets
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divided by the exercise price per share) exceeds the rate of return 
earned on the warrant proceeds. Thus, given the rate of return earned 
on warrant proceeds, the dilution to earnings per share caused by the 
exercise of warrants is easily calculated.
Warrant agreements, however, generally place no restrictions on 
the use of warrant proceeds. Consequently, funds received from the exer­
cise of warrants become a part of the pool of corporate assets which may 
be used for any legitimate corporate purpose. Under these circumstances, 
the appropriate rate of return on warrant proceeds is the average rate 
of return on assets before interest and taxes (the operating rate of 
return).
The operating rate of return, net of tax effect, produces results 
that conform closely to the guidelines for computing fully diluted earn­
ings per share. This conformity is shown in the following comparison:
1. An estimate of dilution will be reflected in every period in 
which the cost of the warrant capital exceeds the operating rate of re­
turn. No dilution will be reflected in those periods when the operating 
rate of return is greater than the cost of the warrant capital. No 
dilution should be reflected in these periods because the status of the 
relevant variables indicates that no dilution will be incurred when the 
warrants are actually exercised.
2. The amount of dilution estimated by this method is a reason­
able approximation of the actual dilution which will be incurred if the 
warrants are exercised because the estimation process utilizes the 
relevant variables which determine the actual dilution, if any, when 
warrants are exercised.
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3. The operating rate of return is an appropriate estimator of 
the actual rate of return which will be earned on warrant proceeds. Un­
less the warrant agreement requires that warrant proceeds be employed 
for a specific purpose, warrant proceeds are comingled with other cor­
porate funds and the determination of a specific rate applicable to the 
warrant proceeds becomes impossible.
4. The operating rate of return injects no variability into 
fully diluted earnings per share that is not the result of the opera­
tions of the firm.
In conclusion, fully diluted earnings per share which includes 
an estimate of the dilutive effect of warrants computed by the operating 
rate of return method will provide investors with an earnings-per-share 
statistic that is comparable over time and among companies. This 
statistic, in combination with earnings per common share, provides 
investors with meaningful information for making decisions related to 
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